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Decade III*
William T. Plumb, Jr.t
IV. Some Unresolved Federal Tax Collection Problems (continued)
C. Conflicts Between Federal and State (and Local) Governments
Although federal, state and local governments cooperate in the deter-
mination and collection of their taxes through exchange of tax infor-
mation,' reciprocal withholding of income tax,2 and other ways, they
often become bitter competitors when the fund available for collection
is inadequate to satisfy all their claims. A major part of the litigation
over the priorities of federal taxes has involved conflict with state and
local tax claims, since one who is delinquent in his federal taxes is
likely to default other tax obligations as well. In fact, the priorities
problem has sometimes been viewed as essentially a contest between
"those who sought to maintain the supremacy of the National Govern-
ment and those who were anxious to sustain undiminished power of
the states. ' 3
This is not as it should be. There may be legitimate differences of
opinion concerning the proper scope of the functions of each level
of government; but there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that the
functions actually performed by each are of vital importance to the
welfare of the nation, and that the nation has a stake in the financial
soundness of all levels of government.4 Whether we shall ever come to
* This article has been awarded the Federal Bar Association Annual Authorship
Award in the field of taxation. This is the third of three installments.-eds.
f Member of the D.C. Bar. A.B. 1936, University of Rochester; LL.B. 1939, Cornell
University.
1. INT. RTv. CODE of 1954, § 6103(b). Some 41 States and the District of Columbia have
entered into agreements with the Internal Revenue Service for the cooperative exchange
of information on taxpayers.
2. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade 1t, 77 YALt
L.J. 605, 610 nn.35-37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Second Installment].
3. Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes,
95 U. PA. L. REv. 739 (1947), citing Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929),
in which the Court reviewed a century of such conflict. In United States v. Vermont, 317
F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1963), afl'd, 377 U.S. 351 (1964), the Government argued, "(i]n the
collection of its revenue the Federal Government must necessarily have supremacy over
the states (and the numerous local tax authorities deriving their power from those states)."
4. In another, but not unrelated, connection, it has been well said that "the Committee
[on Payments in Lieu of Taxes and Shared Revenues] proceeded from the compelling
need to maintain robust local government. This is not merely in the sole interest of local
1104
Federal Liens and Priorities
the actual sharing of revenues, efficiently collected by the federal gov-
ernment on behalf of the states, may be problematical because of fears
of federal control over state expenditures. But no such problem im-
pedes the adoption of rules for the fair and equitable distribution of a
delinquent taxpayer's assets, which would remove a recurrent source of
friction in sensitive intergovernmental relationships. And, as the
Supreme Court conceded at the conclusion of an opinion sustaining
federal priority, "nor would the Federal Treasury have been rendered
bankrupt by a contrary result."5
1. Revision of the Rules of Intergovernmental Priority
A long-standing irritant in the relations between federal and state-
local tax administrators was the federal government's argument for a
double standard of "choateness" for their respective tax liens.0 Although
the federal tax lien arises and becomes a "choate" lien on all property
and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer as soon as the tax is
assessed,7 the Government contended that a competing state or local tax
lien was not "choate" until it was made specific by seizure under levy,
transferring title or possession of particular property.8 It was not
Congress but the Supreme Court, in United States v. Vermont,0 that
finally repudiated that double standard and upheld the priority of an
antecedent general lien for state withholding taxes which the state
law, in terms tracking the federal statute, impressed at the time of
assessment upon all the taxpayer's property. Thus, while the conflict
between the federal and local governments was not eliminated,10 the
combatants were at least armed with equal weapons.
In Vermont the state was armed with a lien that not only had
attached to the property but also had been filed and perfected even
communities. The States and the Nation share in the general interest to maintain finan-
cially sound local governments .... The interest of the Federal Government in main.
taining its financial strength mirrors the vital interest which citizens of local governments
have in the same subject. The situation ...is one calling for balanced judgment and
reasonableness." COzSnssION ON INTERGO ETNmE.NT-AL RELATIONS, A STuDY COmmIEE
REPORT ON PAYIENrs IN LIEU OF TAXES AND Swam RE ENUES 5 (1955).
5. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 635 (1948).
6. See Plumb, The Priorities of Federal Taxes over State and Local Taxes, 12 ,NATL
TAx J. 204, 205 (1959).
7. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 US. 81, 84 (1954).
8. The Government relied on United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 61 (1953),
which had imposed such requirement with respect to the federal insolvency priority.
See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE 1-J. 2-8,
pt. H.A (1967) [hereinafter cited as First Installment].
9. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
10. As would occur under the "pooling" alternative, considered in Section 2 of Part
IV.C infra.
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against bona fide purchasers before the federal tax lien arose by assess-
ment." The Supreme Court did not even mention that fact, however,
and filing was quite clearly not considered a prerequisite to the state's
priority over the federal tax.12 Similarly, the federal tax lien need not
be perfected by filing in order to prevail over state and local tax liens
attaching after the federal tax is assessed.'3 It has sometimes been urged
that state and local tax liens should be added to the categories which
are protected against unfiled federal tax liens-which, if competitive
equality is to be maintained, would require protection for federal tax
liens against unfiled state or local liens. The American Bar Association
recommended against imposing such requirements, on the premise that
neither of the taxing authorities extends credit in reliance upon the
taxpayer's apparent freedom from liens.14 Congress, however, has taken
the opposite tack in requiring that purchasers, secured lenders, and
mechanics' lienors perfect their interests in order to prevail against the
federal lien, apparently on the premise that the tax collector becomes
a "reliance" creditor when he has to decide what collection action to
take.'5 On that premise, a reciprocal provision that federal, state, and
local taxes take priority from the time they are perfected in some
manner might be appropriate.16
A further feature of certain state and local tax liens may prejudice
these in competition with federal tax liens. If a state, for whatever
reasons, chooses to provide for the enforcement of its tax liens by
judicial process, the liens may be held not to be "choate" until such
process is invoked, even though state law purports to make the tax a
lien on all property from an earlier date.17 It is true that federal tax
11. See United States v. Vermont, 317 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir. 1963).
12. Perfection of a competing lien as against bona fide purchasers has sometimes been
regarded as an element of "choateness." United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 1957).
13. United States v. City of New Britain, 847 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. City of
New York, 182 F. Supp. 779, 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1956). Even
if state law gives the state or local tax lien the force of a judgment, that does not make It
a "judgment lien" against which the federal lien would be invalid without filing. United
States v. Gilbert Associates, 845 U.S. 861, 868-65 (1953); Treas. Reg. § 801.6323-l (a)(2)(i)(b)
(1956).
14. 84 A.B.A. REP. 707 (1959). See Plumb, supra note 6, at 210-11.
15. See Second Installment, 658 n.329, 673 n.409, 678 n.429.
16. In this respect, a state or local tax which is enforceable without obtaining judg.
ment is comparable to a judgment, whether or not so labeled. See note 13 supra, United
States v. Vermont, 877 U.S. 351, 858-59 (1964). It should not be necessary for the state or
local authorities to go through the otherwise needless formality of obtaining a "judgment
in a court of record" in order to permit them to rely on their debtor's apparent assets In
the same manner that a judgment lienor or the federal tax collector may do.
17. In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965); Ersa Inc. V,
Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956). While those cases may be explained as turning on an
adverse interpretation of the state law by a state court, it is nevertheless true that the
1106
Vol. 77: 1104, 1968
Federal Liens and Priorities
liens are summarily enforceable without need to resort to the courts.
But equality, not identity, is the goal to be sought, and the manner
provided for enforcement of a lien is no proper part of the test of its
priority.' The American Bar Association proposal would have pro-
tected the Hen when it became effective against third parties (either
generally or subject to exceptions), without regard to the manner of
enforcement.19
So much for equality; what of superiority? It is not uncommon for
the states to make their taxes paramount liens on the taxpayer's prop-
erty, or to "relate back" their liens to a date prior to the time of actual
administrative determination of the amount of the liability, in either
case displacing earlier liens and encumbrances upon the property.O
So far as such rules reflect an exertion of naked sovereign power over
competing claimants, it should not be surprising that they are ineffec-
tive against the federal tax lien.2' In some circumstances, however, such
superiority of the state or local lien may be justified.
The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, accordingly, made a significant
concession to the priority of state and local claims by subordinating
federal tax liens even to after-arising liens for real property taxes, special
assessments, and certain charges for public services. Congress thus
recognized the superpriority which state laws almost universally pro-
need for judicial process for enforcement has generally been fatal to "choateness." In
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1964), the Court said:
Moreover, unlike those cases in which the Security Trust [340 U.S. 47 (1950)] rationale
was applied to subordinate liens on the ground that judgment had not been obtained
prior to the time the federal lien arose, it is as true of Vermont's Hen here as it was
of the federal [sic] lien in New Britain [347 U.S. 81 (1954)] that "[tjhe asessment is
given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due,
administrative officials may seize the debtors property to satisfy the debt [emphasis
added]."
18. In his dissenting opinion in Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362,
377-78 (1946), ir. Justice Reed said:
I deem the recorded notice as the incident that consummates the lien upon the
specific and ascertainable property. The enforcement proceedings after that recorda-
tion are only an enforcement of a lien already fixed upon the specific property
adequately described in the recorded notice.
19. 84 A.B.A. RE'. 686, 692, 701, 707 (1959).
20. 4 AssaxucAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.1061 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). If a quotation
from Plumb, supra note 6, at 208, may be pardoned:
When we criticize the strong-arm priorities of the federal government we must not
forget that the States have led the way in granting themselves priority over the
antecedent interests of third parties, and we should not be surprised that, when the
play is rough, the bigger boy takes the marbles.
21. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); Unittd States v. First Nat'I
Bank 9- Trust Co., 386 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1967); City of Dallas v. United States. 369 F.2d
645 (5th Cir. 1966); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33, 8.3-9
(2d Cir. 1958); see Plumb, supra note 6, at 208, 211.
22. INM. RV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(6). This had been recommended, with respect
to real property taxes and special assessments, by the American Bar Association. 84 A.B.A.
RaP. 691, 720 (1959).
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vide for such obligations on the theory that they reflect benefits con-
ferred by the state or local government upon the specific property
taxed and subjected to the lien. A real property tax is imposed upon
the entire property, regardless of the number and nature of the
interests into which it may be divided (although it is in fact borne
by the equity owner or, if his equity is insufficient, by the most junior
of the lienors); a special assessment reflects improvements theoretically
enhancing the value of the property and thus benefiting the pre-exist-
ing liens.23
Further study might lead to the conclusion that additional super-
priorities may deserve federal recognition. It is doubtful that this will
be the case with personal property taxes, which seem more appro-
priately to be regarded as "personal" levies, rather than as impositions
in rem upon the specific assets which measure the tax.24
The most likely area where such a superpriority may be justified
relates to sales, gasoline, and other taxes collected from the consumer,
as well as withholding taxes. In theory, the collecting agent should set
such taxes aside in trust for the state or local government. As a prac-
tical matter, if delinquency occurs there is frequently no trust fund
that can be traced,25 and the taxing power will be dependent upon its
lien. If a federal tax lien exists before the state or local tax is collected
from the public or withheld from the employees, or before the formal
assessment of the liability, the Federal Government will profit from the
resulting enhancement of the net assets of the collecting agent. It would
be more equitable to recognize a superpriority for that type of liability
as a sort of rough-hewn substitute for tracing the actual collections as
trust funds into the specific accounts that were enhanced thereby.2-0 But
however supportable that view may be as applied to current working
23. The justification is not so readily discernible in the case of water and other
service charges, which were a late addition to the bill. It is also not clear why the federal
government, as junior lienor, should consent to bear the entire burden of property taxes
the superpriority of which is justified on the theory of benefit to all interests in the
property. The Special Committee on Federal Liens originally considered recommending
that the federal lien be charged only with its pro rata share of the burden of after.
assessed property taxes. 83 A.B.A. REP. 507, 528 (1958). That limitation was ultimately
abandoned in the interest of simplicity and the avoidance of circular priorities injurious
to mortgagees.
24. Plumb, supra note 6, at 213. Congress, in consenting to taxation of federal prop.
erty or to the priority of property taxes, has rarely included personal property taxes in
the scope of the consent, although it did so with respect to the security for Small Business
Administration loans. See First Installment, 290 n.383 (1967).
25. Cf. First Installment, 275-76 nn.295-303. An actually identifiable trust fund would
be protected against federal liens. Cf. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
26. Plumb, supra note 6, at 213. Equality should be provided, of course, where the
federal claim too relates to collected or withheld taxes.
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capital, from which it may be argued that the collecting agent would
have expended his own funds before invading the trust,- it seems to
break down when the superpriority is extended to plant and equipment
to which federal tax liens had previously attached.28
This may be an area where cooperative effort of the kind that, in the
private sector, produced the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 could result
in some further accommodations. Actually, private mortgagees have as
great a stake in obtaining federal iecognition of such superpriorities as
the states and municipalities themselves. Except in the unlikely event
that the delinquent's property is othenise unencumbered, a state or
local government, when armed with a state law superpriority (lacking
federal recognition), can satisfy its claims, at least in part, at the ex-
pense of the holder of a prior security interest or judgment lien under
the circular priority principle. 9 Private creditors, therefore, are the
primary beneficiaries of federal recognition of such state and local
superpriorities and should share the burden of justifying additional
cases. Such relief should be justified, however, on the merits of the tax
claim; any appeal for relief based merely on the inequity which the
non-federally-recognized superpriority causes to the mortgagee is more
properly addressed to the state legislatures.30
So much for superiority; what of inferiority? The really serious cause
for state and local discontent with federal priorities relates to the situa-
tion arising when a taxpayer dies insolvent, makes an assignment for
creditors, or suffers a receivership or a reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. In that event, the ancient and unreformed absolute
priority of the Federal Government, discussed at length in Part II.A in
the First Installment, becomes operative. An antecedent state or local
tax lien that was "choate" in every sense required for perfection against
later federal tax liens (and even against bona fide purchasers) will then
be subordinated not only to federal taxes but to all federal claims,
27. 5 A. Scowt, TRUSTS § 517 (3d ed. 1967).
28. E.g., the gasoline tax lien involved in United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 484
n3 (1941), which was "first and prior to any and all other existing liens, upon all of the
property of any distributor, devoted to or used in his business as a distributor, which
property shall include refinery, blending plants, storage tanks, warehouses, office buildings
and equipment, tank trucks or other motor vehicles, and any other property devoted to
such use, and each tract of land on which such refinery, blending plant, tanks or other
property is located, or which is used in carrying on such business."
29. See First Installment 231-32; Creedon, On Mortgage Foreclosures and Federal Tax
Liens, 18 Bus. LAw. 117 (1963).
90. Plumb, supra note 6, at 211. An intermediate position that might have some
equitable appeal to a state court, in the absence of a change in the law, is outlined in
Creedon, supra note 29, at 1147-48 (1963).
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secured or unsecured by lien.3t Even a real property tax lien, despite
some lower court authority to the contrary, may be vulnerable in
insolvency.32 Enactment of the reform of the insolvency priority pro-
posed by the American Bar Association (whereby lien priorities would
be recognized and unsecured federal, state and local taxes would stand
on a parity, ahead of federal non-tax claims, as in bankruptcy) would
do much to promote intergovernmental harmony.8 3
2. The "Pooling" Alternative
In 1957 the National Association of Tax Administrators (NATA)
presented to the Congressional staff two alternative proposals for
achieving greater equity in cases involving conflicting federal, state and
local tax claims. The second alternative was to apply the same rules of
"choateness" to the claims of all taxing authorities, The substantial
achievement of that objective by Supreme Court decision, except in
the area of insolvency, appears to have stilled the clamor for the first
alternative, which to me has the greater appeal.
The first alternative, rather than arming the combatants with equal
weapons, would have seated them at the conference table in true
equality, by pooling all assets available for federal, state and local tax
claims, on the basis of the priorities of any such governments over
private claims, and dividing such assets pro rata among the govern.
ments concerned. Congress has already moved in that direction, by
providing for proportionate sharing among tax claims in bankruptcy,
in the absence of valid liens. The NATA proposal would go a step
further and call upon the several governments, as between themselves,
to surrender the advantages of pre-existing liens,34 and to share the
benefits thereof with each other, not only when the taxpayer's assets
are administered in bankruptcy or insolvency but also whenever a tax
lien is enforced on property on which another taxing authority has a
lien.35 In order to preclude a race to gain an advantage, it seems that
31. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 'U.S. 361 (1953); Illinois ex tel. Gordol v.
Campbell, 829 U.S. 362 (1946). See United States v. Vermont, 877 U.S. 851 (1964).
82. See First Installment, 234-55 nn-52-53.
33. 84 A.B.A. REP. 732, 734 (1959). See First Installment, 251 n.152. 253 n.167.
34. Whether special exceptions should be made for property taxes or for collected
and withheld taxes, see notes 22-23, 25-26 supra, would be a question of policy. Special
assessments should in any event be separately treated, as under INT. REv. CoDo of 1954,
§ 6323(b)(6)(B).
55. This is analogous to the provision permitting a bankruptcy trustee to pregcrve
invalidated liens and preferences for the benefit of the entire body of creditors, 11 US.C.
§§ 96(b), 107(b)(2), except that only the taxing authorities would share the benefit.
Administrative procedure could be developed for such sharing where a lien is enforced
without judicial action.
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preferential payments received at a time when the taxpayer is unable
to pay all his tax liabilities should be contributed to the pool.
The premise of that proposal is that all tax claims are equally meri-
torious, and that possession of a prior lien signifies only that the
holder has permitted its claim to go delinquent for a longer period of
time.3 6 Governments "second in time" are not voluntary creditors
and cannot be accused of having unwisely extended credit without
regard for prior liens. During the sometimes extended period that the
holder of a prior lien permits the delinquent taxpayer to operate and
attempt to pay off his taxes, the taxpayer enjoys the benefit of the
services of all three levels of government, each of which contributes
in some degree to the earning of his income; yet only those govern-
ments holding the most stale claims may be satisfied: 7
Adoption of the proposal may have beneficial side effects. The exist-
ing priority system has no doubt encouraged the state legislatures, in
self-defense, to give superpriority to their tax claims, in order that
they may recoup from mortgagees and others under the circular priority
principle what they lose to the federal priority.38 While the proposal
would not, of itself, relieve those inequities, since superpriorities would
be preserved for the benefit of the common pool, there would be less
inducement to the states to enact or retain such provisions where they
cannot equitably be justified. Further, relief from competitive pressure
to gain priority over the rival government may make it more often
possible for the taxing authorities to be lenient with taxpayers who
may have a chance to work out of their difficulties if they are not
forced into liquidation or bankruptcy.
Since the proposal would require the state and local governments
to surrender part of the benefit of their prior liens, superpriorities,
and preferences, legislation would be necessary at the state as well as
the federal level.39 Congress could enact the legislation, to go into
effect in any state when reciprocal legislation was adopted by its legis-
lature.40
36. 3 IV. CoLim, BANFKuRcY 5 64.403 (1961); Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bantk-
ruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REV. 697, 729 (1955). Interest and penalties might .vell be excluded
in determining the ratio of division of the fund, if it is inadequate to satisfy the prindpal
of all claims.
37. Cf. Borock v. City of New York, 268 F.2d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 1959) (receivership opera-
tion).
38. See note 20 supra (Plumb quotation).
39. In some cases, there may be difficulties in bringing local governments into the pool.
40. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593 (1937). In the absence of state
legislation, the existing priority rules could be continued--or they might be toughened
up, as an "inducement" to adoption of the alternative system. If the Government correctly
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3. Unemployment Taxes
The interrelationship between federal and state unemployment taxes
gives rise to unique problems of priorities. The federal unemployment
tax was enacted, not as a means of raising federal revenue, but in order
to encourage and assist the states to establish tax-supported unemploy-
ment compensation systems. Payments by employers into approved
state systems may be applied as credits against, in general, 90 per cent
of the federal tax (or 81 per cent if the payment to the State is un-
timely).41 Yet payment to the state fund may be prevented if the federal
tax has priority, and the credit is not earned unless the state contri-
bution is actually paid. This can lead to some odd results.
Let us first take the situation of the financially embarrassed employer
who is unable to meet his unemployment tax obligations but whose
assets are not under administration. If the federal tax is the superior
lien (either because it happened to be assessed sooner than the state
liability or because the lien provided by state law lacks the essential
quality of "choateness"), 42 100 per cent of the federal tax may be
satisfied from the proceeds of sale of the employer's assets, with no
offsetting credit for the state tax, which remains unpaid. But if a single
dollar is left over (and is not absorbed by other prior claims), the
payment of that dollar to the state will entitle the employer to a federal
refund, which in turn may be applied on the state tax, and so on until
the entire line of dominoes has fallen and the employer has earned the
maximum 81 per cent credit for late payment,43 and the state has re-
ceived a large tax payment.
Now let us suppose that the employer dies insolvent, makes an
represented the situation when it argued in the Vermont case (as quoted in the Court of
Appeals opinion, 317 F.2d 446, 450) that "the Federal Government is not in a position
. . to match the timing of the innumerable state and local tax liabilities," the stafes
may need some such inducement to give up the advantage they have gained through the
Vermont decision.
41. In applying these percentages, the gross federal tax is taken to be three per cent,
although in fact it has for some years been higher. Additional credits, above actual pay.
ments to the State, are allowed under certain conditions. The maximum credit may be
reduced if the state fund is indebted to the federal fund. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954,
§§ 3302-03. For purposes of illustration, these variations will be ignored.
42. The unemployment tax in Pennsylvania, for example, does not give rise to a
"choate" lien until judicial process is invoked for its enforcement. Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley,
234 F.2d, 178 (3d Cir. 1956). Other States have liens which, while formerly held not to be
"choate," Consumers Power Co. v. Rubiner, 225 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Mich. 1963), would
appear to meet the standard established by United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351
(1964)-provided the State happened to be first to make its assessment.
43. Kush v. Convair, 58-2 US. Tax Cas. 9827 (N.D. Tex. 1958). See Massachusetts v,
United States, 333 U.S. 611, 624 (1948) (rejecting the applicability of that principle in an
insolvency case, which is next considered). See also Note, Priority and Effect of Liens on
Distribution of Insolvent Estates Between Federal and State Claims for Unpaid Taxes,
31 MIN. L. REv. 479, 484 (1947).
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assignment for creditors, suffers a receivership, or undergoes a Chapter
X reorganization. The federal insolvency priority statute,4 overriding
any prior lien that the State may have obtained,4 r then requires that
100 per cent of the federal unemployment tax (as well as all other
federal claims) must be paid before anything can be applied on state
unemployment contributions. 6 Furthermore, even if there is money
left over after paying priority claims so that all or part of the state
unemployment contributions can be paid out of the estate, no credit
will be allowed against the federal tax for such payment. Although the
tax law expressly allows partial credit for late payment, the Supreme
Court holds that such provision must yield to the insolvency priority
statute, which gives absolute, not conditional or defeasible, priority to
federal claims as they exist on the date when the priority attaches.
47
The four dissenting Justices, referring to the decision as an "unneces-
sarily ruthless interpretation of a statue that at best is an arbitrary
one," pointed out that it could result in the federal government taking
100 per cent of the tax and the state taking 90 per cent in addition, in
preference to general creditors48
Finally, let us consider the situation if the employer goes into bank-
ruptcy, and if neither the federal nor the state claim for unemployment
tax had previously become a "choate" lien." In such circumstances,
the two claims rank equally.0 But that does not mean they will be paid
proportionately. Rather, an algebraic formula must be resorted to,
since the amount available for the state's claim depends on the amount
allowed on other tax claims, including the federal unemployment tax
4 . REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875). 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964). See First Installment, pt IIA.
45. Ilinois ex rel Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) (involving a lien as
"choate" as that which was accorded priority, in the absence of insolvency, in United
States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964)).
46. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948); Illinois ex re. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8 (1946).
47. Massachusetts v. United States, 533 U.S. 611, 624-29 (1948). At that time, the
credit was wholly forfeited if the state tax was not paid by a certain date, whereas now
only 10 per cent of the credit is lost, no matter how late the pa)ment is made. However,
the assignee there had, at the risk of surcharge, paid the state tax within the time
allowed by Section 902(a) of the Social Security Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1399.
Therefore, the decision remains authoritative today, inasmuch as it was not the tax
law but the insolvency statute that prevented the allowance of the credit.
48. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 635, 638 (1948).
49. If the Government had a lien antedating bankruptcy and superior to the State's
lien (if any), the situation would be the same as outlined at p. 1112 supra. since lien
priorities are respected in bankruptcy. See Note, 31 MINN. L. Rxv. 479 (1947), supra
note 43.
50. Although state laws generally refer to unemployment "contributions" rather than
"taxes," it seems to be established that they rank as taxes in bankruptcy, under 11
U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1964). In re William Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846 (ad Cir. 19-11); cf.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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which, in turn, cannot be determined until the amount paid on the
state's claim is known.51 At times the result of applying the formula
will be that, the smaller the available fund, the greater the dollar share
(not merely the percentage) which the Federal Government will take.
The solution to these anomalies is not easily found. It is obvious that
merely putting state tax liens on a parity with federal tax liens and
giving state and federal claims equal rank in insolvency, as heretofore
proposed,52 would not resolve this problem, for such equality exists in
bankruptcy and a wrong result is reached nevertheless. The real trouble
lies, not in the various rules of priority, but in the concept that credit
is to be allowed only to the extent that the state tax is paid. That
concept is designed to assure that the amounts for which credit is
provided actually reach the state fund. But, when assets are insufficient,
it has the opposite effect of depriving the state fund of its share while
giving the Government more than it would be entitled to if assets were
sufficient, thereby penalizing the state fund for the employer's inability
to pay.53 The Government should be satisfied if it gets the net amount
to which it would be entitled if the full credit were allowed, and should
be content to let the state have whatever excess can be recovered.64 Or,
if the principle of parity is applicable (as it is in bankruptcy, and as
has been herein recommended for lien and insolvency situations as
well), it would be appropriate to divide the available fund in the pro-
portion which such net amount bears to the state tax.G5
The proper solution, therefore, should be to provide that whenever
the Federal Government has collected more than its proper share
(determined under one of the principles last stated), the excess shall
be treated as collected on behalf of, and shall be paid over to, the state
fund.56
51. The formula, which was approved in United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510,
518 (1942), was set out and explained by the trial court, sub nom. In re Independent
Automobile Forwarding Corp., 38 F. Supp. 976, 978 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Note, 31
MINN. L. REv. 479 (1947), supra note 43.
52. See Sections 1 and 2 of pt. IV.C. supra.
53. As well as, in one situation, Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1918),
penalizing general creditors by allowing what, in substance, is double proof.
54. The solution, however, is not to be found in treating the federal tax claim as if It
were only that net amount and regarding the rest as a state tax claim. For there would
be no assurance that the assets thus released would not be absorbed by other claims having
intermediate priority, leaving the state tax, for which credit had been allowed, unpaid.
See Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 632-33 (1948). By collecting the full
amount as a federal claim and then sharing the amount collected, that problem Is
avoided.
55. In either event, the net federal tax should be computed by allowing the full
credit, without reduction thereof for late payment, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, .,.302(§)(O),
since such reduction improperly penalizes the state for the employer's inabfility to pay.
See First Installment, 280-81 n.330.
56. The Special Committee on Federal Liens tentatively proposed such a solution, 83
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4. Taxes on Property Acquired by the United States at Tax Sales
In 1966, as we have seen, Congress subordinated the federal tax Hen
to liens for real property taxes and special assessments attaching to the
property between the time a federal tax lien arises and the time the
federal lien is enforced.5 If the United States then buys the property
at its own tax sales,58 however, the property is immunized from later
special assessments59 and is removed from the local property tax rolls
until it is redeemed by the taxpayer or is resold by the Government.O
That interval will in no event be less than 120 days 0l-a period which
may well embrace the date when one whole year's property taxes would
otherwise attach-and in exceptional cases may extend for many
years.
62
There is ample precedent for Congressional consent to nondiscrim-
inatory taxation of real property acquired through the enforcement of
debts arising in connection with federal loan and guarantee programs6
A.B.A. REP. 556, 539-40 (1958), but abandoned the proposal in its final report because it
lacked the time (and, frankly, the know-how) to resolve the drafting problems encountered,
which, however, should not be insoluble. The tentative proposal was framed as an
amendment to the insolvency priority statute, but the problem is a more general one
and the amendment really belongs in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3302. A technical amend-
ment of the bankruptcy law would be required, however, in order to prevent double
proof, by providing that state unemployment contributions shall rank as taxes only to
the extent that the state tax exceeds the allowable credit against the federal tax; and a
like provision would be needed in the insolvency priority statute if it is amended to put
federal and state tax claims on a parity.
A similar problem might conceivably arise if a decedent's estate, of sufficient net value
(over $100,000) to qualify for a credit against the federal estate tax for state death taxes
paid, becomes insolvent (as a result of shrinkage in value or otherwise) and is unable to
pay both the state and federal taxes. Cf. In re Levy's Estate, 70 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Surr. Ct.
1947), which antedates Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948), and thus
applied a more sensible solution. See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems,
13 TAx L. Rav. 459, 519 (1958). The situation would probably arise too rarely to warrant
legislative attention.
57. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(6).
58. Id. § 6335(c)(1).
59. Cf. Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933); Board of Direc-
tors of Red River Levee Dist. No. 1 v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 170 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.
1948).
60. In Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886), it was held that property taxes
accruing during the period allowed for redemption, as well as while the United States
held tile, were invalid and that liens therefor could not be enforced against the property
in the hands of later private owners.
61. Treas. Reg. § 301.7506-1(b)(1) (1957) directs that realty be retained for at least
one year after it is purchased by the United States as a tax sale, but that period may be
shortened when the regulations are conformed to the 1966 amendment of lxr. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 6337(b), reducing the redemption period from one year to 120 days.
62. E.g., United States v. City of New York, 233 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1956) (federal lien
arose in 1933, sale to United States in 1942, title of United States quieted in 19A6); Cobb
v. United States, 172 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (federal lien arose in 1931, sale to United
States in 1935, tide of United States quieted in 1949). There were newspaper reports in
1958 of an attempt by the District of Columbia to tax property which the United States
had held off the local tax rolls-and leased to the original owner-for more than 21 )ear.
63. See First Installment, 290 n.386.
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-functions which are no less "governmental" than taxation itself.0 4
The criteria for such consent which were recommended in a study by
the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations are met-the prop-
erty is acquired as a result of a debt to the Government, is temporarily
held, and ordinarily continues to be devoted to a use comparable to
privately owned property. 0 The property enjoys the benefits of the
services of local government, or is enhanced by the improvement for
which a special assessment is levied, just as surely during the period
of federal ownership as in the period when the property was merely
subject to lien. The injury to state or local government from loss of
tax revenues may be greater, because there is here no chance to recoup
from a mortgagee under the circular priority principle.10 Congress
should, therefore, consider consenting to the taxation of such prop-
erty.67
64. Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
65. COMMsISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A STUDy CoMNiTra . Re v'onT ON
PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES AND SHARE REVENUES 4, 30, 57-58 (1955).
66. See First Installment, 231-32.
67. A draft submitted to, but not acted upon by, the Special Committee on Federal
Liens would amend INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7506, relating to administration of real
estate acquired by the United States, by adding a new subsection, as follows:
(e) Property Taxation.-Real estate acquired by the United States as provided in
this section, while held pending disposition and until put to permanent use by the
United States, may be subjected to State and local property taxes to the same extent
and in the same manner according to its value as if it were privately owned, and any
such tax shall be based upon an assessed valuation which does not represent a larger
percentage of true value than is used by assessing authorities in valuing properties
generally for tax purposes within the taxing jurisdiction; provided, that any special
tax treatment accorded to other similar property shall be applied to such property
held by the United States. Such real estate may also be subjected to special assessments
imposed by any taxing authority directly upon such real estate to defray the cost of
any public improvement, in the same manner as against real estate privately owned
in such jurisdiction; provided, that in the undertaking of any such public improve-
ment project the United States shall have the same rights and privileges in approving,
rejecting or contesting such project or assessment as are accorded to owners of private
property. Such property taxes and special assessments shall be paid only from the
proceeds of resale of such real estate, except that, if the property is not sold but Is
converted to permanent use by the United States, payment of taxes and special
assessments incurred before such conversion shall be made from funds appropriated
for the acquisition of property so used. The United States shall not be subject to
penalties or penalty interest nor shall its property be subject to any lien, foreclosure
or other proceedings because of its nonpayment or failure to make timely payment
of such taxes or special assessments, nor shall subsequent owners be liable therefor,
provided, that this shall not preclude the payment of interest charged on special
assessments paid in installments over a period authorized by State or local law, In
the event that State constitutions or statutes prohibit the taxation of federally-owned
property, the Secretary or his delegate shall make payment in lieu of taxes or special
assessments in the amounts and at the times when such levies would otherwise be
payable hereunder if such prohibition did not exist. After any real estate acquired
as provided in this section is put to permanent use by the United States, its status
with respect to property taxation and special assessments shall be governed by other
provisions of law applicable to property so used.
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D. Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
Federal estate and gift taxes may be, and usually are, assessed and
collected in the same manner as other federal taxes, the executorc or
the donor being the person against whom the tax is assessed and from
whom payment is expected. 9 If the assessment is not paid on demand,
a general federal tax lien arises against property of the estate (as an
entity) or of the donor. In the case of these two taxes, however, those
collection principles of general application are supplemented by
provisions imposing personal liability for the tax on certain third
parties and creating special liens on property transferred by the dece-
dent or by the donor.70
In this area the Special Committee on Federal Liens largely confined
itself to recommending changes (which in substance were adopted by
Congress) to conform the priorities of the special liens for estate and
gift taxes to those which it was recommending with respect to the
general tax lien.7' The Special Committee took note, however, of the
possibility that "the Government's protection is unnecessarily broad
and unnecessarily disturbing to titles in light of the fact that the Gov-
ernment has other remedies available for collection of the estate and
the gift tax," and commended the matter to the attention of the inter-
ested Sections of the American Bar Association for further study.
72
1. Personal Liability
The estate tax may be collected from property of the probate estate,73
if that is still in existence when the assessment is made. If the estate has
been distributed, "transferee" liability may be imposed upon the dis-
tributees.74 The executor also may be held individually responsible for
the tax, unless he took the precaution of obtaining from the federal
68. In this discussion, the term "executor" is used to include an administrator or,
if there is neither, "any person in actual or constructive posession of any property of
the decedent." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2203.
69. Ir. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2002, 2502(d).
70. Imr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324.
71. 84 A.B.A. REP. 693-95, 721-23 (1959).
72. 84 A.B.A. REP. 669-71 (1959).
73. For convenience of reference, the term "probate estate" will sometimes be used
herein to embrace realty passing directly to heirs or devisees, without going through
probate, and the term "distributee" will include such heirs and devisces.
74. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6901(a)(1)(ii). The usual procedure for determination of
a tax deficiency is followed, leading to an assessment which, if not paid on demand,
becomes a general lien on all property of the distributee. Id. § 6321. Without need for
assessment of the transferee liability, the special lien for estate tax attades to the specific
property received but, as we shall see, the effects of the two liens on third parties' rights
are different. Section 2 of pt. IV.D infra.
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tax collector a discharge of his personal liabilityY. Despite the avail-
ability of those remedies, however, whenever the estate tax is not paid
when due, personal liability therefor may also be enforced against
"the spouse, transferee, trustee .... surviving tenant, person in posses-
sion of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise or release
of a power of appointment, or beneficiary who receives, or has on the
date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross estate
under Sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at
the time of the decedent's death, of such property."7 0 The quoted
language is a marvel of concise drafting; but conciseness, like extrem-
ism, is a virtue only when it reaches defensible results. Here, in some
circumstances, the formulation results in burdens on the wrong persons,
which might be avoided if the law gave more individualized attention
to the cases covered by the provision.
The sequence of terms used parallels the provisions of Sections 2034
to 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code, and they are interpreted in the
light thereof.77 Thus, since the term "beneficiary" comes at the end
of the sequence, paralleling the position of Section 2042 (which sub-
jects certain life insurance proceeds to estate tax), it is held that the
term refers to a life insurance beneficiary and not a beneficiary of an
inter vivos trust. Therefore, if an inter vivos trust is included in the
gross estate (under §§ 2035, 2036, 2037, or 2038), the person held liable
is not the beneficiary but the trustee, whose position in the sequence of
statutory terms corresponds to the position of those sections in the
series. It makes sense to hold the trustee rather than the beneficiary if
the trust remains undistributed at the time the estate tax liability is
determined, for the trustee then has funds in his hands from which to
indemnify himself, while the beneficiary who has no right to present
possession of the funds and perhaps has a terminable interest therein
might be hard put to raise the money to meet a personal liability equal
to the actuarial value of his interest.78 Yet the same principle has been
75. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2204. The discharge of the executor by the probate court
will not, by itself, protect him, if he does not get clearance from the federal tax collector.
The executor's personal liability, in the absence of a discharge, is limited to the amount
of property which had passed through his hands. Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1958). It may
be determined and assessed in the same manner as a tax deficiency. INT. R v. CoeE or
1954 § 6901(a)(1)(B). See generally W. PLUmB & L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LitNS 267-69
(1967) [hereinafter cited as PLUMB & WRIGHT].
76. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a)(2). The surviving spouse may incur such personal
liability, even though, by reason of the marital deduction, none of the tax was actually
attributable to property she held or received (e.g., as joint tenant or insurance beneficiary).
Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 316 (9th Cir. 1962).
77. See PLUMB 9- WRIGHT 269-72.
78. Higley v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1934).
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applied, with much less justification, to hold the trustee personally
liable when he has already innocently distributed the trust corpus to
the beneficiary 9-who himself continues free of personal liability.81
As a result, the trustee of an inter vivos trust which terminates at
or after the grantor's death cannot distribute such property with any
assurance that he will not later be subjected to personal liability, up to
the full amount that had been in the trust, for an estate tax deficiency
arising, perhaps, not out of the transfer in trust, but out of other
transactions of the decedent of which the trustee may have had no
knowledge or means of knowledge. It is anomalous that the executor
of the decedent's estate can free himself of personal liability by obtain-
ing a discharge, thereby permitting dosing of the estate within a
reasonable time,"' but there is no comparable provision for a trustee.8 2
It is true that one court has held the Government estopped to assert
personal liability against a trustee who had made distribution in reli-
ance upon the initial (but not conclusive) finding of the tax collector
that no additional tax was payable.83 But estoppel against the Gov-
ernment is grudgingly granted by most courts,8 4 and is a slender reed
to rely upon, particularly where, as here, the reasonableness of the
trustee's reliance upon a non-final determination may be subject to
question.
Some means should be provided, therefore, whereby a trustee may
safely distribute the corpus at the time prescribed for such distribution
or within a reasonable period thereafter. One solution would be to
relieve the trustee automatically if he properly makes distribution
without knowledge of an estate tax liability,8s thus leaving the Govern-
ment to pursue the distributee under its continuing lien on the former
trust assets or under a newly imposed personal liability. If Congress is
unwilling to go so far, it should at least provide for a discharge for the
trustee under the same conditions prescribed for the executor. A reason-
able middle ground, which would facilitate the timely dosing of trusts
that reach their termination date at or soon after the death of the
grantor, might be to discharge a trustee under the same conditions
79. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 32 T.C. 1017 (1959), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962). For the grounds of reversal.
see text accompanying note 83 infra.
80. Patrida B. Englert, 32 T.C. 1008 (1959).
81. See note 75 supra.
82. Rev. Rul. 57-423, 1957-2 Ctr.r. BuL.. 623.
83. Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 31 317 (9th Cir. 196l2.
84. See Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied against the
United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx L. REv. 487 (1964).
85. Cf. First Installment, 258-61.
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that particular property may be discharged from the estate tax lien-
i.e., if it appears to the District Director that the estate tax, although
not yet definitely determined, has been "fully provided for" through
property in the executor's hands and through the lien on the property
distributed to the trust beneficiaries (or such further security as may
be required).
8 6
The positions of an insurance beneficiary and the insurance company
holding the proceeds pursuant to a settlement option are the exact
reverse of those of a trust beneficiary and a trustee. Here, the personal
liability falls, not on the insurance company but on the beneficiary,
even though he cannot immediately reach the funds from which he
might meet the liability and even though his interest therein may be
terminable.8 7 The same grounds that dictate against imposing personal
liability on a trust beneficiary who has no present right to possessions
should lead Congress also to relieve the insurance beneficiary who is
similarly situated. It does not follow, however, that personal liability
should be imposed on the insurance company, even with the modifica-
tions above proposed with respect to trustees. The insurance company
has no fiduciary obligation to the beneficiary and should not be
required or relied upon to litigate the merits of the estate tax in a
proceeding to determine its personal liability."" It should suffice that
the Government may enforce its lien on the insurance proceeds while
they are held by the company, in a proceeding in which the real party
in interest would be joined, letting the company stand neutral. Per-
sonal liability might still be imposed on the beneficiary, but only after
distribution.
In the case of the gift tax, the positions of the trustee and trust
beneficiary are apparently the opposite of those they occupy with
respect to the estate tax. Although the gift tax is primarily the obliga-
tion of the donor, the "donee" of any gift made by the donor during
the calendar year is also made personally liable if the donor does not
pay the gift tax when due.90 Because the Supreme Court has held, for
86. Such a discharge of property from the lien may, on a proper showing, be granted
before audit, Treas. Reg. § 301.6325-1(c)(2) (1955), although the wide margin for dif-
ferences of opinion on valuations and other factors affecting estate tax liability make It
difficult to obtain at that stage, in actual practice.
87. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 128 F.2d 745 (D.C. Ctr 1912);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 19 T.C. 264 (1952). See Brafman v. United States, 381 F.2d 823
(5th Cir. 1967).
88. See p. 1118 supra.
89. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 128 F.2d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
90. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6324(b). The donee is liable, to the extent of the full
value of the gift, even if his particular gift was not taxable or was fully tax-paid. LaFortune
v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958).
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an entirely different purpose, that the beneficiary, not the trustee, is
the "donee" of a gift in trust,91 the lower courts generally make the
beneficiary personally liable for the gift tax, although he cannot reach
and may never receive the trust fund.02 That inequity should be cor-
rected, by imposing personal liability only when and if the beneficiary
comes into possession.
It may be noted that holding the beneficiary to be the "donee" for
this purpose has not resulted in relieving the trustee. Not only does
the special gift tax lien attach to the property in his hands, but he is
subjected to another form of personal liability as a "fiduciary" for the
donee.93 There is an important difference, however, between personal
liability as "donee" and liability as "fiduciary." Since the latter liability
is incurred in a representative capacity, it is limited to property in the
trustee's hands as a fiduciary when the liability is enforced, and ends
when the trustee gives notice that the fiduciary relationship has termi-
nated. Thus, the problems encountered in the case of the trustee's
personal liability for the estate tax94 do not arise here. Nevertheless,
because one appellate court has suggested that a trustee may after all
be personally liable for the gift tax as donee," clarification is desirable,
either to confine the trustee's liability strictly to his fiduciary capacity
or, if he is to be made liable as donee, to provide a procedure to
discharge the liability upon distribution of the trust.
2. Lien Priorities
In addition to imposing personal liability for estate and gift taxes
upon designated third parties, the law provides special liens for such
taxes, which arise without any governmental action at the moment of
the death or of the gift, before the tax liability is or can be determined,
91. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941), involving the exclusion from tax of
the first q5,000 (now $3,000) of gifts by the donor "to any person." lxr. REV. Com: of 1954,
§ 2505(b).
92. Alma l. Myer, 2 T.C. 291 (1943), afJ'd, 149 F.2d 6-42 (8th Cir. 1945) (beneficiary
was entitled to income only in trustee's discretion, and could not reach corpus until age
30). See Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 711 (1944). In Charles A. E. Goodhart, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. (13279[i]) 2G7, 270
(1943), it was stated that even a contingent remaindernan of a trust could incir personal
liability as a "donee," but in the particular case the contingency was held so remote that
the value of the interest could not be ascertained. Happily, the court did not move
from that premise to the conclusion that the contingent remainderman, having failed the
burden of proving the valuation which sets the outer limit of the donee's liability, was
liable for the gift tax without limitationl See also Fidelity Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141
F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1944).
93. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6903; Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 86
(7th Cir. 1944).
94. See pp. 1118-20 supra.
95. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 19-44).
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and which continue for ten years unless the tax is paid in full or be-
comes barred by lapse of time. 8 Although the special liens arise sooner
and may terminate sooner than the general liens covering assessments
of the same tax liabilities, the liens will co-exist during the major part
of their life spans, and the tax collector may rely on whichever lien
applies or is in a stronger position in the particular circumstances.97
The special estate tax lien attaches to all property includable in the
decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes.9 8 The lien is not confined
to property passing through the probate estate and subject to the
decedent's debts but embraces interests which he had created inter
vivos in third parties, if for any reason such interests are includable in
his gross estate.P9 Although paralleling the personal liability for estate
tax, as indicated above, the special lien may attach to property in the
hands of one (e.g., an insurance company or a trust beneficiary) who is
not subject to personal liability. The special gift tax lien attaches to all
gifts made by the donor during the year to which the tax relates 0
Since no provision is made for filing notice of the special liens,101
third parties would have no warning of their possible existence unless
they knew that, somewhere in the chain of title, the property had been
the subject of a transfer to which either the estate tax or the gift tax
might have applied. Congress has acknowledged this difficulty, however,
only in selected situations. In the case of property that passed through
the probate estate, or directly to the heirs or devisees of a decedent, the
law seems, in general, to take it for granted that a subsequent purchaser
or encumbrancer can discover a death in the chain of title, and hence
it protects them only if the executor had obtained a discharge from his
personal liability for the estate tax.10 2 That assumption may be valid
enough in the case of real estate, but the chain of title to personal
property is less readily ascertainable, and a purchaser or encum.
96. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a)(1), N(b). PLUMB , WNVIoUHT, pt. 11, is devoted
to these special liens.
97. Thus, if the special lien is divested under one of the provisions considered below,
third parties must still be alert to the general lien, which arises upon assessment. United
States v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
98. Including property which, by reason of passing to charity or to a surviving
spouse, is deductible and thus had no net effect on the tax liability. Cf. note 76 supra.
99. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943) (tenancy by the entirety).
100. Whether or not the particular gift was subject to tax. Cf. note 90 supra.
101. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943). So far as the decision holds a
mortgagee to be unprotected, it has been modified by later amendments.
102. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a)(3). Concerning discharge of the executor, see
note 75 supra. Provision ought to be made for the maintenance of a public record of sud
discharges in the District Director's office, in order that more remote purchasers and
encumbrancers, not dealing directly with the executor, can ascertain whether tile title
is clear of the estate tax lien.
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brancer may be unable to discover such a latent defect in the title
unless dealing with the executor himself. Congress has recognized
the difficulty in part by granting protection without regard to the
executor's discharge to purchasers of and lenders on securities, pur-
chasers of motor vehicles, retail purchasers, casual purchasers for less
than $250, and certain lenders on savings passbooks and life insur-
ance policies. 03 But the problem exists in the case of almost any
personal property, and Congress should consider broadening that
protection further to cover purchasers of and holders of security
interests in all forms of personal property, unless the property is still
under administration in the estate or unless the purchaser or secured
lender knew the transaction was intended to defeat collection of the
tax.04
Obviously, whether the property is real or personal, third parties
would have difficulty in anticipating the possible existence of an estate
tax lien if the property was included in a decedent's gross estate for
reasons other than that it was owned by the decedent at his death and
passed either through the probate estate or directly to heirs and
devisees.10 5 Therefore, in the case of any property which was includable
in the gross estate under Sections 2034-2042 of the Internal Revenue
Code-e.g., property transferred by the decedent inter vivos, or over
which he held a power of appointment, or in which he was a joint
tenant-the law provides, in general, for divestment of the estate tax
lien in favor of a "purchaser or holder of a security interest" without
reference to whether the executor had obtained a discharge.100 For the
same practical reason, the gift tax lien is also divested in favor of a
"purchaser or holder of a security interest."L 0 7 In either case, the estate
or gift tax lien, when thus divested from any specific property, becomes
a general lien on all property of the transferor, subject again to divest-
ment from any additional property he may sell or encumber.
Formerly, protection in those cases was extended only to a "bona
fide" purchaser, mortgagee or pledgee, and there was cause for concern
among title examiners that a chain of title that disclosed a transfer in
103. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(b), 6324(c)(1). Concerning retail and casual pur-
chasers, Second Installment, 674-76.
104. The American Bar Assodation so recommended. 84 A.B.A. REP. 694, 722 (1959).
105. This comment does not apply with equal force to all such property. A purchaser
of real estate from a surviving joint tenant would no doubt be better able to ascertain the
possible existence of an estate tax lien than a purchaser from an inter vivos donee who
might be held to have received the gift in contemplation of death. But the law draws no
distinction.
106. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a)(2).
107. Ir. REv. COnE of 1954, § 6324(b).
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trust, a deed reciting a consideration of "love and affection," a joint
tenancy in which one tenant had died, or similar circumstances could
be construed to put a purchaser or lender upon inquiry that a gift tax
or estate tax might have been incurred with respect to the property
and might remain unpaid. 08 We may hope that the omission of the
words "bona fide" in the new law, although unexplained in the Com-
mittee Reports, was intended and will be construed to remove those
uncertainties and to make the protection of purchasers and secured
lenders in these circumstances unconditional, assuming they have given
full value.10 9
Strangely enough, because of ancient drafting oversights that were
not rectified in the 1966 legislation, there are gaps in the protection
generally accorded purchasers and holders of security interests with
respect to the estate tax lien on non-probate property, as well as the
gift tax lien. For technical reasons (which might better be explained
in footnotes than in the text), a purchaser from or lender to an inter
vivos trustee is probably not protected against the gift tax lien on the
property held in trust."0 However, while a purchaser from or lender
to such a trustee is protected against the estate tax lien, one who deals
with the person to whom the property is distributed at termination of
the trust is probably not protected against the estate tax lien (unless
the grantor's executor has obtained a discharge or unless one of the
special exceptions relating to securities, etc., applies).111 And if those
original takers are not protected, then there is no protection from those
secret liens for subsequent owners of such property or subsequent
108. 84 A.B.A. REP. 670-71, 722 (1959). See Wright, Title Examinations as Affected by
the Federal Gift and Estate Tax Liens, 51 MicH. L. REv. 325 (1953). Actually, the one
published ruling in the area indicated that a liberal interpretation of "bona fide" would
be applied. Rev. Rul. 56-144, 1956-1 Cum, BULL. 563.
109. See PLUMB & WRIGHT 260-63, 274-7r-. discussing this and related ambiguities in the
new law.
110. Section 6324(b) protects purchasers and holders of security interests only if the
transfer to them was made "by the donee (or by a transferee of the donee)." The trustee,
of course, is not a transferee of the donee. And, as we have seen, pp. 1120.21 supra, the
prevailing view is that the trustee is also not the "donee" of the gift, although the lien
does attach to the property in trust. Therefore (unless § 6324(c) is satisfied), the divestment
will not take effect and the lien will adhere to the property in the hands of anyone
thereafter acquiring an interest in the property. See PLUMB & WRIGHT 264-65.
111. Section 6324(a)(2) protects purchasers and holders of security interests only If
the property was transferred by "(or transferred by a transferee of) such spouse, transferee,
trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession, or beneficiary .. . The word "Such"
refers to the persons, so described, on whom personal liability for the estate tax is
imposed. As we have seen, at pp. 1118-19 supra, in the case of an inter vivos trust, the
personal liability is imposed on the trustee and not on the distributee of the remainder,
who is held to be neither a "beneficiary" nor a transferee of the trustee. Nevertheless, the
estate tax lien attaches to the property and, since the divestment provision is inapplicable
(unless § 6324(a)(3) or (c) is satisfied), the secret lien follows the property into the hands
of later owners and encumbrancers. See PLUMB 8 WRIGHT 283-84.
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holders of the encumbrance. The drafting of Section 6324 ought to be
carefully reviewed in these respects.1"
2
The status of most statutory and common law liens, as against the
secret estate and gift tax liens, parallels their situation with respect to
the general federal tax lien. Some are expressly protected,"2 while
others remain vulnerable 14 although the lienors ordinarily could not
possibly anticipate the existence of an estate or gift tax lien-a lien
which begins life as a charge on specific property but becomes general
as soon as any of such property is sold or encumbered. What has been
said above concerning extending protection to liens of landlords,
attachments, state and local taxes, and miscellaneous liens'" would be
equally applicable here.
It has never been Congressional policy to grant judgment liens pro-
tection against secret estate and gift tax liens comparable to that which
judgment liens enjoy as against the general federal tax lien.n 0 One
consequence of this is that those special liens will apparently occupy
a preferred position in bankruptcy, since the trustee stands in the shoes
of a judgment lien creditor." 7 Since ordinarily an estate or gift tax
Hen, although secret and frequently general, is an offset to a fairly
recent "windfall" accretion to the wealth of the bankrupt, that priority
may not conflict seriously with bankruptcy policy. But the matter might
well be reviewed by the interested organizations.
E. Withheld Taxes
A quarter century ago, when individual income taxes first reached
levels far beyond the capacity of the average person to provide for by
foresight and savings, the Government pressed employers into service
as collection agents (a role they were already filling with respect to the
old-age tax under Social Security). Undoubtedly, vast numbers of indi-
vidual tax delinquencies were prevented thereby. But the problem of
112. The remedy would seem to lie in the deletion of the language in quotation marks
in the two preceding footnotes. The second sentence of § 6324(a)(2) and the third sentence
of § 6324(b) would then read simply "transferred to a purchaser or a holder of a security
interest," which form of expression has solid precedent in § 6324(a)(3).
113. Mechanics' liens, certain possessory liens on personal property, attorneys' liens and
liens for real property taxes, special assessments and public service charges. Nr. RE,. CoDa
of 1954, § 6324(c).
114. Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943). That case involved real property
taxes, which have since been protected; but its principle applies to other liens still not
expressly relieved.
115. See Second Installment, sections 7.10 of pt. IV.B., pt. IV.C. supra.
116. United States v. McGuire, 42 F. Supp. 337 (D.NJ. 1941).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964). See United States v. Speers, 382 US. 266 (195).
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employer delinquencies arose in their stead,118 as shoestring operators
took advantage of the reduction of their net payroll obligations to
provide themselves with a new source of working capital-in effect
borrowing the funds which the law required them to hold inviolate
as a trust." 9 If the employer's gamble failed, there was usually no trust
fund that could be traced by the Government. 20 In the scramble for
such assets as the employer might have, the competing lienors, sureties,
and secured lenders-now fortified by their newly expanded priorities
-would inevitably come out ahead of the tax collector, whose lien
for the withheld taxes can arise only after returns become due and
assessments are made. Yet the workers get credit for having paid their
taxes even though the amounts withheld from their wages never reach
the Government.' 2'
It was primarily this situation that initially led the Government to
advance and the courts to accept the doctrine of the "inchoateness" of
many liens competing with the federal tax liens-although, since the
doctrine was not tailored to meet the specific situation, it had pernicious
applications far beyond the withholding tax area. As a condition to
relaxing its opposition to legislative relief from that doctrine, the
Treasury was properly insistent that it be provided with more effective
weapons against abuses involving trust fund taxes.
The Treasury asked Congress for two provisions, one of which was
granted. No longer can a lender or surety keep a failing employer's
labor on the job in order to salvage a loan or complete a bonded con-
tract by supplying only enough funds for the "net payroll." One who
steps in and pays wages directly, on behalf of an employer, or who loans
funds specifically for payrolls with knowledge that the employer does
not intend or will not be able to pay withholding taxes, is now made
personally responsible for such taxes.122
The second Treasury proposal was directed specifically at the con-
118. $57,604,521 of "trust fund" taxes (including $16,290,098 attributable to the con.
struction industry) was written off as uncollectible in the fiscal year 1964, and another
$210,950,140 was delinquent as of January 1965 (of which $55,608,622 was attributable
to the construction industry, including $29,730,508 which was more than one year old).
Hearings on H.R. 11256 & H.R. 11290 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1966).
119. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7501.
120. See First Installment, 275 n.297.
121. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 31(a).
122. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3505. For the previous situation, see United States v,
Hill, 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966) (bank); Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337 (Ct,
Cl. 1965) (general contractor); Century Indem. Co. v. Riddell, 317 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.
1963) (surety). But cf. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
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struction industry, which withholds less than 6 per cent of the trust
fund taxes collected annually from all employers, yet is responsible for
28 per cent of the dollar volume of such taxes written off as uncollect-
ible and 26 per cent of the cases in which there is a history of repeated
delinquencies.m That situation results, apparently, from the common
practice of undercapitalized contractors to bid low in order to get large
jobs, relying on the withholding tax margin to save them from disaster
if the bid proves to have been inadequate (sometimes known as "shell
financing"). Unfortunately, the proposal proved so controversial that
it had to be withdrawn from the bill lest passage of the entire measure
be jeopardized. But the problem to which it was addressed is a real
one, and the proposal will no doubt be revived in some form.? There-
fore, it merits full discussion here, and careful study by those genuinely
interested in finding a workable solution that will not injure legitimate
business operations.
As originally introduced in 1964,1 the proposal would have required
a person who contracted with an employer of labor for work on real
property to obtain from the employer, at the time of the final contract
123. Hearings, supra note 118, at 40, 42-44.
124. When the provision vas withdrawn by action of the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Treasury urged "that hearings be held on proposed section 3505 of H.L
11256, designed to solve a pressing withholding tax collection problem in the construction
industry," and that "measures must be found to end the failure of this industry properly
to account for the trust funds which it obtains through the withholding system." Hearings,
supra note 118, at 41.
125. Proposed § 3506 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in H.R. 1Mi, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964), read as follows:
SEC. 3506. CERTIFICATE OF PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT OF WITHHOLD TAXES.
(a) LIABILITY.-f a person contracts with an employer (as defined in subtitle C)
for the construction, improvement, alteration, repair, replacement, or demolition of
real property (other than a residence occupied or to be occupied by such perton) and
the contract price exceeds $1,000, such person shall be liable in his oum person and
estate to the United States for all taxes (together with interest), if unpaid, required
by this subtitle to be deducted and withheld from wages paid by such employer for
work performed under such contract, if a return was due under section 6071 or a
deposit was required under section 6302 with respect to such taxes on or before the
date on which final payment of the contract price is made.
(b) EXCEPTION.-The liability imposed by subsection (a) shall not apply with
respect to any such taxes with respect to which such person obtains a certificate
executed by such employer under penalty of perjury certifying that such taxes have
either been paid over to the Secretary or his delegate, as provided under section 6151,
or deposited, as provided under section 6302. This subsection shall not apply-
(1) if such certificate is false and the person obtaining such certificate had
knowledge of its falsity at the time the certificate was received, or
(2) to the extent of any payments made by such person to such employer after
such person learns of the falsity of such certificate.
(c) EFFECT OF PAYMENT.-Any amounts paid to the United States pursuant
to this section shall be credited against the liability of the employer. The person
making such payments shall be relieved of any liability to the employer to the extent
of such payments.
(d) CROSS REFERENCE.-For penalty imposed for villfully making a false cer-
tificate, see section 7206.
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payment, a certificate that all required payments and deposits of taxes
withheld from his employees for work under the contract had been
made, up to the latest due date thereof. The requirement would have
applied in the case of contract payments by the owner to a contractor,
or by a contractor to a subcontractor; the owner would have incurred
no responsibility with respect to a subcontractor's withholdings. A
specific exception was made for work on owner-occupied residences, so
that the ordinary homeowner would not have been concerned. Also
excepted were jobs involving less than $1,000 (increased in the later
version of the bill to $2,000).
If the employer was in fact delinquent and the certificate was not
obtained, the owner or contractor would have been made responsible
for the unpaid withholding taxes, and would have been entitled to
indemnify himself by retaining a like amount of the contract price. If
the delinquent employer, however, falsely certified that he was current
in his withholding tax obligations, risking the penalties of perjury, the
owner or contractor would have been protected in relying on the cer-
tificate unless he had actual knowledge of its falsity. He would have
had no obligation to verify its correctness by investigation.120
The proposal was subjected to a barrage of criticism, centering on
the argument that it would require "an enormous amount of paper-
work and the expense of accumulating and storing certificates"-al-
though it is difficult to believe that businessmen, in connection with
construction or improvement jobs of substantial size, do not customarily
retain in their files receipts for payments made, in which the contractor
could incorporate a simple printed form of certificate. Only if the
certificate was not forthcoming would the payor have to do any more
than that-and then his responsibility would be only to freeze the final
payment until the tax collector and the employer worked out what was
due. True, the businessmen would have to learn a new rule, but they
126. One possible flaw in the proposal was the absence of a provision protecting tile
contract payor in relying on interim certificates, given by the employer other than at the
time of final payment. Therefore, it would have been necessary for the payor, for perfect
safety, to increase the customary holdback until the final payment, to cover not only his
possible defenses and offsets but also the maximum delinquency in withholding taxes that
might occur during the entire course of the job. Yet the employer, in order to meet his
obligations, would need the same money that the contract payor is holding back againstthe possibility that they will not be paid. If the employer, in order to get interim
payments, told the payor that his taxes were current but, under penalties of perjury,admitted at completion that he had been delinquent all along, the payor would not have
the protection of the statutory certificate with respect to any of the taxes. The proposalmight read ly be amended, however, to protect the payor in relying on interim certifcateg,and to limit his liability to taxes accruing thereafteri is unable to get the final cer-
tificate.
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should be hardened to that by now, for they face the same problem
whenever the withholding rates or the mechanic's lien laws or the
commercial laws or the zoning regulations are changed. On any sub-
stantial improvement job, the businessman would probably have legal
advice in drawing the contract.
The Treasury, however, under heavy pressure, went on tie defensive.
Having cited the analogy to the mechanic's lien enjoyed by the em-
ployee himself, the Treasury produced a substitute designed to place
the tax collector squarely in the employee's shoes, with respect to the
withheld portion of his wages, without imposing any obligation on the
contract payor to do more than the state law already required him to
do to protect the employees of his contractor (or subcontractors). The
substitute proposal provided that if taxes withheld from wages paid
for services performed in the construction or improvement of real
property (with the exceptions above noted) were not paid over to the
tax collector, the United States should have "the same rights (includ-
ing liens), remedies, and priorities against any person or property to
collect such unpaid taxes as are provided by any law for the collec-
tion of such wages by such employee." However, because the normal
time limits for filing or giving notice of mechanics' liens might well
expire before the federal tax collector even knew a delinquent tax
claim existed, the bill provided that whatever time limits were set by
state law should run, not from the date specified therein (e.g., com-
pletion of the work), but from the due date of the quarterly return
of withheld taxes (usually a month after the quarter ends). Further,
since the return might be filed late, it was provided that the time
should ordinarily not expire sooner than 30 days after the actual filing
of the return; but, to provide a cut-off if no return was filed, the time
was in no event to extend beyond six months after the return became
due. If the required action was taken within that extended period, it
would be regarded as "timely for all purposes," and the Government's
rights would "then have the same priority as the rights of such em-
ployee would have if such employee had taken the same actions on
the first day when such employee may take such actions."'1
s
127. Proposed § 3506(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1951, in H.R. 11256, 89lh
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The bill as introduced is set out in IHearings, supra note 118, at 3.
12.
128. Proposed § 3506(b), Hearings, supra note 118, at 12 (enphasis addcd). 'This pro-
vision seems to jeopardize the position of mortgagees, in those few states where tie
priority of a mechanic's lien dates only from its filing, which the federal law would, in
effect, deem to have occurred as soon as the wages were paid with respect to whid the
withheld portion was not paid over.
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In those states which follow the so-called "Pennsylvania rule," a
mechanic's lien may be imposed in favor of a contractor's employees
(and in some cases subcontractors' employees as well), even though no
part of the contract price remains unpaid when notice of the lien is
given. The retention of part of the contract price for a limited period
to guard against unknown liabilities may be a familiar practice in those
states, although the proposal would require withholding a probably
larger sum for a substantially longer period.129 As a practical matter,
apart from the proposed federal law, a holdback for any significant
period is ordinarily unnecessary if the contractor produces releases from
subcontractors and suppliers; employees' liens are rarely a threat since
any default in the payment of wages, other than in the final week, is
likely to come promptly to the owner's attention through stoppage of
work. Since the contractor can produce no effective release of lien from
the federal tax collector (who will not yet even have received a return
for the final period), withholding of part of the contract price may
become necessary where it might otherwise have been dispensed with.
If the substitute proposal is revived, the certificate procedure origi-
nally proposed should be superimposed on the "mechanic's lien" sub-
stitute, in order to bring the contract payor's obligations more truly
in line with what would be required of him under state law. The
certificate, made under penalties of perjury, that taxes are current
would be equivalent to the "statement under oath" that is sometimes
accepted from a contractor as a condition to his receiving payments
without holdback.10
The effect of the substitute proposal is unclear in those states follow-
ing the so-called "New York rule," under which the owner's liability
129. In the case of a job completed in January, for example, the return for the
quarter would not be due until April 30, making the earliest required notice date (with
respect to January withholdings) May 30, even in a state which requires notice to be
given 30 days after completion. If the period under state law is three months from
completion, the time under the proposal would expire July 31. But, unless the contractor
could then present proof that he had filed his return, the owner would not be completely
secure until October 30.
130. Also imported from the original proposal should be the limitation of the contract
payor's responsibility to those tax payments and deposits already due, excluding those
the employer will be obliged to pay over after the contract relationship has terminated,
and also the limitation of the responsibility to taxes withheld from wages by his immediate
contractor, not by subcontractors from whom he is in no position to exact a certificate. On
the latter point, the Treasury made a puzzling statement, with respect to its substitute
proposal, that "[i]n the case of employees of subcontractors the property owner often
shifts the risk of nonpayment of wages to the general contractor." Hearings, supra note
118, at 41. If that means that the Government's rights, in the shoes of the employee, could
be controlled by contracts which are binding on the employee, the principle would seem
to extend even to "no lien' contracts (which may bind even the employees of the general
contractor) and to waivers given by employees whose net wages have been satisfied-
which would make the proposal of little effect.
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to anyone other than the contractor himself is limited to the amount
remaining unpaid on the contract at the time the owner receives
notice of a claim of lien. Conceivably, the proposal to treat the belated
notice as "timely for all purposes" could be construed as deeming the
notice to have been given before the owner paid the contractor. But
the question here is not one of timeliness; rather it is a substantive
question of whether an act was done before knowledge was acquired,
and it would be rather startling if the law were to presume that knowl-
edge existed before it could in fact have been acquired. Therefore, the
extended time periods which the Treasury regarded as so essential to
the workability of its proposal would have no real effect in those states
-- which may well constitute a majority' 31-and the owner could there
pay the contractor before the tax collector could possibly give notice
concerning the unpaid taxes. Thus, the provision would have a non-
uniform operation and would fail to resolve the financial problem at
which it is directed, except in a limited number of states.
The substitute proposal was torpedoed as its predecessor had been.
Since it is evident that compromising the objective did not blunt the
opposition, the Treasury should revert to its original proposal, which
would operate more uniformily and more effectively than the substi-
tute, and fight it out on the merits, especially now that the fate of the
long-sought tax lien reform bill is not hanging on the outcome. 32 The
trust fund taxes, being a part of wages, contribute value to the owner's
property just as do the labor and materials that go into the building.
The owner or contractor who benefits from a low bid made possible by
"shell financing" gets a free ride on non-tax-paid labor. Owners and
contractors who receive the ultimate value of the tax portion of the
wages that go into the work may fairly be called upon to cooperate in
a reasonable way to see that such taxes reach their destination.
V. Tax Collection Procedures
"Taxes," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "are what we pay for civilized
society."' 33 Or, as the present Commissioner has phrased it, they are
131. In 4 AimuCAN LAW oF PRoPERTY § 16.106F, at 20 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952), this is
characterized as "by far the more prevalent" rule.
132. The Treasury stated at the hearings that "the earlier proposal had some ad-
vantages over the present solution from the standpoint of those affected by the proposal,
but either solution to this problem would be acceptable to the Treasury Department'
Hearings, supra note 118, at 40.
133. Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (di-senting
opinion).
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"the heart and soul of the production of those things that a government
must do for its people."' 34 A system that must raise over 100 billion
dollars a year from vast numbers of taxpayers must operate speedily
and to a large extent impersonally if it is to be effective.Y5 Arbitrary
actions in individual cases are inevitable, and the remarkable thing is
not that they occur, but that they occur so seldom. Nevertheless, while
unimportant in the mass, such instances may be traumatic for the indi-
viduals affected. As the Lord is concerned with the smallest bird that
falls, so also must the Government be concerned with preventing and
remedying such isolated injustices-if not on grounds of benevolence,
then for the pragmatic reason that the sense of justice is essential to the
working of a system so heavily dependent upon voluntary compliance
and cooperation. 13 6
Much progress appears to have been made in this regard in recent
years, both through legislation and through administrative action.
Congress should, however, continue to re-examine tax collection pro-
cedures with a view to avoiding injustices to individual taxpayers or
third parties.
A. Remedies of the Taxpayer
1. Jeopardy Assessments
Much attention has been focused on the problem of jeopardy assess-
ments, whereby income, estate and gift taxes may be summarily assessed
and collected, without prior opportunity for review, if "the Secretary
or his delegate (i.e., the local District Director) believes that the assess.
ment or collection of a deficiency.. -will be jeopardized by delay. 1
87
134. Cohen, Administration and Control of Tax Collection, A.B.A. TAx Starzoio BULL.,
April 1966, 44, 45.
135. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 8 (1962); Bull v.
United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
136. Whether or not exaggerated and distorted, as the Internal Revenue Service asserts,
113 CONG. REC. 10,459 (daily ed. August 14, 1967), the instances reported in congressional
hearings and in such popular exposes as Barron, Tyranny in the Internal Revenue Service,
READER's DIGErST, Aug., 1967, at 42, contribute to a public "sense of injustice" that may
one day undermine the system.
137. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6861(a). While the making of a jeopardy assessment does
not preclude Tax Court review of the merits of the deficiency, id. § 6861(b), collection
efforts may proceed concurrently and independently, Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d
760, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1961),
unless the taxpayer is able to give bond. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6863. In the typical
jeopardy assessment case, where the taxpayer's assets are insufficient to assure collection
of the assessed liability, the right to stay collection by giving bond is illusory. Shelton v.
Gill, 202 F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1953); Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (SD.
Fla. 1957); Macejko v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ohio 1959); see Note, Jeopardy
Assessment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55 GEo. L.J. 701, 705-06 (1967).
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Jeopardy assessments are commonly made under emergency conditions
without adequate audit, and may thus sometimes be arbitrary and
excessive, perhaps far exceeding the taxpayer's assets.133 With all his
property seized or tied up by liens and levies, the taxpayer may then
be unable to employ counsel and pay the other expenses of establishing
that the tax is not owing,139 or of defending related criminal charges. 1 0
Financial pressure may force him to settle an asserted tax liability that
he might have successfully defended."' Even if the taxpayer is able to
obtain a refund of the erroneous tax, he can never be made whole if its
collection has meanwhile deprived him of his livelihood and reduced
his family to destitution,'- or if his business, built over a lifetime, has
been forced to close because it could not meet payrolls and maturing
oblig-ations, 143 and has perhaps lost irreplaceable franchises and good
will.
14 4
Undoubtedly we have come a long way from the days when the
ruling principle was that the taxpayer must "pay first and litigate
later,"'145 for fear that "no government could exist that permitted the
collection of its revenues to be delayed by every litigious man or every
embarrassed man, to whom delay was more important than the payment
of costs."'146 In 1924, rightly sensing that such fears were exaggerated
and concluding that the "right of appeal after payment of the tax is
138. E.g., Anthony J. Petrone, 18 T.C.M. 787 (1959) (deficiency of $1,718,238 in tax and
$1,552,767 in penalties, based on gross "unexplained bank deposits" of one whow net
worth admittedly was only $M8,819).
139. Illinois Redi-Mix Corp. %. Coyle, 360 F.2d S48 (7th Cir. 196); Lloyd v. Patternon,
242 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1957).
140. United States v. Rinieri, 304 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1962) (mem.); Summers %. United
States, 250 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), rev'g 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955). See Plumb,
Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 247, 29- (1938).
141. Funk-houser v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1955).
142. Injunctive relief has been granted on that ground. Macejko v. United States, 174
F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Arnold i. Cobb, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9711 (N.D. Ga.
1957); Long v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ala. 1957). But such a result is no
longer possible. McClure v. Rountree, 330 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1961); Johnson v. Wall, 329
F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1964); Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1963). The taxpayer'e
"financial situation may well appeal to the discretionary authority of the Government as
a creditor," see Second Installment, 608-09, but it affords no ground for equitable relief.
Stanton v. Mfachiz, 183 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D. Md. 1960).
143. See Melvin Bldg. Corp. v. Long, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ' 9792 (N.D. I1. 1938), rev'd,
262 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1959). In Mensik v. Long, 261 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1938), the court
said that the very fact that the taxpayer's funds were in use in his business and might be
lost constituted jeopardy and was justification enough for putting him out of business.
144. The injunctions granted on that ground in Hirst & Co. Y. Gen-sch, 133 F.2d 2-17
(6th Cir. 1943), and Midwest Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1912), would not be
obtainable today. Licavoli v. Nixon, 312 F-d 200 (6th Cir. 1953).
145. Cheatham v. United States, 92 US. 85, 89 (1876). See State Railroad Tax Cares, 92
U.S. 575, 613 (1876).
146. See Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 US. 69, 75 (1877).
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an incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occa-
sioned by an incorrect assessment," 14 Congress reversed that principle
and established the Tax Court' 48 as a forum in which-in the case of
income, estate and gift taxes, which now constitute by far the larger
part of federal revenues-the taxpayer might litigate a proposed de-
ficiency assessment before payment, unless the delay would jeopardize
its collection. 4
9
It is only in the exceptional cases today, therefore, that a taxpayer's
property may be taken to pay a disputed income, estate or gift tax be-
fore he has had a chance to prove his case in court. In recent years
controls have been established which require that jeopardy assessments
shall be made "sparingly," and subject to high level administrative
review both before and after the assessmentO to assure abatement if
jeopardy does not exist or the assessment is excessive.'51 It has been
reported that jeopardy assessments were made in only 270 cases in the
fiscal year 1966,152 in contrast to 2,500 as recently as 1958,.15 Congress
has mitigated the hardships occasioned by jeopardy assessments by
providing that, with certain exceptions, the sale of the taxpayer's prop-
erty (but not its seizure, which may be as destructive of its value) may
be stayed until he has had an opportunity to litigate the liability in
the Tax Court. 5 4 His bank accounts, wages and other claims may
147. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924), in 1939-1 Cum. BULL., pt. 2, at
246.
148. Then known as the Board of Tax Appeals.
149. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336. The taxpayer is ordinarily en.
titled to receive a notice of deficiency, from which he may appeal to the Tax Court within
90 days, and no assessment or collection of the tax is permitted during that period or
thereafter, if an appeal is filed, during the pendency of the case in the Tax Court. INT.
Rv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6212, 6218. The taxpayer's right to litigate in the Tax Court beforc
payment is so jealously guarded by Congress that, in the absence of an administratie
finding of jeopardy, the taxpayer is entitled to have any violation of those restrictions
judicially enjoined, without need for showing irreparable injury or other extraordinary
circumstances. Id. § 6213(a); Maxwell v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1958) Ventura
Consol. Oil Fields v. Rogan, 86 F.2d 149, 154-55 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 800 U.S.
672 (1937). See Quigley v. IRS, 289 F.2d 878, 880 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
150. Rev. Proc. 60-4, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 877. See Note, supra note 137, at 718-19.
151. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6861(g). Before such power was expressly granted, the
Service doubted that it had the "authority to revoke the assessment even though It finds
that a mistake has been made and that there is no danger of losing the tax." S. RrP. No.
730, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1953).
152. See Note, supra note 137, at 717.
153. Gould, Jeopardy Assessments-When They May Be Levied and What to Do About
Them, N.Y.U. 18T INST. oN Fm. TAx 937, 944 (1960). Strict comparability between the
statistics cannot be established, as it is not stated whether the assessments in 1958 were
made in 2,500 "cases" or involved 2,500 tax years (in which event the comparable 1060
figure is 636).
154. IN. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 6868(b)(3); Smith v. Flinn, 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958),
modified, 264 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1959). This provision does not prevent sale during the
pendency of an appeal by the taxpayer from a Tax Court decision, unless he can provide
a supersedeas bond. INT. Rav. CODE Of 1954, § 7485; Treas. Reg. § 301.6863,2(a)(2) (1958).
See Note, supra note 137, at 706-07, 714,
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nevertheless still be appropriated by levy, pending contest of the
merits,155 although the risk that irreplaceable life insurance values
will be destroyed by surrender of his policies has been minimized by
the 1966 legislation."5
Almost without exception the courts have held that the requisite
"belief' that jeopardy exists is a subjective judgment to be made in the
uncontrolled discretion of the collection officials, free of any power of
the courts to review it. 5 Although the power to make jeopardy assess-
ments is currently exercised with restraint and the harshness of their
enforcement has in some circumstances been mitigated, it seems con-
trary to the ordinary citizen's concept of fairness and justice that the
only protection against abuse of this exceptional procedure lies in
the Service's internal policy limitations, and that the only remedy
for the victim is a plea addressed to the same officials who made the
determination in the first place.5 s Since there are no more than a few
hundred cases a year in which even the Service believes that use of
the jeopardy procedure is necessary, it can hardly be claimed that the
"lifeblood" of the nation would be seriously threatened by permitting
impartial judicial review of that necessity before possibly destroying
155. If seizure of his cash assets leaves the taxpayer without funds to live on, a sacrifice
sale of his property may be unavoidable. See Darnell v. Tomlinson, 220 F.2d 894, 896
(5th Cir. 1955).
156. INrr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6332(b). See Second Installment, 612-17.
157. Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1957); Publishers New Pres, Inc. v.
Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 240, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Yet the fact which the tas collector must
"believe" exdsts is an objective fact, which the courts are capable of acertaining. Com-
parable language, requiring that "the Secretary or his delegate" must be "satisfied" that
a fact exists, has recurred frequently in the tax laws, e.g., INr. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 16
(a)(2), 355(a)(1)(D), 911(a)(1), and has generally been deemed "largely admonitive and (to
mean] that the additional element is not lightly to be inferred but to be established by
proof which convinces in the sense of inducing belief." United States v. Jefferon Elem. Co.,
291 U.S. 386, 597-98 (1934); see Stranahan v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 729, 731 (6th Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 822 (1931). But cf. Brush Terminal Bldgs. Corp. v. Commissioner, 204
F.2d 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1953); see IMintz, Corporate Separations, 36 TA&Xm 882, 886-87 n.39
(1958). It has been persuasively argued that Irr. REv. CoDe of 1954, § 6218(a), as well as
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), entitle the taxpayer
to an injunction upon a court's finding that the fact which the tax collector must "believe"
exists does not in fact exist. Kaminsky, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of
Jeopardy Assessments under the Internal Revenue Code, 14 TAx I. REv. 545 (1959). But
only one court seems to have been persuaded. Philanthropic Inst. of America v. Wise, 65-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9492 (D. Ariz. 1965), relying on the Administrative Procedure Act.
158. "It is repugnant to the values of a free society to leave citizens at the mercy of
the bureaucracy solely on the faith that the bureaucracy will not act arbitrarily" Note,
supra note 137, at 721-22. I am indebted to Nelson, Sovereign Immunity and Federal
Liens, 26 BRooxLYN L. REv. 18 (1959). for a pertinent quotation from Shakespeare's
Measure for Measure, act II, scene 2: "[I]t is excellent to have a giant's strength, but ...
tyrannous to use it like a giant." To which Nelson adds, "The power of modern govern-
ment is undoubtedly greater than any giant can conjure; one of society's vital problems
therefore is to protect itself from the abuse of such power, however manifested.' Nehon,
supra, at 18.
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the taxpayer, even if some loss of revenue might occasionally result
from that small delay.
The American Bar Association has therefore proposed that the fed-
eral district courts, under the Declaratory Judgments Act,'5D be per-
mitted to review, not the merits of the tax deficiency, but the finding
that assessment or collection of the tax would be jeopardized by
delay.'00 The proposal provides that such actions be given calendar
preference to minimize delay in the collection of the tax where jeopardy
in fact exists.' 01
One defect that has been noted in the proposal is that no standards
are provided by which the courts may measure the existence of jeop-
ardy, with the single exception that the imminent expiration of the
statute of limitations shall not be considered to constitute jeopardy.102
Judicial review may thus be ineffective, since without standards the
courts may tend to defer to the judgment of the collection officers. 1 3
The fact that the assessment exceeds the taxpayer's net worth is a factor
now given weight by the Service in finding that the tax is in jeopardy,
101
and it would no doubt also influence the courts if they are not in-
structed to the contrary. Yet the only really relevant factor should be
whether a delay to permit the merits to be determined is likely to
159. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
160. 83 A.B.A. REP. 221-23 (1958). For more discussion, see A.B.A. Srarzoz or TAXATIoN,
1958 PROGRAM AND CommITTEE REP. 157-60. The proposal was embodied in Section 88 of
H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), an omnibus bill consisting of A.B.A. recommcnda.
tions.
161. A proceeding as summary as a writ of habeas corpus or a magistrate's hearing on
whether there is probable cause to detain a criminal has been suggested as appropriate.
Note, supra note 137, at 728, 730.
162. On occasion, the threat of a jeopardy assessment has been used as a club to
extract from a solvent taxpayer an agreement to extend the period of limitations, although
that is claimed to be contrary to present policy. Note, supra note 137, at 719-21. Veeder v.
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929), and Foundation Co. v. United States, 15 F.
Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1936), have been cited for the point that the imminence of expiration
of the statute of limitation is justification for a jeopardy assessment. Actually, a normal
deficiency notice will protect the Government as fully against the running of the statute
as will the making of a jeopardy assessment. INT. REV. CODE of 1951, § 650"'(a)(1). At the
time involved in the cited cases, a deficiency notice suspended the time for assesment
only for the period during which an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax
Court) could be filed, and until final decision if an appeal was filed. The court In
Veeder noted that, if only a few days remained for assessment when the notice wa5 sent,
the same few days would be all the time available for getting the assessment machinery
moving after the restraint on assessment was removed, and that this might constitute
jeopardy. Section 277(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926 rectified that situation by adding 60
days to the suspension period, thus removing that justification for a jeopardy assessment.
It has been suggested that the Government gains a burden of proof advantage by making
a jeopardy assessment, giving it 60 more days to perfect an otherwise inadequate or aibl.
trary deficiency notice. Note, supra note 137, at 720. But that seems an inadequate excuse
for subjecting a taxpayer to a jeopardy assessment.
163. Note, supra note 137, at 735.
164. Id. 718.
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reduce the fund available to satisfy the Government's claim through
concealment or disposition of assets, intervention of judgment liens,
or the like.105 The mere fact that the assessment exceeds the taxpayer's
net worth does not alone justify impoverishing the taxpayer to satisfy
the still disputed liability.
Even where such dangers are found to exist, the court might be
empowered to grant relief from the jeopardy assessment if the taxpayer
could make less burdensome alternative arrangements to preserve the
status quo and prevent the encumbrance or dissipation of assets. Giving
a security interest in such assets as exist might serve that purpose for
one who could not possibly provide the surety bond for the full amount
claimed which would be required if the jeopardy assessment were
allowed to stand. 6 If such an encumbrance would unduly hamper the
operations of a business, some supervision by a court appointee might
protect the Government without putting the taxpayer out of business
or depriving him of possession and general control while the merits of
the tax remain in doubt.167 The court should in any event retain juris-
diction so that it may make such orders as changes in the situation may
require, including reinstatement of the jeopardy assessment or exten-
sion of the security interest to new properties.
A coordinate proposal by the American Bar Association would em-
power a district court, even where jeopardy exists, to order the release
from the lien of sufficient funds to pay the expenses of contesting the
civil and criminal aspects of the liability.""5 Tax litigation is often
165. Compare the standards set out in I,,T. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6851, concerning the
power to terminate a taxpayer's taxable year in case of jeopardy. It has been suggested that
the proposed review procedure be made available also in cases under § 6351. See Note,
supra note 137, at 7S6.
166. Concerning bonds, see note 137 supra.
167. In Melvin Bldg. Corp. v. Long, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9792 GN.D. 111. 195S), and
Homan Mfg. Co. v. Sauber, 55-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9666 (N.D. Ill. 1955), final decree ret*d
sub norm. Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1957), the district coutts
granted injunctions conditioned upon supervision of the taxpayer's property by the
court or by a receiver, but the appellate courts held that an injunction was improper
under existing law, even upon conditions.
168. 83 A.B.A. REP. 223 (1958); H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sems. § 87 (1965). See
authorities cited notes 139-40 supra. Since the release would be discretionary with the
court, consideration could still be given to the availability of funds, free of the lien, from
stockholders of a corporate taxpayer or from others with a common interest in the con-
troversy (cf. Lebanon Woolen Mills v. United States, 311 F.2d 364 (Ist Cir. 196,): United
States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)), although tle hope
for the largess of friends should not be a factor, as it was in the decision of the Court of
Appeals in United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1957). The propoaml
seems deficient in confining the relief to jeopardy assessments under hIr.~. Rrv. CoDE of
1954, § 6861, which is limited to income, estate and gift taxes, whereas tile fame problem
may arise in the case of other taxes which, without need for finding jeopardy, may be
assessed before the merits are adjudicated. See pp. 1141, 1144 infra. In addition, no pro-
vision is made for cases where the lien has already been enforced, as by sekizure of the bank
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complex and expensive, and the taxpayer reduced to indigency by the
Government's lien on all his property may be inadequately served by
appointed counsel and by the $300 worth of accounting and other
expert services which the present law allows him-and then only for
a criminal case.169 Whatever the limits of the constitutional require.
ments,170 common fairness should require that the government not
prosecute the taxpayer, and perhaps strip him of all he owns, while
depriving him of access to the means of defending himself-in effect,
what one court characterized as "holding and hitting."171
The proposal would also permit release of funds necessary to repair,
maintain and preserve the liened property (expenditures which ordi-
narily will be as beneficial to the Government as to the taxpayer),172
and also to pay other taxes "whether due before or after the making of
[the] jeopardy assessment."'17 Consideration might be given to permit-
ting the court also to release moderate amounts for the taxpayer's essen-
account on which the taxpayer must rely for payment of the expenses. See Note, supra
note 137, at 736. It would be desirable also to amend INT. RZV. COrr of 1954, § 6325, to
authorize administrative release of funds for such purposes, in order to avoid burdening
the courts when the parties are in agreement on the amount needed. Judge Finnegan,
dissenting in United States v. Brodson, supra, at 116, erred in suggesting that § 6861(g)
might permit such relief to be granted by administrative action; the standard prescribed
for abatement of the assessment would not be met.
169. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
170. Counsel: see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Lay expert: see cases
cited note 140 supra; cf. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953).
Civil litigation: see Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUbt. L. REV.
1322 (1966).
171. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955). The majority of the
appellate court, in reversing, raised the question whether the person who had property
and was not able to get at it was entitled to more consideration than the one who was
too poor in the first place to afford an adequate defense. 241 F.2d 107, at 111. Chief
Judge Duffy, in dissent, saw a vast difference:
Here the Government, by its deliberate act, by a jeopardy assessment, captured the
defendant's assets and thus denied him the use of his own funds to defend himself,
the tools of defense were taken from him; the Government pauperized him by
placing him in a financial straight-jacket sic].
Id. at 111. The problem might arise more oten than it does were it not for the strong
policy of the Government to refrain, if at all possible, from prejudicing its criminal case
by making an assessment while the prosecution is pending, thereby precipitating pre.
mature exposure of its case in civil litigation. See Ferguson, jurisdictional Problems in
Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IOWA L. Rxv. 312, 320 (1963). On remand of Brodson, the
district court granted a continuance to permit the civil case to be tried first, in order
that the amount of the lien could be fixed and any excess assets made available for the
expenses of criminal defense. United States v. Brodson, 155 F, Supp. 407 (E,, Wis, 1957).
But how the civil litigation would be financed was not explained.
172. Cf. the 1966 amendment adding INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6325(d)(2), which per.
mits administrative action to subordinate the tax lien to security interests and lien,
incurred for purposes beneficial to the Government's lien.
173. The latter involves some inversion of priorities, but apparently contemplates that
the taxpayer be permitted to use current income to pay the taxes incurred In the
process of earning it. See A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION, 1958 PROGRAM AND CosMMtrrr
RFP. 161. So confined, the provision is supportable, but it may be misunderstood and
misused if the wording is not narrowed. Cf. pp. 1108-09 supra.
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tial living expenses where his entire assets have been encumbered by a
lien the merits of which remain in doubt.
174
2. Litigation of the ferits Before Payment
There are two customary methods for litigating the merits of federal
tax assessments. The method used by a substantial majority of taxpayers
(although available only with respect to income, estate and gift taxes)
is to file a petition with the Tax Court, within 90 days (in special
circumstances 150 days) after the Internal Revenue Service mails a
notice of deficiency. When that method is followed, the tax need not
be paid until the Tax Court has reached a decision, unless there is a
jeopardy assessment.'-, The second method is to pay the tax, file a claim
for refund, and bring suit for refund after rejection of the claim or a
six-month wait, against the United States in a federal district court or
the Court of Claims.176 Many taxpayers, for a variety of reasons, prefer
the remedy by refund suit, particularly in the district courts.17
Efforts by taxpayers to obtain the advantages of district court juris-
diction without having to prepay the tax demanded have been generally
unsuccessful. At one time there was a tendency for the courts to permit
the taxpayer to test the merits in an injunction suit if he could show
that collection of the disputed tax would be a business or personal
disaster for him. 78 But it is now firmly established that, no matter how
174. Such relief was granted by the district court in the case from which the Govern-
ment's appeal was dismissed in United States v. Fauci, 242 F.2d 237 (Ist Cir. 1957). The
hardships involved are evidenced in the cases cited note 142 supra. Cf. Second Installment,
605-10.
175. See note 149 supra. Once the Tax Court has reached a decision, collection of the
amount redetermined by it is not stayed pending an appeal, unless the taxpayer files a
supersedeas bond. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7485.
176. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(2) (1964); INr. R v. CODE Of 1954, §§ 6532(a)(1), 7422(a).
The further alternative remedy, by suit against the District Director to whom the tax
was paid, see Plumb, Tax Refund Suits against Collectors of Internal Revenue, GO HARry.
L. REv. 685 (1947), is no longer available. IN-r. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7422(Q, as amended, by
Pub. L. 89-713, 80 Stat. 1107 (1966).
177. The precedents may be more favorable in another forum. Or the taxpayer may
prefer trial before a judge familiar to him or his counsel (perhaps known for his "pro.
taxpayer" leanings) rather than before a stranger visiting from Washington. The Tax
Court may rarely or never sit in the taxpayer's vicinity, so that trial in another court
means a saving of time and expense. The issue may be one that might better be heard by
a judge of broad general experience, or by a jury, rather than by a specialist in the
intricacies of the tax laws. The taxpayer may wish to make use of the more effective
discovery and pre-trial procedures which the district court affords, or to avail himself
of equitable defenses which the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to entertain. Or he may
fear the possibility that the proposed deficiency will be .enlarged if he braves the Tax
Court, where the statute of limitations is automatically held open for the assertion of
additional tax. INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, § 6503(a)(1). See Beaman, Wihen Not to Go to the
Tax Court: Advantages and Procedures in Going to the District Court, 7 J. TAX. 856
(1957); Carey, Choosing Tax Procedures for Tactical Advantage, 40 NorME DA=M LA,.
363 (1965); Ferguson, supra note 171, at 339.
178. See notes 142-44 supra.
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extreme the hardship or how irreparable the injury, the taxpayer may
not enjoin the enforcement of the assessment by levy or sale except in
the rare (and perhaps hypothetical) case where he can show that the
tax was not merely illegally imposed but is so arbitrary that by no
possibility, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, could
the assessment be sustained. 70 Nor can the taxpayer obtain relief
before payment by suing to have the tax lien removed as a cloud on
the title to his property,180 or by seeking a declaratory judgment on the
merits of the tax.' 8 '
Some taxpayers have sought to obtain the practical effect of a declara-
tory judgment by paying a small part of a disputed tax, filing a claim,
and bringing suit for refund, intending thereby to obtain an adjudi-
cation that would govern the entire assessment. The Supreme Court,
however, held in Flora v. United States8 2 that full payment of the
amount demanded was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a refund suit,
because Congress has established "a system in which there is one tri-
bunal [the Tax Court] for prepayment litigation and another for
post-payment litigation.'
8 3
Actually, the jurisdictional dichotomy between "prepayment" and
"post-payment" litigation is not nearly so dear-cut as that quotation
would suggest. Except for income, estate and gift taxes, for which Con-
gress has failed to provide an alternative tribunal for prepayment litiga-
tion, 84 the courts have circumvented the jurisdictional prerequisite of
179. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7421; Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
870 U.S. 1 (1962). Injunction is, of course, permitted where, in the absence of jeopardy, an
assessment of income, estate or gift tax has been made without giving the taxpayer an
opportunity to go to the Tax Court. But that would not bring the merits before the
district court. See note 149 supra.
180. Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1965); Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. 718
(E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1965); Broadwell v. United States, 234 F.
Supp. 17 (E.D.N.C. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S, 825
(1965). The taxpayers relied unsuccessfully on 28 U.S.C. § 2410, which consents to making
the United States a defendant in an action to quiet title.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964); Martin v. Andrews, 238 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1956), see
Flora v. United States, 862 U.S. 145, 164 (1960).
182. 862 U.S. 145 (1960).
183. Id. at 168. Although the majority placed great stress on what it deemed to be
restrictive language in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1964), giving the district courts jurisdiction
over refund suits against the United States, the Court's expressions concerning the general
intention of Congress (as evidenced in the Declaratory Judgnents Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1964), and other legislation) leave little hope that the much broader jurisdictional
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(2) (1964) would be construed to give the taxpayer any more
right to sue for refund in the Court of Claims than he would have in the district court,
before full payment of the disputed assessment. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States,
292 F.2d 901, 903-04 (Ct. Cl. 1961), in which (in an entirely different connection, but citing
Flora) that court reasoned backward from the words, "concurrent with the Court of
Claims" in 28 U.S.C. § 1846 (1964), and declared that its refund jurisdiction was tie
same as that of the district courts.
184. The Tax Court has no jurisdiction over liabilities for employment and other
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prepayment by devising a theory that such other liabilities are "divis-
ible," so that the amount attributable to a single transaction may be
paid and its refund sued for, in order to test the validity of the entire
assessment covering all transactions in the year or quarter.1 5 Thus the
specter of suits for refund of token payments designed to test the valid-
ity of much larger assessments that remain unpaid-the specter that
so alarmed the Government and the Supreme Court where income
taxes were involved' 8 -is not only tolerated but encouraged in the
case of these other liabilities. Furthermore, even in the case of an
income, estate or gift tax liability, if the taxpayer has already com-
menced a suit for refund of an amount previously paid before the tax
collector determines that, on the contrary, he owes additional tax, the
refund suit may be allowed to proceed if the taxpayer so elects; the
Government will ordinarily file a counterclaim, thereby permitting the
district court or the Court of Claims to pass on the merits of the unpaid
tax.187 In either of the situations last mentioned, the Government will
usually refrain from collecting the balance until the dispute is resolved
by the court.-18 But the taxpayer is entirely dependent upon the grace
of the tax collector, since there is no legal barrier-not even the re-
quirement of an administrative finding of jeopardy-to the enforce-
ment of the additional liability by levy and sale, despite the pendency
of the suit in which the taxpayer claims he has already paid too mudi.161
excise taxes, or over the penalty imposed on a corporate officer or other person, under
INT. R-v. CODE Of 1954, § 6672, for not collecting, withholding, or pa)ing over certain
taxes. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 6211-15; Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d ,193 (9th Cir.
1964).
185. Steele v. United States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960), rcv'g 172 F. Supp. 793 (W.D.
Ark. 1959) (divisibility conceded by Government in appellate court); Jones v. Fox, 162
F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1957-58). See Flora v. United States, 362 US. 145, 171 n.37 and 175
n.38 (1960).
186. Elora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1960).
187. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7422(e); see Rosamond Gifford Charitable Corp. v.
United States, 170 F. Supp. 259, 244 (N.D.N.Y. 1938). Upon receiving a deficiency notice,
the taxpayer has the option of going to the Tax Court, in vwhich event the Tax Court
has jurisdiction to find either a deficiency or an overpayment (LI'r. REV. CoDE of 1951,
§ 6512(b)), and under § 7422(e) the district court or Court of Claims will lose jurisdiction
to the extent that the Tax Court acquires it.
188. See Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 1966); A.B1.A. Tax Seriox BULL.,
April 1966, at 88. The courts, while refusing to require such restraint, see note 189 inlra,
have been free with pointed suggestions that the tax collector "should refrain" from
enforcement pending the suit. Sherwood v. Scanlon, 207 F. Supp. 680, 6SS (E.D.N.Y. 1902).
189. Florida v. United States, 285 F.2d 596, 602.-04 (Silt Cir. 19G0); see Bluhmiaer v.
United States, 230 F.2d 146, 152 (8th Cir. 1956); Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 1. FZ2d
776, 778 (3d Cir. 1941). Although the Bushmiaer and Sirian Lamp cases were overruled by
the Supreme Court in Flora v. United States, 362 US. 145 (1960), both the majority, id.
at 166, 176, and the dissent, id. at 193, were in accord with their vie%'w that collection was
not prevented by the pendency of the refund suit. Injunctions against collection of ite
unpaid balance were denied in Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1965), Vuin v.
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It has been urged that Congress grant the federal district courts con-
current jurisdiction with the Tax Court over appeals from determina-
dons of deficiencies in income, estate and gift taxes. 100 The competence
of the district courts to determine the merits of federal tax liabilities
has been acknowledged by Congress in refund suits and in the excep-
tional cases last mentioned, the argument runs, and the free choice
among those forums should not be limited to those who are sufficiently
affluent to afford to tie up funds equal to the entire amount demanded
during the pendency of litigation. Under this proposal, collection
would in the absence of jeopardy be restrained pending the outcome
of the proceeding. The impediment to tax collection would be no
greater than it is at present if the right to "litigate first and pay later,"
well established for over 40 years in the Tax Court, were made avail-
able in the district courts as well. 191 The proposal has been opposed,
however, on the ground that it would change the basic theory under-
lying establishment of the Tax Court as "a specialized tribunal for
disposition of tax controversies" and would "tend to produce an un-
satisfactory body of tax law.' 192
Burton, 327 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1964), Wood v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9686
(N.D. Ind. 1964), and Sherwood v. Scanlon, 207 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). It has been
held, however (in a pre-Flora decision), that once the Government has elected to file a
counterclaim, administrative collection may be enjoined as an interference with the
jurisdiction of the court. Bushmiaer v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 329, 337 (W.D. Ark.
1956). But see Harding v. Woodcock, 137 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1890).
190. Bills to this effect, although confined to income taxes, died in the 81st, 82d, and
83d Congresses. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 162-63 (1960). Such bills were
endorsed by the Committee on Tax Court Procedure of the Section of Taxation, with
the recommendation that they be extended to estate and gift taxes, but the resolution
was not submitted by the Section to the House of Delegates. A.B.A. SECrTON or TAXATION,
1953 PROGRAM! AND COMMrTr RP. 115-17. The proposal was revived in 1962, A.B.A.
SECTION OF TAXATiON, 1962 PROGRAM AND CoMmrrrEE REP. 55-69, but the Section voted to
recommend it for study in connection with the American Bar Foundation Federal Tax
Procedure Study rather than to submit it to the House of Delegates for approval. A.B.A.
TAX SECTION BULL., Oct. 1962, at 9.
191. The proposal would give incomplete relief from Flora unless it were supple.
mented by a provision that a refund suit may be maintained without full payment of
the assessment, in order to take care of the cases where the taxpayer has no real oppor.
tunity to appeal from a deficiency notice. See note 193 infra. Restraint on collection of
the balance might or might not be provided in such cases. The Committee on Court
Procedure of the Section of Taxation in 1961 proposed that collection be restrained
pending suit for refund of a partial payment (a restraint that had been omitted front the
Bar's recommendation of overturning Flora, a year earlier, see note 198 infra), but the
proposal was withdrawn for further study, from which nothing has materialized. A.B.A.
SEC rION OF TAXATION, 1961 PROGRAM AND CoMzMTTEE REP. 44.
192. The Council of the Section of Taxation opposed the 1958 proposal, supra note
190, on these grounds, which presumably also influenced the withdrawal of the 1961
proposal, supra note 191. They reflect the view of the Tax Court as the body of experts
best qualified to interpret and apply the tax laws (see Dobson v. Commissioner, 320
U.S. 489, 499 (1943)), a view which, if carried to its logical conclusion, would suggest that
the Tax Court be given exclusive jurisdiction of refund litigation as well as deficienciesSee raynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedu  for Federal Income, Estate and Gt
Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLusJ. L. Rv. 1393 (1938). Surrey, The 7'raytor
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An analysis of the division of jurisdiction betveen the Tax Court
and the federal district courts would carry us far beyond the scope of
this study. The Flora case is relevant to a study of collection problems,
however, in those situations where the assessment exceeds the taxpayer's
ability to pay and he has failed without choice or fault to petition the
Tax Court. 193 The tax collector can then seize all the taxpayer has for
application on the disputed assessment, and the taxpayer may be with-
out a remedy either to prevent such collection or to recover the amount
which is in excess of the correct liability.9 4 Or, if he is able to pay
the tax only in installments over a period of years, the statute of
limitations on recovery of the earlier payments, which runs from the
date of each payment, may expire before he ever becomes entitled
under the Flora rule to sue for them.1t) 5
Rare as such cases may be,'98 a just government should be concerned
about the existence of a wrong without a remedy.9 7 Even if it goes
Plan-What It Is, 17 TAxEs 393 (1939); Traynor & Surrey, New Roads toward the Settle-
ment of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW & CO.NmM. Po. 30
(1940). A bibliography of commentaries on the proposal is found in Ferguson, supra note
171, at 371.
193. His time for petitioning the Tax Court, which runs from the mailing of the
deficiency notice to his "last known address," may have expired before the notice even
reached him. Irr. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6212(b), 6219(a); Brown v. Lethert, 3GO F.2d 560
(8th Cir. 1966); Lubring v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 556, 558 (4th Cir. 1962); Cohen v. United
States, 297 F.2d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 1962). He may have shown on his return (or consented
to the assessment of) a tax he believed at the time to be correct, but which a later
decision or better information leads him to question. Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d
609 (2d Cir. 1940). Or he may have been in such financial straits when the deficiency notice
was received that he was unable to employ counsel to advise him of his rights and to tame
the necessary action. Because of a judicial exception to the Flora rule, mee pp. 114041
supra, the problem does not arise in the case of taxes outside Tax Court jurisdiction.
194. This "grossly unfair" and "shockingly inequitable" effect was noted by the four
dissenting Justices in Flora v. United States, 562 U.S. 145, 195-96 n.22 (19G0). See Ferguron,
supra note 171, at 335.
195. Imra. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6511(b)(2) limits the refund to the amount paid within
a prescribed period prior to the filling of a refund claim, and § 6532(a)(1) requires bringing
suit within two years after its rejection. In Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 769
(N.D.N.Y. 1954), the taxpayer had paid $4,100 on a disputed income tax assAement of
$10,536.96, and arranged to pay the balance monthly over a six-year period. To avoid
the bar of the statute of limitations, he filed a claim for the $4,100 and, when it was
rejected, filed suit, although the full assessment had not been paid. Prior to Flora, the
suit was permitted, but it would be precluded today. See Flora v. United States, 362 US.
145, 195-96 (1960) (dissenting opinion). The Government asserted that § 6511(b) was
designed for "discouraging installment payments when litigation is contemplated." Brief
on Reargument at 13. But long-term installment payments are permitted only when the
taxpayer is unable to pay otherwise, and the statute of limitations on refunds was never
intended to penalize taxpayers for their inability to pay a disputed tax. See Kaminshy,
Mandatory Injunction: A Promising Escape from Flora v. United States, 39 TAxEs 699,
701-02, 706-07 (1961).
196. See Ferguson, supra note 171, at 335-36.
197. It has been suggested that a mandatory injunction (not to restrain collection,
which is prohibited, see note 179 supra, but to require a refund) may be available under
present law, despite the Flora decision. INrr. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6402(a), impoms a
mandatory duty on "the Secretary or his delegate" to credit or refund "any overpayment,"
without reference to whether the full assessment has been paid. Where inability to meet
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no further, Congress should permit one who has overpaid his tax to
recover the overpayment by suit,0 3 without interfering with the
Government's right to collect the balance of the outstanding assess-
ment.190 Moreover, in those exceptional situations where a taxpayer is
demonstrably unable to pay a disputed assessment without extreme
business or personal hardship, and is unable for any good reason to
petition the Tax Court before payment, Congress should relax the ban
on injunctions against tax collection, subject to conditions, such as
those discussed earlier in connection with jeopardy assessments, de-
signed to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.210
Much of the opposition by the Supreme Court and certain commen-
tators to permitting litigation of the merits before full payment
revolves around a number of procedural problems with which present
law fails to deal. If those problems were resolved by legislation, at
least some of the grounds for such opposition would disappear. The
principal problems were succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in the
Flora opinion:
[W]ould the Government be required to file a compulsory counter-
claim for the unpaid balance in District Court under Rule 13 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? If so, which party would
have the burden of proof?
20 1
If the taxpayer is permitted to sue for refund of a partial payment,
as proposed, the Government not only is but should be required to
the Flora condition makes the normal legal remedy for enforcement of that official duty
inadequate, Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1961) may
authorize a mandatory injunction. See Kaminsky, supra note 195. Although mandamus
(the antecedent of the mandatory injunction) was held not a permissible substitute for a suit
for a disputed tax refund in Empire Ordinance Co. v. Harrington, 249 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir.
1956), that view was premised on the adequacy of the remedy by suit for refund. Tile sug-
gested remedy is untested, however, and in any event is a less satisfactory remedy than a
suit for refund. See generally Developments in the Law-Remedies against the United
States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. Rxv. 827, 846-50, 861-64 (1957).
198. Promptly following the Flora decision, the American Bar Association recommended
such legislation. The A.B.A. report sets out the resolution, 86 A.B.A. REP. 333 (1961), but
inadvertently fails to show its adoption, id. 123-26, n.312, as a result of which error it was
omitted from the omnibus bill containing A.B.A..approved recommendations, H.R. 11450,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See A.B.A. SEcrioN OF TAXATmON, RMSrD EXPLANATION or I-I.R.
11450, at 85 (1967).
199. By expressly providing that collection efforts may proceed, the law would assure
-if that is the purpose of Congress-that a suit for refund of a token payment may not
be used as a substitute for a Tax Court proceeding, by one who has assets from which
voluntary or involuntary collection may be effected, while also assuring a remedy to those
who have already paid all they can. See note 189 supra. Regarding the procedure for
refunding excessive collections made during the pendency of the suit, see pp. 1145.46 infra.
200. P. 1137 supra. Regarding the release of certain essential funds from the lien
during the pendency of the proceeding, see pp. 1137-39 supra.
201. 362 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1960).
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counterclaim for the unpaid balance, in order to avoid multiplicity of
litigation.20 2 A "horrible example" propounded by a supporter of the
Flora rule; °3 affords sufficient reason for insisting on this: Suppose a
$50,000 tax is assessed, based on five disputed $10,000 issues. The
taxpayer pays $10,000 and brings suit for its refund. He must win all
five issues if he is to recover, since if he loses any he will owe at least
the $10,000 he has paid. If he wins the suit, therefore, there is no
problem, because an adjudication that he did not owe even $10,000
clearly precludes his owing the balance of the assessment. But if he
loses and no counterclaim has been filed or required to be filed by the
Government, the decision affords no guidance at all on whether the
$40,000 balance is owing. The court may decide any one of the issues
against the taxpayer and find it unnecessary to consider the others, or
the jury may render a general verdict without specifying on which issue
he lost. Indeed, when he pays the next $10,000 and sues for refund, all
the issues must be litigated over again, since none is res judicata. But
if the Government must raise its counterclaim or be barred by the
judgment, whichever way it goes, the entire liability can be determined
in a single suit.
In order to prevent the compulsory counterclaim rule from unduly
interfering with tax collection, however, it should be expressly pro-
vided-unless Congress decides to go all the way and restrain collection
while a tax is being litigated in the district court 0 4 that the pendency
of the counterclaim shall not prevent administrative collection of the
balance owing.-"s This suggestion too has stirred procedural nightmares
in the minds of Flora's supporters, but they could be easily dealt with
by providing that any amounts collected pending the suit shall be taken
into account in the computation of the final judgment, without need
202. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction ....
An income, estate or gift tax liability is a single cause of action, no matter how many
issues it may involve, and a judgment thereon precludes subsequent litigation of additional
issues involved in the same tax. Chicago Junction R)s. v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 156
(Ct. Cl. 1935); Guettel v. United States, 95 F.2d 229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
603 (1938). The same is not true of the "divisible" taxes (see pp. 1140-41 supra), but the
issues in those cases are ordinarily single, and stare decisis, if not collateral estoppel, will
suffice to discourage repeated litigation.
203. Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment before Suing in the District Court?
B J. TAX. 179, 181 (1958).
204. See p. 1142 supra.
205. See pp. 1141, 1144 supra.
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for the formality of an additional claim for refund or amendment of
the complaint.205
Provision should also be made that the burden of proof on the
counterclaim shall be on the taxpayer, in order that he may gain no
advantage from being permitted to put the Government in the position
of moving party.207 Congress has already expressly placed the "burden
of proof" on the taxpayer when the Government files a counterclaim in
a case where a deficiency is determined after a refund suit has been
commenced.2 08 There, however, the Committee Reports interpret the
taxpayer's burden as "the same burden of proof as he would bear if he
had appealed the case to the Tax Court,"20 9 a burden (essentially an
obligation to make a prima facie case) apparently no greater than he
would bear in resisting the Government's counterclaim if the statute
were silent.210 In dealing more broadly with counterclaims in situations
where the alternative from which the taxpayer is relieved is to sue for
refund, Congress might consider the refund suit standard of proof. It
would not be amiss, however, to consider establishing a uniform general
206. This should resolve the procedural complications visualized In Riordan, supra note
203, at 181. Even if multiple issues are involved in the assessment, as in the example In
the text, the original claim and complaint must have raised all of them, since if the
taxpayer controverts less than all, the $10,000 he has paid will not be an overpayment,
Therefore, additional payments, pending suit, would inject no new issues and no new
claim should be required.
207. If the taxpayer were required to pay the full tax before suing for refund, the
burden of proof would be on him, not only to show that the tax assessment ig erroneous,
but to produce evidence from which the correct tax can be determined, which includes
an obligation to negative any offsetting issues raised by the Government. David v. PhIney,
350 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 338 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl,
1964). But cf. Fulton Container Co. v. United States, 355 .2d 319, 324 (9th Cir. 1906), If
the Government is required to counterclaim, the assessment makes a prima face case, but
once the taxpayer introduces evidence, the traditional view would place the burden of
proof on the Government. The result might be that, if the evidence is well balanced, the
court would deny both the refund and the counterclaim (which might be much the
larger amount). See United States v. Molitor, 337 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1964). The Second
Circuit, however, has placed the burden of proof (not merely the burden of going forward)
on the taxpayer, so that he will be no better off for having avoided the need to pay and
sue for refund. Lesser v. United States, 368 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), sce United States
v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1965) (same view expressed in a collection suit),
208. INT. Rnv. CoDE of 1954, § 7422(e). See note 187 supra.
209. H.R. REP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A431 (1954); S. REP'. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 611 (1954).
210. In the Tax Court, the Commissioner's determination, unless arbitrary, Is pre,
sumptively correct, but the presumption disappears when the taxpayer Introduces evidence
sufficient to sustain a contrary finding, and the burden of proof is then held to be on the
Commissioner. Herbert v. Commissioner, 377 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1966); Robert Louis
Stevenson Apts. v. Commissioner, 377 F.2d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1964). Contra, United Aniline
Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701, 704 (Ist Cir. 1963). See 9 J. MERTENS, LAW Or FrtVErAL
INCOME TAXATION § 50.61 (1965). In a collection suit, or a counterclaim by the Govern-
ment outside the scope of § 7422(e), the taxpayer's burden is certainly no less, United
States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418, 422 (1882), United States v. Molitor, 837 F.2d 917, 922-25
(9th Cir. 1964), United States v. Strebler, 313 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1963), and may well be
greater. See note 207 supra.
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rule for the burden of proof applicable in all tax litigation, in whatever
forum it may arise and whoever may be the moving party.2 n
A problem closely related to the foregoing involves the right of the
taxpayer to raise the merits of his tax liability as a defense when the
Government has to resort to the district court in aid of collection
(independently of any refund suit by the taxpayer). Although the great
bulk of involuntary collection is effected by levy, without need for
judicial proceedings, the Government occasionally finds it necessary
or expedient to bring suit, either to foreclose its lien on property of the
taxpayer (especially where the existence of rival claims might make
it difficult to realize an adequate price on a sale under levy),2- or to
reduce the tax claim to judgment (and thus permanently toll the run-
ning of the statute of limitations). 13 The Government may also, when
joined as a defendant in a private foreclosure action in a federal or
state court, cross-claim against the taxpayer for foreclosure of its own
lien,2 14 or it may intervene for that purpose in a suit in which it has
not been joined.c 2 15
At one time the Government argued, and some courts held, that the
assessment was conclusive in such a proceeding, and that the taxpayer's
only recourse was to sue for refund in a separate proceeding.2 10 It now
seems well established, however, and is acknowledged by the Govern-
ment,2 17 that the taxpayer may raise the merits of the tax liability as a
defense to such a suit.218 This position has been criticized on the
ground that the taxpayer should be in no better position merely
because the Government is forced to sue than if the tax had been col-
211. This would not, of course, e.cude special rules for the burden of proof or of
going forward on particular issues. E.g., INw. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 269(c), 341(c), 534,
6902(a), 7454(a).
212. Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7403. See PLUM & TRcGHT 209-10.
213. PLU M 8. VRIGrT 4748..
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964).
215. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7424. In addition, the Govemment may file claims in
bankruptcy and receivership proceedings. Id. § 6871; Abel v. Campbell, 334 F.2d 939 (5th
Cir. 1964).
216. United States v. 360 Acres of Land, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 960 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Schwartz, 126 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1954). United States V.
Hauser, 25 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Cal. 1938); see Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.-d 909, 911-12 (2d Cir.
1960). The Government sought, in the House version of the bill that became the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Ses. § 7403(c) (1954)), expressly to make
the assessment conclusive in lien foreclosure actions, but the provision was not enacted.
H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sens. A431 (1954); S. RnP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
610 (1954).
217. See 1961 ATr'y GEN. ANN. RP. 310-I; Ferguson, supra note 171, at 318.
218. United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1961), repudiating (at the
instance of the Government) the contrary dictum in Pipola v. Chicco, 74 F-2d 909 (?d
Cir. 1960).
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lected administratively,219 and that the injection of the merits may
delay collection more than if the litigation involved only the issues
normally incident to a foreclosure suit.2 -2 0 But, once the matter is in
court, it seems a futile duplication of litigation to exclude considera-
tion of the merits in the first Suit. 2 2 1 The Government's power to collect
by administrative action from any property it can find which is not
directly involved in the pending suit need not be delayed or interfered
with, at least if the law is amended to provide expressly that it shall
not be.22 2 While it would ordinarily be inappropriate to levy on the
property which is the subject of the foreclosure suit,223 the Govern-
ment's interests therein can be protected by the appointment of a
receiver if necessary.224 The enforcement of non-federal liens that have
priority over the tax lien need not be delayed to await adjudication of
the merits of the tax; and subordinate non-federal liens can only be
benefited by a delay for that purpose.
225
The objection that permitting the taxpayer to raise the merits in a
collection suit forces the Government to assume the burden of proof
can be met by expressly placing that burden on the taxpayer, as sug-
gested above in connection with counterclaims. 220 A further objection
219. The administrative levy (INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6331, 6332) has the practical
effect of an execution on a final judgment, even though the merits of the tax remain to
be determined. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); United States v.
Morris & Essex R.R., 135 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943).
See PLumB & WEIGHT 200-07.
220. In Note, Conclusiveness of the Merits of a Tax Assessment and lhe Congressional
Policy of Summary Tax Collection, 71 YALE L.J. 1329, 1334-36 (1962), the conclusiveness
rule is supported on this ground in the case of foreclosure suits, which are likened to levies,
On the other hand, it is there acknowledged that the merits should be open in a suit to
reduce the tax to a personal judgment (frequently brought when the statute of limitations
is about to expire), in order to get the issues settled without further delay. Since the
Government in a foreclosure suit normally asks a personal judgment as well, unless it
lacks personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer, and since the taxpayer could raise the merits
only if he appears, the distinction seems an academic one. See 84 A.B.A. RE., 677 (1959)
(discussion without recommendation).
221. If the merits can be raised as a defense to the collection suit, it follows that the
taxpayer must raise them there or not at all, and the judgment will bar contesting the
issue by later suit for refund, United States v. Hoper, 242 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1957), United
States v. Graham, 243 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1957), or even in an already pending Tax Court
proceeding with respect to a jeopardy assessment. See United States v. Mauro, 243 F. Supp.
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In its discretion, the district court may defer to the Tax Court and
withhold final judgment until that body has reached a decision. United States v. O'Connor,
291 F.2d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 1961); Florida v. United States, 285 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1960).
Cf. Herman Roberson, 41 T.C. 577, 581 (1964).
222. Harding v. Woodcock, 137 US. 43 (1890). See p. 1145 supra.
2g3. Cf. Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1958).
224. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7403(d). In a state court proceeding, the Government
would be dependent on state procedures. See note 228 infra, concerning litigation of the
merits of the tax in a state court.
225. Concerning the junior lienor's or purchaser's right to litigate the merits of the
tax if the taxpayer does not, see pp. 1183-84 infra.
226. See notes 207-10 supra.
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has been raised that the same issues might have to be litigated re-
peatedly if the merits may be raised in foreclosure suits involving
property worth less than the amount of the tax.2T The problem is not
likely to arise, however, because the Government's practice is to ask
for a personal judgment for the full tax in conjunction with a fore-
closure suit, if personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer is obtained. And
he must, of course, make an appearance if he is to defend on the merits.
Thus, if the merits are placed in issue, they will be conclusively decided
by the first suit, even if later suits to reach other property prove neces-
sary.
There may be some question, however, whether the Government
should have to litigate the merits of the tax if the taxpayer raises
such a defense when the Government intervenes or cross-claims to
enforce a tax lien in a state court action. State courts are not equipped
by experience to determine complicated issues of federal tax lia-
bility.2 s Rather than deny the taxpayer that defense, however, and
force him to bring a later suit for refund, the Government should
follow the practice of removing such cases to the federal court when
a defense on the merits is raised. -29 In order to facilitate that practice,
the American Bar Association recommended that the time for seek-
ing removal (which now expires 30 days after the Government re-
ceives the initial pleading or summons, before the taxpayer frames
the issues he will rely on)23o should run from the receipt of any plead-
227. Note, supra note 220, at 1336 n.48. Reverting to the case of a $50,000 assement
involving five disputed $10,000 issues (p. 1145 supra), a suit to foreclose a lien on property
worth $10,000 might be disposed of by deciding any one of the issues for the Government.
making the others unnecessary to the decision and theoretically requiring their relitigation
in the next suit to foreclose on other property.
228. A recent decision holds that, since a state court is not qualified to consider sub-
stantive federal tax issues, it must allow the Government's claim without question, leaving
the taxpayer to his remedy by suit for refund. P.C. Monday Tea Co. v. Milvaukee County
Expressway Comm., 29 Wis. 2d 372, 139 N..2d 26 (1966). But see United States v Hoper,
242 F.2d 468 (holding that failure to raise defense on the merits when Government filed
claim in state probate court precluded later refund suit); Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tax.
571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949) (passing on the merits).
229. The Government has the right to remove to the federal court any foreclosure or
similar suit in which it is joined, 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1964) and even one in which it
intervenes. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7424. Since mortgage foreclosures ought not to be
made a burden on the federal courts, the right is exercised sparingly, unless it is anticipated
that the merits of the tax will be controverted. Certain proceedings (receivership, probate,
etc.) may not be removed by the United States, but a federal court determination of the
merits may be obtained by suing the representative for the tax and then filing the judg-
ment as a claim in the state proceeding. See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien
Problems, 13 TAx L. Rv. 247, 281 (1958).
230. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 138, § 83, 62 Stat. 101, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
(Supp. I, 1965). The taxpayer, when he is a co-defendant in a mortgage foreclosure suit.
would not have raised his defenses to the Government's plea for affirmative relief until
after that time. When the United States intervenes under IN'r. RE%, CoDE of 1954. § 7424,
it is unclear when the time for removal would run.
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hug, motion, order, or other paper which for the first time injects
into the case any new issue concerning a right of the United States.zI
3. Recovery by Taxpayer for Damages Suffered
The taxpayer against whom an erroneous assessment is enforced
may suffer damages far exceeding the face amount of the tax liability,
damages which cannot be redressed merely by refunding the amount
of the tax with interest. At the very least, his property will probably
have been sacrificed at forced sale prices, and in some cases he may have
had his credit impaired and his business interrupted or wholly de-
stroyed. Similar injuries may, of course, be suffered by one who actually
owes the asserted tax liability, but must in that event be accepted as
the normal lot of the delinquent debtor. Even that taxpayer, however,
may have a just complaint if his property is sold without following the
procedures which the law has provided to ameliorate or prevent such
harms,282 or if his property is sold when it should legally have been
retained by the tax collector to await the outcome of litigation over a
jeopardy assessment,233 or if loss or damage to his property while in
custody prevents his receiving credit for what might have been realized
from its sale.
2 34
231, The Bar proposed that the time run 20 days from such date, but It should
be 30 days in view of the general enlargement of time now provided by 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)
(Supp. I, 1965). It was also proposed that the federal court be permitted, in its discretlon,
to remand the case to the state court after disposing of the federal issues. 84 A.B.A.
REP. 677, 736, 739 (1959). The idea of removing the case to the federal court for the sole
purpose of determining the federal rights, and then remanding for final action by the
state court, was embodied in the House-passed version of H.R. 980, in 1931, dealing with
making the United States a defendant in mortgage foreclosure suits (see note 349 infra).
It was argued that "[t]he balanced scheme of the bill thus preserves the rights of cach
sovereign power within its proper sphere of action. The junsdiction of the State courts
over its real estate is preserved while at the same time the granting of the right of re-
moval to the Federal courts for the determination of the status of the Government's lien
spares the Federal Government from having its interests passed on by a State court."
H.R. REP. No. 95, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). The Senate rejected that view, contending
that the state courts could be relied on to deal fairly with federal rights, and that re-
moval and remand of every case would entail needless delay and expense. S. Rr,. No. 351
71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). The final compromise, the antecedent of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1444
and 2410, permitted state courts to adjudicate federal rights in mortgage foreclosures un.
less the United States asked removal, in which case all issues would be dealt with by the
federal court. The present proposal would, like the 1931 House bill, preserve the state
court's proper sphere, but would eliminate the objectionable feature of that bill, by re-
moving only those cases where the Government considers it essential, and leaving remand
to the discretion of the federal court in the light of the circumstances of each case. In
order to minimize the trespass on Judiciary Committee jurisdiction, the provisions in this
and the preceding note were omitted from the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.
232. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §§ 6335-36. The requirements are detailed in Plumb, supra
note 229, at 272-75.
233. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6863(b)(3). Cf. Smith v. Flinn, 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.
1958), modified, 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959) (injunction).
234. A recurring situation involves levies on receivables, which after levy the taxpayer.
creditor is helpless to collect, and which the tax collector then fails to pursue, with the
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Under the modem adaptation of the ancient feudal principle that
"the king can do no wrong,"2 5 it seems clear that in none of those
circumstances can the wronged taxpayer obtain compensation from
the United States for his injuries,230 except by the unsatisfactory process
of getting a private bill through Congress, which simply does not have
the time or facilities for making an impartial "judicial" determination
of the facts.2-T For more than 150 years, that was the only means by
which a citizen could obtain redress from the Government for tortious
injuries. In 1946, however, culminating over 20 years of effort to achieve
reform, Congress delegated to the courts the power to adjudicate tort
claims against the Government-subject to a number of exceptions.2--3
One type of claim for which relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act
is expressly denied is "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of goods by any
officer of customs or excise ... ."-O The precise reason for that ex-
clusion is obscure.2 40 It is not separately discussed in the reports, but
is referred to only as one of a group of exceptions for "claims which
relate to certain governmental activities which should be free from the
threat of damage suits or for which adequate remedies are already
result that they become uncollectible. The taxpayer receives no credit on his taxes for
the amounts not collected from his debtors, and is denied recovery of damages. Catalina
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 763 (Ct. Cl. 1958); United States v. Banner,
226 F. Supp. 904 (N.D.N.Y. 1963); Estate of Samuel Stein, 40 T.C. 275, 278 (1963). Recovery
in tort for goods seized under the tax laws, then lost or misdelivered, iwas denied in
Chambers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 601 (D. Kan. 1952). On the other hand, recovery
was allowed, both in tort and on an implied contract to use due care, where goods detained
under the customs laws mysteriously disappeared. Alliance Assur. Co. v. United States, 252
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Agnew v. Haymes, 141 F. 631 (4th Cir. 1905) (limited
tort remedy against tax collector).
235. For an excellent capsule review of the history of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, see Developments in the Law-Remedies against the United States and Its
Oflicials, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 827, 829-50 (1957). See also Nelson, Sotereign Immunity and
Federal Liens, 26 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 18 (1959).
236. Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593, 598 (1893); Heasley v. United States, 348 F.2d
40, 42 (8th Cir. 1965); cases cited note 234 supra &- notes 243, 260 infra.
237. Congress tends to rely heavily on the facts reported by the accused agency,
although it may refer the matter to the courts for determination of the facts. See 64 A.B.A.
REP. 211 (1939); Gellhom 9: Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims against the
United States, 55 COLum. L. REv. 1, 5 (1955). Such a reference, pursuant to 28 US.C.
§§ 1492, 2509 (1964), was made by Congress to the Court of Claims following the decision
in Catalina Properties, Inc. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 763 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Id., 230 F.2d
380 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
238. Federal Tort Claims Act, Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1916,
ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. The history of the reform effort
is recorded in Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35
GEo. L.J. 1 (1946). See also United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949) referring to
twenty-eight years of congressional "drafting and redrafting," dating from 1919.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1964). The exception precludes administrative relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), as well as judicial relief.
240. The list of exceptions went through many accretions and attritions during the
many years such bills were pending, but the tax exception, which was in the bill intro-
duced in 1925 (S.1912. 69th Cong., 1st Sess.), if not earlier, survived to the end. See United
States v. Muniz, 874 U.S. 150, 155 (1963) (which ignores the pre-1925 bills, note 238 supra).
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available." 241 The commentators have assumed that Congress con-
sidered the tax collection exception to fall in the second category
42
but, if so, Congress acted under a misapprehension, for the existing
remedies by refund suit and in the Tax Court afford no relief for tor-
tious wrongs.243 More likely the Internal Revenue Service, placing
itself on a plane with the military's "combatant activities ... during
time of war,"244 quietly persuaded Congress that its functions were
"activities which should be free from the threat of damage suits." If
the sovereign is no longer without sin, at least it may still be said
that "the Internal Revenue Service can do no wrong."
The traditional safety valve for the inequities of sovereign im.
munity, in the days when immunity was complete, was the judicial
development of theories by which redress might be obtained by per-
sonal suit against a public officer.24" The officer could be sued for
damages caused by his nonperformance or malperformance of minis-
terial duties246-and even for unlawful acts done, without personal
fault, under superior orders.2 4 Congress collaborated in the fiction, in
the case of revenue officers, by indemnifying them out of public funds
if they acted under orders or had "probable cause" for their actions.
2 48
But the remedy had its limitations and may now even be extinct. A
tax assessment was deemed sufficient warrant for its enforcement, and
hence an officer who followed legal requirements was protected from
liability for the harm (over and above the amount collected) caused
241. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946) (emphasis added).
242. Gottlieb, supra note 238, at 45; Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE
I-J. 54, 547 (1947).
243. The contention that the exception related only to errors in the determination of
tax liability (for which another remedy does exist), and not to "collection of a tax by
wrongful means," was rejected in Broadway Open Air Threatre v. United States, 208 F.2d
257 (4th Cir. 1953). See also United States v. Worley, 213 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 917, 918 (1955); Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553 (S.T.N.Y. 1qG7),
aff'd per curiam, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9301 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Banner, 226 F.
Supp. 904 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
244. Excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1964).
245. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). See Developments in the Law, supra
note 235, at 830. The process paralleled the development of the "personal" liability of tax
collectors for the refund of customs and internal revenue taxes erroneously assessed, a
fiction which served as "a remedial expedient for bringing the Government into cotirt."
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 383 (1933). See Plumb, Tax Rejtund
Suits against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HAiv. L. REV. 685, 687-91 (1947).
246. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Agnew v. Haymes, 141 F. 631
(4th Cir. 1905).
247. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1964); INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7423(2). See George Moore Ice
Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 US. 373, 382 (1933). The very fact that the officer was thus
indemnified caused the court in Film Truck Service, Inc. v. Nixon, 216 F. Supp. 77 (ED,
Mich. 1963), to view a suit against the officer for his own tort as an attempted evasion of
the sovereign immunity from tort suits.
1152
Federal Liens and Priorities
by such enforcement, even though the assessment turned out to be
erroneous249 Furthermore, the superior official who formally or actu-
ally made the erroneous tax determinations was sheltered from personal
liability under the doctrine that the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion must be free from that threat.2 0 And even in the case of wrongs
negligently, knowingly or maliciously committed by subordinate of-
ficers, for which there once was a remedy, the trend of modem decisions
is to grant absolute immunity, in order that they may not be hesitant
to act with the boldness and expedition that the circumstances may
require.
2 5 1
It may be acknowledged that the tax collection function is too im-
portant to be hampered by imposing on the revenue officers a threat
of ruinous personal liability for error. -2 52 But it is the public as a whole
that benefits through more efficient and effective operations from the
officer's personal immunity. It is more consistent wiith the "steadily
expanding cqnception of public morality"2 - that the losses caused by
the inevitable excesses and mistakes should not be borne by the indi-
vidual taxpayer but should be "charged against the public treasury
[so that] they are in effect spread among those who contribute finan-
cially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden on
each taxpayer is relatively slight.' 12  Tax collection would suffer no
more from the Government's acceptance of that responsibility than
have the other vital governmental functions which have been subject to
it for many years.2 55
249. Harding v. Woodcock, 137 U.S. 43 (1890); Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
613 (1871); Herwig v. Crenshaw, 188 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.. 905
(1952); Powell v. Rothensies, 183 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1950).
250. Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 605 (1934). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Cooper v. O'Connor,
99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938). See Developments in the Law,
supra note 235, at 834-37.
251. Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961); National Dairy Products Corp. v.
O'Connell, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9598 (D.R.L 1966). See also Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d
855 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F-2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). But cf. Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir.
1965). In the area of non-tax torts, this policy is carried to the point that even the Govern-
ment itself, when held liable under the Tort Claims Act, is denied a remedy over against
the offending employee. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
252. The indemnity provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1964) and by Iter. Rrx. CODE of
1954, § 7423(2), might be deemed, under the modern philosophy, to afford the employee
insufficient assurance for this purpose, since he would have to establish "probable cause."
253. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). See also National City Bank v. Republic of Chula, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955).
254. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957), discussing the general
policy of the Federal Tort Claims Act. On like grounds, it has been urged that the contro-
verial "discretionary function" exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964), should be modified.
Developments in the Law, supra note 235, at 838, 900.
255. The abortive notion that "it was not contemplated that the Government should
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Rather than merely repealing the exception to the Tort Claims Act
quoted above (a reform which might be partially nullified by a labored
reading of certain other exceptions from the coverage of the Act,250 and
by the reluctance of judges to acknowledge that a new law changes
familiar concepts25 7), Congress should recognize that tax collection has
no clear counterpart in the private sector 258 and should tailor its ac-
ceptance of liability to the special circumstances. 25 90 The law should
expressly provide that the taxpayer from whom an erroneous tax is
exacted shall be entitled, without need for showing negligence in the
determination, to recover not merely the tax paid but any conse-
quential damages suffered,2 0 if he has taken all reasonable steps to
be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or function," Daldit
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953), was quickly abandoned by the Supreme Court,
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See Caruso, An Analysis of the
Evolution of the Supreme Court's Concept of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FE. B.J.
35 (1966). Repeal of the tax collection exception (and all but two of the others) was urged
by Judge Holtzoff in his review of L JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL ToRT CLAIsS (1964), In 53
GEo. L.J. 1151, 1153 (1965).
256. The exception for claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1064),
although confined by some courts to acts on the policy and planning levels rather than on
the operational level (United Air Lines v. Weiner, 334 F.2d 379, 392-93 (9th Cir., 1904),
petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98
(9th Cir. 1962)), is applied by others whenever an exercise of judgment by an operating em-
ployee goes amiss. E.g., Blitz v. Boot, 328 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
855 (1964). See Developments in the Law, supra note 235, at 894; Jayson, Application of the
Discretionary Function Exception, 24 Fan. B.J. 153 (1964). Decisions broadly immunizing rev.
enue officers from personal liability for acts involving judgment or discretion, e.g., O'Campo
v. Hardisty, 262 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958), might be applied to restrict relief against the United
States if the Tort Claims Act were merely made applicable to tax collection cases, without
further amendment. In addition, one court has declared that the Tort Claims Act applies
only to negligent acts and not to wrongs which amount to a conversion of property, United
States v. Banner, 226 F. Supp. 904 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), a conclusion that is difficult to reconcile
with the jurisdictional words of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), "negligent or wrongful act or
omission." See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956); Aleutco Corp. v. United
States, 244 F.2d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1957). See also note 263 infra, regarding the po3sible
effect of the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) for "interference with contract rights."
257. See Caruso, supra note 255, attributing the Supreme Court's initial reluctance
to apply the Tort Claims Act to the fact that "[ a]ll human beings [in which category
he includes Supreme Court justices] are in favor of progress-provided it doesn't change
anything they believe in."
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964) makes the United States liable "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." The absence of any
private parallel to the Government's relationship to the armed forces caused the Court to
deny servicemen a remedy under the Act, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950),
although the Court-after going through some evolution in its thinking, Caruso, supra
note 255-held otherwise as to claims by the inmates of federal prisons. United States v,
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
259. Cf. INT. REV, CODE of 1954, § 7426 (Supp. II, 1965-66), which constructs a system
of remedies for third parties injured by tax collection, but unfortunately (in harmony
with the present policy of the Tort Claims Act) omits a remedy for consequential damageg
suffered through the seizure and sale of one person's property for another's tax. See note
326 infra.
260. In Harding v. Woodcock, 137 U.S. 43 (890), the Court denied recovery againt the
tax collector for such a loss, suggesting that te liability, if any, was that of the Govern-
ment. Id. at 43. But in Kjar v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 119, 140.41, cert. denied,
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delay collection until the dispute has been settled.20' The taxpayer who
suffers harm through unlawful acts or omissions in the enforcement of
a tax, whether valid or invalid, should also be entitled to recover.2 "a
The recovery, however, should in either event be limited to actual
pecuniary loss. 2 3 Even though jury trials are excluded,2 the Internal
Revenue Service is too attractive a target to risk subjecting it to judicial
measurement of the mental pain and anguish resulting from improper
tax collection 26
5
B. Remedies of Person Levied On
The federal tax collector may levy upon all property or rights to
property belonging to a delinquent taxpayer or on which a lien
332 U.S. 768 (1947), the court on rehearing (not included in the report in 69 F. Supp.
406) declared: "It is true that the assessment was erroneous and consequently that the
levy and sale of the property pursuant to the assessment was erroneous; however, vhen the
Government returns to the taxpayer whose property has been erroneously seized and sold
the amount it has received for the property, it has discharged the full responsibility
placed upon it by the law. There is no duty to realize from a sale of property its full
market value, and which makes the United States liable if it fails to do so." Despite the
court's denial of a "duty," the court suggested the possibility of tort liability but bad no
power to impose it. The violation of duty, of course, lies not in the sale but in the
wrongful assessment, of which the sale and the sacrifice of value are consequences. If the
assessment is only partially incorrect, the sale might have occurred irrespective of the
error; it would be necessary to determine whether the injury would have been as great if
only the correct amount had been collected.
261. A taxpayer who voluntarily (compare note 177 with no e 193 supra) passes up te
opportunity to defer collection by petitioning the Tax Court with respect to a disputed
tax, there being no finding of jeopardy, would be in no position to complain of thc injury
caused by enforced collection. Whether a taxpayer should be required to attempt to defer
collection by injunction would depend on whether that remedy is made more readily
available, see pp. 11.940, 1144 supra, and on whether the taxpayer's financial situation
made such an effort feasible. But at least the existence of the dispute -should have been
made known to the tax collector so that he could avoid the injury by deferring collection if
he saw fit to do so.
262. See p. 1150 supra.
263. This might, however, include recovery for loss of use of property, Laney Tank
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 205 (E.DS.C. 1965), and lost profits from a
destroyed or damaged business. See United States v. Griffith, Gornall - Carman, Inc..
210 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1954). 28 US.C. § 2680(h) (1964) excludes liability under the Tort
Claims Act for "[a]ny claim arising out of ... interference with contract rights," which
has been read by some courts to exclude recovery of damages for any tort so far as it
results in interference with business. Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1964);
Dupree v. United States, 264 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.), rehearing denied, 266 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959); United States v. Mullins, 228 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. Va.
1964); Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Therefore, it may be
desirable to clarify the law in order that only the specific tort described as "interference
with contract rights" will be excluded, as was held, under present law, in Nicholson v.
United States, 177 F.2d 768, 769 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Ein Chemical Corp., 161
F. Supp. 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
265. The Tort Claims Act does not permit recovery of "punitive" damages, but the
only express limitation to "actual or compensatory damages, measured by... pecuniary
injuries" relates to certain wrongful death cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964). In other cases,
recovery for pain, suffering and mental anguish may be allowed. Dempsey v. United States,
176 F. Supp. 75, 83 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
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exists.26  A person in possession of such property or indebted to the
taxpayer must tread with care, as he is literally "the man in the middle."
If he improvidently satisfies his original obligation to the taxpayer in
disregard of the levy, he must pay again to the tax collector, probably
with a 50 per cent penalty added,267 and it will be no defense for him
that the taxpayer did not in fact owe the tax.208 On the other hand, if
he honors the levy, he will have a complete defense to any liability to
the taxpayer for failure to pay the debt or to surrender the property
to him. 26 9 But he will not be protected against the claim of a third party
who may have an interest in or lien on the property or debt, unless the
circumstances are such that delivery or payment to the taxpayer himself
would be a defense m
When the person levied on has notice of such an adverse claim, he
may protect himself by interpleading the rival claimants, including the
United States. That procedure was facilitated by the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966, in which the Government expressly consented to be sued
in interpleader. 271 But the expense to the innocent stakeholder of
initiating such a proceeding may be substantial,21 2 and must be borne
by him without the customary reimbursement from the fund in court,
if the Government's claim to the property is sustained.21 3 It should be
possible to devise a simple standard procedure by which a person levied
on, knowing there are adverse claimants, may pay into court and be
discharged, without need for a formal pleading, merely by giving notice
or asking the court to give notice to the claimants.
Alternatively, Congress might provide that delivery or payment to
the United States, in response to a levy, of property or a debt in which
the taxpayer has or is claimed or believed to have an interest shall dis.
266. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6331(a).
267. IrNT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6332(a)-(c).
268. The merits of the tax are of no concern to the third party and may not be raised
by him as a defense to the levy. United States v. American Exch. Irving Trust Co., 43
F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
269. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 6332(d).
270. See Plumb, supra note 229, at 300-01.
271. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(5). Formerly, it was necessary to go through a ritual dance
in which the United States moved to be dismissed as a defendant for lack of consent-and
then immediately intervened in the suitl
272. Legal fees of $500 were incurred by the stakeholders in Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs,
140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 239
F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 355 U.S. 587 (1958), and United States v. Hubbell, 323 F.2d
197, 201 (5th Cir. 1963). And a fee as high as $1,500 has been reported. American Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 299 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
273. United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. Hub.
bell, 323 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963). See PLUMB & WRGHT 250. Although the liability of the
United States for the costs has been enlarged by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. II, 1965-66), "the
fees and expenses of attorneys" are still excluded.
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charge the obligation of the person levied upon, not only to the tax-
payer (as at present) but also to any other claimants. It would then be
up to the adverse claimants, the real parties in interest, to initiate
proceedings against the United States to establish their interests. Uncle
Sam, despite some lingering fears for his solvency, is probably as safe a
custodian of the property or funds as the court clerk. And the suggested
procedure would not merely relieve the stakeholder of expense and
risk, but would reduce litigation, since many interpleader claims are
now commenced by uneasy stakeholders with respect to possible claims
that would not be pressed at all if the initiative to litigate had to be
taken by the adverse claimant. But the acceptability of the proposal
depends upon the existence of a completely adequate system of rem-
edies against the United States by which the adverse claimant can
vindicate and protect his rights.274
Sometimes the person levied on may face the possibility of liability to
third parties unknown to him; in this situation he cannot protect him-
self by bringing an interpleader action. He may be required to sur-
render the taxpayer's property or pay an obligation, without the tax
collector having to produce the supporting document (note, warehouse
receipt, bill of lading, stock certificate, savings passbook, or insurance
policy) which the taxpayer himself would have had to produce. The
asserted threat of double liability may be illusory if the document
remaining at large is nonnegotiable, and if a previous transfer of the
document without notice to the obligor would not bind him. N But
the threat can be a real one if the document is negotiable, even if
negotiation is enjoined by a court.2 70 The risk of double liability may
also be present if the tax collector levies on a domestic bank with
respect to a foreigner's deposit in a foreign branch of the bank, when
274. A system of remedies against the United States for third parties wh0s property
has been taken under levy is provided in INT. RtV. CODE Of 1954, § 7426, added by the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. The procedure set out in the text -as suggested by a
government attorney to the Special Committee on Federal Liens, but it did not find favor
because of doubts (perhaps remediable) concerning the adequacy of § 7426 to protect the
adverse claimant's position in the way it would be protected ff the property or fund were
in judicial custody. See p. 1165 infra.
275. Accordingly, savings accounts may be levied upon without surrender of the pass.-
book. United States v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 198 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 195-2); United States
v. Bowery Savings Bank, 297 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1961). And life insurance may be levied
upon without surrender of the policy. IN-r. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 6332(b)(1); Equitable life
Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 33 (lst Cir. 1964).
276. An injunction against transfer by the taxpayer, as in United States v. LusA, 65-1
U.S. Tax. Cas. 9156 (N.D. MI1. 1964), and United States v. Schuermann, 105 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Mo. 1952), would not protect the person levied on if in fact a transfer has already
been made, or if a transfer is later made in contempt of court. See UNtronnr Comt'Ensr
CoDE § 8-317, Comment 1; Austin S.& Nelson, Attaching and Leqing on Corporate Shares,
16 Bus. LAw. 336 (1961).
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a court in this country has no power to protect the foreign branch from
being required by a foreign court to pay the depositor 2 17
The American Bar Association proposed that when the tax collector
fails to surrender a document in connection with a levy, the Govern-
ment should indemnify and defend the person levied upon in the event
of any claim being made by a holder of the document,2 8 but the
provision was omitted from the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. The
proposal could readily be broadened to cover levies on foreign bank
deposits.2 79 The alternative discussed above, by which the person levied
on would be discharged of liability to third parties, whose exclusive
remedy would then be against the United States,.2 0 might equally
serve to remove the risk of double liability in cases of failure to sur-
render documents; but it would not resolve the problem where levies
are made to reach deposits in foreign branch banks, since the statutory
discharge could not be made effective in a foreign court.
In general, the person levied on may resist the levy on any sub-
stantive ground establishing that he is not obligated to the taxpayer.281
But what of defenses that do not exist at the time the tax lien attaches
to all the taxpayer's property, although they arise before the levy is
made? Some courts adhere to the view that, as soon as the lien attaches,
"the property has, in effect, two owners, the United States and the tax-
payer,"'282 and that "once a federal tax lien has attached to such a
portion [of a debt] it is no longer a part of the balance 'due' the [tax-
payer] but is 'due' to the Government." 2 3 Courts influenced by that
concept are apt to hold that the Government cannot be concluded by
a compromise or concession made by the taxpayer after the Govern-
277. See United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 401-02 (1965) (dissenting
opinion), and the opinions below, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), reaffirmed en bane, 325 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1964), which the Supreme Court reversed. See Plumb, What the Jianlwr
Should Know about Federal Tax Liens and Levies-Revisited, 84 BANKING L.J. 1, 6-9
(1967).
278. 84 A.B.A. REP. 697-98, 727 (1959). Compare the provisions for indemnification
where a note or document of title cannot be surrendered because it has been lost, stolen
or destroyed. UNIFonc CommEacLTA CoDE §§ 3-804, 7-601. There would be no occasion to
require a bond where the indemnitor is the United States.
279. With the bank thus protected, the tax collector might feel less constrained to use
such levies sparingly, see Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-1(a)(2) (1964), and the Government might
benefit in those cases where its jurisdiction to reach the deposit by levy on the domestic
bank is recognized by the foreign court or is not challenged.
280. P. 1157 supra.
281. Cf. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
282. See Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D. Iowa 1957). This unfortunate
verbal flourish originated in United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965 (4th
Cir. 1941), where the issue presented involved merely the priority of liens.
283. Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319, 335 (N.D. Iowa 1961). See PLuMn & WS.-oiit
238-39, from which this discussion is in part drawn.
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ment becomes his "silent partner," so the later levy may force the
obligor to reopen the merits of his liability. -84 Furthermore, since a
local statute of limitations cannot run against a claim once it becomes
owned by the United States, such a court may also hold an obligor
liable to respond to a levy made years after he has lost or properly
destroyed the evidence on which he might have based a defense, if
the tax lien against his creditor arose unknown to the obligor, before
the statute expired.28 The Service has not attempted to pursue that
theory to the point of requiring a debtor on whom no levy has been
made to ascertain the Government's interest by searding the records
before paying a debt,2s6 although one court adhering to the "co-owner-
ship" theory has credited the Service's position to self-restraint rather
than to the requirements of the law.27
The better reasoned decisions, however, although they have not
dealt with those specific issues, recognize that "the lien, unaccompanied
by timely service of notice of levy, did not amount to an assignment
or attachment of the claim and the creation of a debt due the United
States,"288 and that "the Commissioner acts pursuant to the collection
process in the capacity of lienor as distinguished from owner."2' 5 In
284. Bensinger v. Davidson, 147 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (settlement reopened);
United States v. Rentz, 213 F. Supp. 521 (NJ). Iowa 1962) (taxpayer's default on cross-
claim by debtor held not to relieve debtor of liability to Government, whicl is entitled
to litigate merits). See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problens, 13 TAx L. RE .
247, 310 (1958).
285. United States v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182 (D.N.J. 1957); United States v. Polan
Indus., 196 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.W. Va. 1961). In Polan, the levy (as well as the lien)
came within the local period of limitations, and only the suit was late; but the court by
dictum approved Jacobs, where the levy was not made within such time. See PLU.SW &
WIUGHT 245. The Government may be bound by a time limitation whid is expr ecd as
a condition to the contract obligation of the taxpayer's debtor. General Cas. Co. v.
United States, 205 F.2d 753, 755 (5th Cir. 1953).
286. Rev. Rul. 57-367, 1957-2 Cuor. Buu.. 846. The ruling held out the threat of com-
mon law tort liability for impairment of the lien if the debtor paid the taxpayer with
actual, rather than constructive, knowledge of the lien, and such liability (of an escrow
agent) was sustained in United States v. Allen, 207 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Wash. 1962). See
PLUME & WRNGHT 24043. In a recent "clarifying" ruling, the Service has withdrawn the
implied threat (which some tax collectors made expressly) that a bank might be charge-
able with knowledge of the lien after one levy (not fully satisfied) had been made, and
that the bank might incur tort liability if it failed to watch for new deposits and give
the tax collector an opportunity to levy again before honoring checks or withdrawals.
Rev. Rul. 67-162, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 356.
287. See Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D. Iowa 1957); Note, Effect of a
Federal Tax Lien on a Bank Deposit, 42 IowA L. Rxv. 412 (1957). But see Plumb, supra
note 284, at S09-10.
288. United States v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 217 F. Supp. 287, 288 (W.D.N.Y. 1963). The
court relied on In re Cherry Valley Homes, Inc., 255 F.2d 706, 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied sub nor. DuBois v. United States, 358 U.S. 864 (1958) (discussed in First Install-
ment, 248 n.155) and United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955), both of which
treated the levy as appropriating the debt to the tax claim.
289. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116 (3d Cir. 1954). See also United States
v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94, 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Brewster-Ra)mond Co., 344 F.d
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harmony with that view, the American Bar Association urged amend-
ment of the law to provide expressly, not only that payment of a debt
prior to levy should be a defense, but also that any other valid setoff or
defense which might have been maintained in an action commenced
by the taxpayer at the time of the levy (or at maturity of the obligation,
if later) should be valid against a levy or a lien foreclosure suit by the
Government.290 The proposal was not enacted, but should be con-
sidered further.
The question of setoff is particularly troublesome.201 There is much
equitable appeal in the view that one should not have to pay over to
the tax collector, in response to a levy for taxes of one's creditor, a debt
which could not be enforced by the creditor himself because he in turn
is indebted to the person levied on; and the courts generally have taken
that view in cases not involving bank accounts. Some courts have
focused, as did the Bar's legislative proposal, upon the extent of the
taxpayer's property right in the debt levied upon, based upol whether
the debtor's right of setoff had matured and could have served as a
defense under state law at the date of levy;292 but others consider the
rights of the parties with regard to setoff as fixed when the lien arises
and attaches to the debt.2 3 In bank cases the setoff has lately been
viewed, not as limiting the depositor's property right in his account,
but as constituting an "inchoate lien" securing the bank's claim against
the depositor.294 Even viewed as a lien, the bank's setoff right may be in
a stronger position under the 1966 Act than it used to be, if the setoff
903, 910 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that even a levy amounts to no more than a perfection
of the lien by seizure and does not make the Government the owner).
290. 84 A.B.A. REP. 697-98, 726-27 (1959). An exception would be made for instances
in which payment was made or a defense or setoff was acquired in bad faith, in order to
aid the taxpayer in hindering, evading or defeating collection of the tax.
291. See PLUMB 9- Wpaoirr 121-25; Dunker, The Contractual Right of Set Off: Its Eflec-
tiveness with Respect to Advances to Agents, 20 PRoc. Ass'N. Lirz INs. CouNsEL 79, 109-24
(1967).
292. United States v. Raley Contracting Co., 210 F. Supp. 54 (ND. Miss. 1962). Early
cases took the same position with respect to bank setoff. United States v. Bank of Shelby,
68 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1934); United States v. Bank of United States, 5 F. Supp. 942
(SM..N.Y. 1934).
293. United States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318 (SMD. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub non. Cali-
fornia v. United States, 195 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 q952):
In re City of New York (DeKalb Ave. Reconstruction), 11 App. Div. 2d 240, 205 N. '.S.2d
125 (1960), aff'd per curzam, 12 N.Y.2d 1051, 190 N.E.2d 250 (1963); see the conceptual
conflict discussed at pp. 1158, 1159 supra.
294. On that ground, the unexercised right of setoff was held ineffective against the
tax levy, whether the right came into existence only as a result of the levy itself, Bank of
Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 856 U.S. 938 (1958), or
had already matured but had not been exercised before the levy. Bank of America v.
United States, 345 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965), aff'g 229 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Cal. 1964), cert,
denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965). Cf. the comment of Prof. Gilmore in 1 SEcunn'y INTEnIsTs iN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.7, at 315-16 (1965).
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right can satisfy the revised requirements for "choateness" of a security
interestm---i.e., if (1) the right is provided by contract and not merely
by law;296 (2) the loan was made before the filing of the tax lien, or
possibly within 45 days thereafter without actual knowledge thereof;
9
and (3) the deposits in the account, against which setoff is sought, were
made before the tax lien was filed. s93 The banks quite naturally regard
such restrictions, requiring frequent searches for tax liens, as an unwar-
ranted impediment to their business and a threat to the security of
their unsecured loans. But it is unlikely that the Treasury would ever
acquiesce in setoff legislation if it made no exception for the situation
where, until the bank takes affirmative action, the depositor is privi-
leged to withdraw his funds at will for any purpose (including volun-
tary payment of his federal taxes).2 9
C. Remedies of Purchaser at Tax Sale
Tax sales are notoriously subject to the rule of caveat emptor,OO and
federal tax sales pursuant to administrative levies are no exception.
The purchaser, it is true, has some protection. The law makes the
certificate of sale of personal property prima fade evidence of the right
of the officer to make the sale, and conclusive evidence of the regularity
of his proceedings in making the sale.30' Although that conclusiveness
295. Under prior law, an unexercised right of setoff was given the protection accorded
to a "pledgee" (now translated, "holder of a security interest'), as against subsequently
filed tax liens. United States v. Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. La. 1966).
296. By federal definition, a "security interest" arises by contract, in contrast to a mere
lien, which is provided by law. INT. Rxv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(h)(1).
297. The 45-day leeway would apply only if there was a loan agreement, antedating
tax lien filing, which is effective under local law to make the bank's right to offset later
advances superior to intervening judgment liens. INrr. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(d).
298. INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(d)(l)(A)-(h)(l)(A). This may involve a problem of
tracing-i.e., whether the amounts in the account are the earliest or the latest deposits.
But at least the minimum balance which the loan agreement requires to be maintained
should be protected.
299. In one of the cases that provoked the Government to take a strictposition on
bank setoff, it is understood that a succession of levies had been made on the account.
and each time the bank asserted that, in view of its right to set off an outstanding note.
there was no debt due to the depositor, but the setoff was not in fact made, and the
bank allowed the depositor to continue to enjoy the benefit of the account. From the
bank's viewpoint, it may be said that the bank was merely extending a fluctuating line of
credit to the taxpayer, equal to the net excess of the note over the deposit, and that the
Government should not complain if, after levy, the bank permitted him to increase the
net debt by drawing on the account. See United States v. Bank of United States. 5 F.
Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), characterizing the privilege of withdrawal as a mere "re-
vocable license." But it is difficult to justify giving such security a more favored position
than commercial and other security interests, with respect to loans and deposits made
after filing of a tax lien.
300. See 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 905b (1954); cf. Waples v. United States. 110 US. 630
(1884); The Monte Allegre, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 616, 644 (1824).
301. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6339(a)(1). A deed of realty sold under levy, on the
other hand, is merely "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." rd. § 6339(b)(1).
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does not extend to the regularity of the prior notice of the sale, the
sale will ordinarily be set aside for such a defect only upon the condi-
tion that the taxpayer repay the purchase price, which was applied on
his tax liability.302 The validity and finality of the sale are not affected
if the taxpayer is later found not to have owned the tax.803 But, since
the sale is made without warranty and purports to pass no more than
the taxpayer's right, title and interest in the property, subject to all
liens and interests which are superior to the tax lien, 04 the purchaser
cannot demand a dear title; 3015 nor apparently can he be reimbursed for
his loss if the title is defective or unexpectedly encumbered, unless
perhaps on the ground of mutual mistake if the property sold proves
not to have been property subject to the lien at all.3 00
If the Government has advance knowledge of an adverse claim which
it disputes, it may elect to set the matter at rest by judicial foreclosure
of the tax lien, 0 7 which is an in rem proceeding that normally sets at
rest all possible claims to the property.8 0 But that procedure may be
time-consuming and costly, and the Government is unlikely to resort
to it if the adverse claim appears frivolous or if the property is not of
substantial value. The property may be sold administratively, free of
an adverse claim, if the claimant agrees to the transfer of the liens to
the sale proceeds, subject to later litigation. 0 The adverse claimant
may seek to block the sale and recover the property by himself initi-
ating litigation before sale.3 10 The claimant, however, may not know
of the proposed administrative sale in time to assert his interest, or
he may content himself with announcing his claim at the sale.
302. Margiotta v. District Director, 214 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1954). If the taxpayer does
not complain of the tax collector's noncompliance with a requirement imposed for the
taxpayer's protection, the tax collector cannot avail of that irregularity as an excuse to
take back and resell the property. Bartell v. Riddell, 202 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
303. Gottlieb v. Cohen, 93 Ga. App. 268, 91 S.E.2d 362 (1956).
304. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6339; Mansfield v. Excelsior Ref. Co,, 135 U.,. 826
(1890).
305. United States v. Pee Dee Coach Lines, 55-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9650 (E.D.S.C. 1955),
Ordinarily, if the Government agrees with the purchaser's position concerning the extent
of the title conveyed, it will, without indemnifying him, render him Informal assistance
in his contest with adverse claimants. E.g., Atlas Fin. Co. v. Wilkerson, 382 S.W.2d 529
(Tenn. 1964) (amicus curiae brief filed). If the purchaser loses out, his remedy, If any,
would appear to be against the taxpayer, whose debt he satisfied. Cf. United States v.
Duncan, 25 F. Cas. 927, 930 (No. 15,003) (C.C. Ill. 1850); Lewark v. Carter, 117 Ind. 206,
20 N.E. 119, 120 (1889).
306. Sandri v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1967).
307. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7403.
308. See United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 1956); cf. United
States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 17, 24 (4th Cir. 1958). Absent claimants not
personally served are bound, subject to their right to reopen the decree within one year.
28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1964).
309. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6325(b)(3), 7426(a)(3)-(b)(4).
310. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7426(b)()-(2); see pp. 1163-66 infra.
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The risk of such claims, known and unknown, as a result of which
the purchaser may lose the property or have to pay an additional
amount to dear the tide,31 naturally depresses the prices which can
be obtained at sales under levy. The resulting sacrifice of values may
reduce the Government's recovery, and thus add to the burdens of an
already distressed delinquent taxpayer. The more frivolous or unwar-
ranted the claim may be, the greater the injustice of selling the property
with the threat unresolved. Only the speculator (or in some cases the
taxpayer, through a relative or friend) can benefit from a system in
which uncertain tides are thus sold.
Better prices might be obtained if the law afforded the purchaser
more assurance of what he was getting at a sale under levy. Instead of
offering merely whatever title the taxpayer may own, the tax collector
might be required to make a representation (not a warranty) con-
cerning the extent of the tide being sold and the prior liens to which it
is recognized to be subject. Then, if the title fell short of the representa-
tion, the purchaser could be given a remedy against the Government
for his loss (including a right to implead the Government in any suit
by an adverse claimant); his recovery should be limited, however, to
the proceeds which the Government had retained.3L' The tax collector
could then recoup from other property of the taxpayer, the inadequacy
of whose tide to the first property caused the loss.' 32 While there may
be practical impediments of which I am unaware, the proposal at least
merits serious study.3 14
D. Remedies of True Owner
One of the important but less noticed aspects of the Federal Tax
311. Sheridan v. Allen, 153 F. 568 (8th Cir. 1907).
312. I cannot imagine the Government being willing to go further and make a war-
ranty sale, in which it might incur liability greater than the amount it had collected.
313. Suspension of the statute of limitations could be provided, as was done in con-
nection with the related problem of wrongful seizure of a third party's property, in Irr.
R V. CODE of 1954, § 6503(g), added by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.
314. The proposal was submitted to the Special Committee on Federal Liens of the
American Bar Association, which made no recommendation, believing itself unqualified
to assess the administrative considerations involved. 84 A.B.A. REP. 680 (1959). With re-
spect to the rule of caveat emptor at mortgage foreclosure sales, it has been said that "a
would-be purchaser . . . must either make an intensive title search before bidding on
property he has no assurance of acquiring or else forego bidding except at a figure that
would take into account the hazard he runs. Usually the first course is impracticable, and
the second is sure to dampen bidding and result in sacrificing the property at a price
below that normally attendant upon a forced sale. The better practice, therefore, is to
purport to sell a clear title. except as to paramount interests in the property which are
definitely stated in the.., notices of sale." 4 AmEcAN LAw oF P0orrfrY § 16.195. at
469 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). A perhaps unique instance in which Congress determined to
indemnify purchasers (of "land sold for direct taxes in the insurrectionary states') is
found in the Act of May 9, 1872, ch. 145, § 2, 17 Stat. 89.
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Lien Act of 1966 was the codification of the procedural rights of third
parties whose property is seized or threatened with seizure for the tax
liabilities of another. For generations the law had clearly delineated
the procedures by which a taxpayer might litigate his rights, but the
law was silent concerning the remedies of innocent third parties, whose
claims were therefore often defeated or delayed by procedural tech-
nicalities315-e.g., that the United States had not consented to be
sued, 16 that the district director could not be sued because he was
acting within the scope of his duties317 or had paid the proceeds into the
Treasury,318 or that federal jurisdiction was lacking. 19 The new law,
in which Congress has given its consent to suit against the United States
in the federal district courts whenever the property of one person has
been levied upon or sold for the taxes of another,3 20 marks a major step
forward, but in a number of respects the relief obtainable in such a suit
falls short of the reform which the American Bar Association has
sought.32
1
In such an action, the court may enjoin the enforcement of the levy
on, for example, a bank account or may prohibit the sale of the prop.
erty levied upon, provided the third party shows that he has rights
superior to the tax lien and that these rights would be irreparably
injured.322 Injunctive relief cannot be obtained in advance of levy,
however, even though the mere assertion of a tax lien or the threat
of a levy may be injurious to the third party.32 3 If seizure has occurred,
315. H.R. EP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1966).
316. Phillips v. United States, 346 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965); Trustees of Puritan Church
v. United States, 294 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1961); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d
297 (3d Cir. 1959); Nehf v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. J 9755 (N.D. 11. 1967).
317. Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961).
318. Manle Indus., Inc. v. Tomlinson, 244 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1957).
319. Morris v. United States, 303 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1962); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d
793 (9th Cir. 1957).
320. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7426. No dollar limit is imposed on the district court's
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(e) (Supp. 11, 1965-66). Venue lies in the district where the
property was situated at the time of the levy, or (if no levy was made) in the district
where the event occurred giving rise to the cause of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(c) (Supp. I,
1965-66).
321. 84 A.B.A. REP. 699, 728 (1959).
322. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7426(b)(1).
323. Suit under § 7426 may be brought only after levy, although surrender of the
property need not have occurred. INT. RV. CODE of 1954, § 7426(a)(1). Injunctions are
prohibited except pursuant to § 7426. Id. § 7421(a). The rule was the same under prior
law, Moore v. Hansen, 325 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1954), but the American Bar Association
had recommended that an injunction or declaratory judgment be obtainable by a third
party whether levy had been made or was merely threatened. 84 A.B.A. REp. 699 (1959).
In some circumstances, independently of § 7426, relief may be obtainable in advance of
levy by suit to quiet title or for a declaratory judgment, but subject to such procedural
uncertainties that it might be better to wait for the levy. See PLUMs & WRIGrr 221.22, A
recent case holds declaratory relief impliedly prohibited in circumstances where the law
now bars injunctions. Jules Hairstylists v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1967),
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the court may order the return of the money or of the specific prop-
erty levied upon.324 If the property has already been sold, however,
the third party may recover no more than the amount realized by the
United States from the sale.325 Thus, the innocent third party is not
only denied recovery for the damages from being unlawfully deprived
of the use of the property,320 but he cannot even be made whole for
the actual value of the property taken. -32  The new law makes no pro-
vision for relief if the third party's property is lost, injured, or de-
stroyed while in the custody of the tax collector.: Nor does the Act
provide for recovery in cases where a third party's money or property
has been delivered to the tax collector without formal levy by a per-
son having no right to do so.39
afd per curiam, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9207 (4th Cir. 1968). But cf. King v. United States,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9237 (Ct. Cl. 1968), which distinguishes dedaratory relief (not di-
rectly involving the merits of a tax) from the "coercive" form of equitable relief against
the United States which the statute restricts.
924. INr. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7426(b)()(A)-(B).
325. bT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7426(b)(2)(). The effect of this provision is uncertain,
in view of the fact that the purchaser at the tax sale acquires only the taxpayer's right,
title and interest in the property, see p. 1162 supra, and the owner has a remedy to re-
cover the property from the purchaser, if he can find him. Under prior law the Govern-
ment successfully contended that the owner thus lost nothing by the sale and could not
recover the proceeds. Horvitz v. Granger, 134 F. Supp. 957 (V.D. Pa. 1955). Recovery
against the United States under the new law, however, apparently is not meant to be
conditioned on inability to recover the property from the purchaser (as it would have
been under the American Bar Association proposal, infra note 327).
826. Such damages may not be recovered by the third party under the Tort Claims
Act. United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 125 F. Supp. 661, 663 (EDJ. Mo.
1954). See pp. 1151-52 supra. The Special Committee on Federal Liens, not wishing to
bite off too much at one time, refrained from recommending to the American Bar Asso-
ciation that "general liability of the United States for damages suffered" by the third
party be provided, in view of "the past unwillingness of Congress to extend the Tort
Claims Act to torts committed in enforcing the tax laws (questionable policy though that
may be)." Instead, the committee would leave that matter to "the 'common law' liability
of the officer committing the wrong" and to his right of indemnity from the United States.
84 A.B.A. REP. 728 (1959). In view of later decisions extending absolute immunity to the
officer (see authorities cited note 251 supra; PLUMB & RViGnT 219-21), further considera-
tion should be given to permitting recovery of such damages from the United States. See
note 263 supra.
327. Cf. note 260 supra, concerning similar losses of taxpayers against whom tax is
erroneously assessed. The American Bar Association proposal would have permitted re-
covery of the value of the third party's property, but only if the owner was unable to
recover the property from the purchaser or another person. 84 A.B.A. REP. 699, 728-29
(1959).
328. The American Bar Association recommended that the value of the property be
recoverable in such a case. 84 A.B.A. REP. 699, 728 (1959). Concerning the possibility of
relief under existing law, see note 234 supra.
329. Relief may be obtainable, however, without reference to the 1966 Act. Although
the United States in such cases has been held not subject to suit (for conversion) under
the Tort Claims Act, even if the tax collector is alleged to have known that the taxpayer
was wrongfully using another's money or property to pay his taxes (Broadway Open Air
Theatre v. United States, 208 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1953); United States v. Worley, 213 F.2d
509, 512 (6th Cir. 1954). cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917, 918 (1955)), there may be a remedy in
implied contract, cf. United States v. State Bank, 96 U.S. 30 (1878), subject to the juris.
dictional limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964) if the suit is in the district court.
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Consideration should be given to remedying those deficiencies in the
Act. At the same time, Congress might consider whether the Act went
too far in permitting the third party to sue without first seeking relief
at the administrative level. 3a Although the Act thus conforms with the
American Bar Association's recommendation that suit by a third party
be permitted without delay for prior administrative consideration, in
order that it wight be known as quickly as possible whether the dis-
puted seizure had in fact satisfied the taxpayer's account,331 the provi-
sion may be at cross purposes with the 1966 action of Congress in mak-
ing prior administrative consideration a condition precedent to Tort
Claims Act suits in an effort to minimize unnecessary litigation.032
E. Remedies of Senior Lienor3a3
The remedies which the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 provided for
third parties are available to senior lienors as well as to owners of the
property levied upon.s 4 Therefore, if the tax collector levies upon
accounts receivable or other debts on which a creditor of the taxpayer
holds a prior lien or security interest, the creditor can recover from the
Government any amounts wrongly collected. And, if the circumstances
are such that collection by the Government would cause irreparable
injury, the senior lienor may be entitled to an injunction.835
Tri-State Ins. Co. v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Okla. 1955). There may also
be a remedy against the tax collector. Pasadena Invest. Co. v. Pasadena Air Prods., Inc.,
234 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D. Calif. 1964). If the tax collector was not aware of the tax-
payer's wrongful use of a third party's property, however, no recovery can be had (the
third party's only remedy being against the wrongdoer). J.C. Pitman & Sons v. United
States, 317 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Schieck v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9388 at
85,897 (D. Wyo. 1966). The proposal of the American Bar Association would have per-
mitted suit against the United States, without jurisdictional limitation, whenever "property
[including money] has been delivered to the Secretary or his delegate with or without
levy, by a person having no right to do so." But the relief permitted in such cases was
no broader, and may have unintentionally been narrower than under present law, being
confined to the return of money or property "wrongfully seized or wrongfully demanded
and paid for the discharge of a lien," or the value of property "unlawfully sold." 84
A.B.A. REP. 699 (1959) (emphasis added).
530. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7426(f). Administrative relief from the Secretary, how-
ever, may be sought if desired. Id. § 6343(b). See H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77 (1966).
331. 84 A.B.A. REP. 729 (1959) states that requirement of an administrative claim
would "serve only to delay a matter that would already have been administratively con.
sidered and which ought to be resolved by litigation as quickly as possible."
332. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2675 (Supp. 1U, 1965-66). See S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).
333. The term "senior lienor" is here used to embrace holders of mortgages, deeds of
trust, commercial security interests, and statutory and common law liens, which have
priority over the federal tax lien.
334. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7426(a).
335. Injunction was granted under prior law in Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th
Cir. 1942), but INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7421(a), would now permit it only if the condi.
tions of Section 7426 were satisfied. It is not enough that the plaintiff's lien Is superior
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1. Seizure and Sale by the Tax Collector
In the case of those levies that must be enforced by sale, however, a
senior lienor would only rarely be entitled either to an injunctions 0
or to any part of the sale proceeds,337 since the existence of a senior lien
does not make a federal tax levy "wrongful," and since the sale of all
the taxpayer's right, title and interest is considered to leave the senior
lien unimpairedses Nevertheless, a sale of property under levy will
sometimes cause serious prejudice to a senior lienor's rights for which
present law appears to afford him no remedy. Thus, when the tax
collector sells chattels under levy, the senior lienor may have no knowl-
edge of the sale and may be unable to trace the purchaser. The law
should require the tax collector to keep a record of purchasers of per-
sonal property, and to make such information available to anyone
claiming an interest in or lien on the property sold.a3 0 When the
United States itself is the purchaser, the senior lienor, if he is required
under state law to proceed by judicial foreclosure, may be without a
remedy to divest the inferior equity until such time as the property
has been resold by the Government to a private party.4O Although,
as we shall see in a moment, the United States has consented to be
joined as a defendant in a suit to foreclose a lien or mortgage on
property whenever it holds or claims another lien or mortgage on
such property, and has consented to the extinguishment of an unfiled
and that he would suffer irreparable injury, id. § 7426(b)(1), unless the levy is also wrong-
Jul. Id. § 7426(a)(1). In view of Section 6331(a), the mere existence of a senior lien mould
not seem to make the levy wrongful, provided the senior lienor's share is paid over to him.
336. The injunction granted, under prior law, in Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. United
States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9819 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), apparently rested upon the fact that
under New York law the chattel mortgagee had become the owner of the property upon
default.
337. Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9301 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. O'Connell,
66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9598 (D.RJ. 1966), in which such defense was not passed on because
the court found (prior to the 1966 Act) that there was no consent to suit.
338. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6331(a), 6339.
339. In Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd per curiam,
68-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9301 (2d Cir. 1968), the prior chattel mortgagee was unable to locate
the purchaser, and the tax collector refused to disclose information concerning his identity.
The court held that notice of sale is required to be given only to the owner or posesor,
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6335, that a record of the purchaser's name is required to be
made only in the case of a sale of real property, id. § 6340, and that the Internal Revenue
Service had no duty to preserve or make available information concerning the purchaser
of chattels.
340. See United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1941). The senior lienor would have
no right to recover the property from the Government under neiv Section 7426(b)(2) of
the 1954 Code, because the levy would not have been "wrongful." Sec note 337 supra.
But he might assert a right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the
"taking" of his lien (even though not wrongfully) by destruction of the normal remedy
for its enforcement. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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tax lien even without such joinder,841 no similar consents have been
given where the United States holds title to the property, whether
recorded or unrecorded.342 Anomalously, the senior lienor who is
privileged to proceed by nonjudicial sale is permitted thereby to di-
vest not only a federal tax lien but a title derived by the United
States from the enforcement of a tax lien, if the lien or title was not
timely filed or recorded, or if the senior lienor gives the Government
timely notice of the sale.3' 3 The same principle should, as the Amer-
ican Bar Association recommended, be applied to judicial foreclosures
of property to which the United States has acquired title by enforce-
ment of a lien.844
2. Foreclosure of the Senior Lien
The judicial or nonjudicial procedures provided under local law by
which the holder of a senior mortgage or other lien may foreclose
the interests of the debtor and of junior lienors may not suffice to extin-
guish a junior federal lien, unless the senior lienor complies with the
further requirements prescribed by Congress for the protection of the
Government.345 Those requirements, so far as they relate to the extin-
guishment of federal tax liens, were much altered by the 1966 legisla-
tion and have heretofore been outlined in the First Installment, in
connection with a recommendation that the changes be made applicable
also to the discharge of junior federal mortgages and nontax liens. '"
I shall deal here only with certain improvements that might be made
in the procedures as they apply to the removal of federal tax liens3 4 7
341. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7425(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (Supp. II, 1965-66); see
p. 1169 infra.
342. Trustees of Puritan Church v. United States, 294 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Siss-
man v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 375 Ill. 514, 32 N.E.2d 132 (1941); Wells v. Long, 68
F. Supp. 671 (D. Idaho 1946), aff'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 19,17); c1.
Wadoch v. Taylor, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9291 (N.D. 111. 1958).
343. INT. Ray. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(b)(2).
344. 84 A.B.A. REP. 737, 740 (1959).
345. Even if the foreclosure failed to conform to the federal requirements, the pri.
ority of the lienor or purchaser would be honored in a later proceeding, to the extent of
the amount of the prior mortgage or lien. But the Government would get the benefit of
any interim appreciation in value. Miners Say. Bank v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 563
(M.D. Pa. 1953); Bank of America v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
346. See First Installment, pt. III.B.2. See also PLu~M & W niuciT, ch. 8.
347. It should be pointed out that most of the procedural problems here discussed
could ordinarily be avoided by a knowledgeable senior lienor by first obtaining an admin-
istrative discharge of the tax lien. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6325(b)(2); Tech. Info. Rel.
No. 10, CCH 1956 STAND. FED. TAX R P. 6578; see PLUMB & WpaRiuT 226-27. Even If
priorities are in dispute, delay of the sale can be avoided by agreement that the sale be
made free of liens, subject to later litigation over the proceeds. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 6325(b)(3), 7426(a)(2)-(b)(4). See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.2-1(b), T.D. 6944, 1968 INT.
RFv. Bu L. No. 8, at 29; Rev. Proc. 68-9, 1968 INT. REv. BuLt. No. 8, at 46.
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a. Judicial Foreclosure
When a mortgage or lien senior to a federal tax lien is foreclosed
by plenary judicial proceedings,s 48 the federal tax lien may be extin-
guished by making the United States a party defendanta 40 If the United
States is not made a party, the judgment or sale (regardless of state law
to the contrary) will not disturb any federal tax lien which was duly
filed before the commencement of the proceeding, but it will discharge
any other such liens-not only after-arising liens, but existing estate or
gift tax liens for which the law makes no provision for filing. ° The
Government may, however, assert such liens without time limitation
by intervening in the proceeding; and if the court declines to permit
intervention-e.g., because it comes so late that it would unduly delay
the proceeding or otherwise prejudice the parties-the effect which the
adjudication would othenviie have had in discharging such liens will
be nullified.35 1 The law ought to provide that, after a certain point of
time, intervention should entitle the Government only to claim a share
of the proceeds, without delaying the course of the proceedings.35-
If the senior lien6r does make the United States a party for the pur-
pose of removing some previously filed or recorded tax or nontax lien,
the law is not so dear that federal tax liens which may arise or be fied
after the commencement of the proceeding wil be discharged. The
348. The term "plenary judicial proceeding" as used here does not denote the enforce-
ment of a judgment lien, including a sale under confession of judgment on a mortgage
or note. Such a sale may technically be a judicial sale under local law, e.g., United States
v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 250 (1960), but in this context it is treated as a nonjudidal We.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-1(a)(1),-(b), T.D. 6944, 1968 INT. Rnv. BuLL. No. 8, at 33.
349. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (Supp. 11, 1966). Although one court narrowly construed the
Government's consent to be joined in a suit to "foreclose" a mortgage or lien as not em-
bracing a suit to "enforce" a lien, Lavenburg v. Universal Sportswear, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), Congress ignored the American Bar Association's recommendation that
such interpretation be forestalled by using the words "enforcement or foreclosure." 84
A.B.A. REP. 759 (1959). Despite some expressions to the contrary, it seems clear that a
foreclosure suit joining the United States under Section 2410 must be brought in the
state court in the absence of grounds of federal jurisdiction independent of the fact that
the United States has or claims a lien. Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493. 496 (9th Cir.
1964); Remis v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 732 (D. Mass. 1959), af'd, 273 F.2d 293 (1st
Cir. 1960). See PLUMB S± WRIGHT 222. Although the Government is entitled to remove the
suit to the federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1964), it rarely does so unless some issue of
federal law, such as the merits of the tax, is expected to arise. See pp. 1149-50 supra.
The suggestion that the federal courts be given original jurisdiction in such cases, Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity and Federal Liens, 26 BROorLYN L. R,. 18, 37-38 (1959). seems un-
wise. The federal courts ought not to be burdened unnecessarily with mortgage and lien
foreclosure cases, in which the essential questions ordinarily involve state law and the
relative priorities of private interests.
350. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7425(a).
351. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7424. The Government may then remove the action
to the federal court as if it had originally been named a party.
352. See Meislin, Federal Tax Liens: Government joinder in Stale Mortgage Foreclo-
sure, 46 VA. L. REv. 926, 931-43 (1960).
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subjection of federal liens to the lis pendens doctrine is uncertain, in
the absence of eXpress statute.5 3 The statute consenting to the joinder
of the United States provides for the discharge, in accordance with
local law, of "the mortgage or other lien held by the United States."354
But it goes on to prescribe that the complaint or pleading "set forth
with particularity the nature of the interest or lien of the United
States," and it might conceivably be held that only those so pleaded
are discharged,355 thus putting the senior lienor in a worse position
than if the United States had not been joined as a party at all.850 This
apparent hiatus in the law should be remedied by prescribing only that
liens duly filed before the proceeding be set forth in the pleading, and
providing for the discharge of any others even though not pleaded.
b. Nonjudicial Foreclosure
In many states a mortgage or deed of trust may be enforced by a
nonjudicial sale, or by a sale under confession of judgment, without
need for a plenary foreclosure suit in which junior lienors are joined.
That is also the common method of enforcing pledges and certain
statutory and common law liens. Formerly, in the silence of Congress,
a divided Supreme Court held that a junior federal lien could be cut
off by such a sale, even without notice to the Government. 57 The
Treasury sought and obtained relief from Congress, in the form of a
right to 25 days' written notice of such a sale whenever it has a tax lien
or a title derived from the enforcement of such a lien,858 provided its
lien or title was filed or recorded more than 30 days before the sale. 50
353. In United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), rcv'g per
curiam 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), the Us pendens doctrine (see J. PoAxr.uoy, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 632, 685 (5th ed. 1941)) did not suffice to protect a mechanic's lienor
who had commenced suit to foreclose before the federal tax lien arose. But that case
turned on the fact that the federal lien, although later in time, was prior in right to the
mechanic's lien. Where the federal lien is junior, United States v. Brosnan, 363 US. 237,
250 (1960), applied lis pendens against the Government, in the silence of Congress. See
PLUMB & WIGHT 229.
354. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964).
355. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(b) (1964). Since the general language above quoted is followed
by the requirement of additional information "if a notice of tax lien was filed," It is
inferable that the "nature" even of those liens which are not on file must somehow be
pleaded "with particularity." A generalized allegation might be accepted by the courts
with respect to unfiled liens. City of Yonkers v. Goldstein, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11,517
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Blinn v. Bowdren, 198 Misc. 254, 97 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
356. See PLuMm & WRIGHT 228-30. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(a)(2), which dis.
charges liens not filed before the proceeding, applies only if the United States Is not
joined as a party.
357. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
358. INT. Rv. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(b)-(c). No like change was made with respect to
federal nontax liens.
359. The regulations have filled what might have been a troublesome gap In the stat.
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If the tax lien or title was not so filed or recorded (whether or not the
law provides for such filing or recording), the Government's interest
will be extinguished without notice if that is the effect of local law.311
The brief interval between the 30th day before the sale (the earliest
date when the final search for federal tax liens and titles can be made)
and the 25th day before the sale (the latest date when notice of the sale
can be given) allows the busy lawyer or title company very little time to
make the requisite searches-perhaps in several offices-and to prepare
and mail the notices of sale.30' There is precedent elsewhere in the
statute for allowing 45 days of grace,302 and extension of the 30-day
period to 45 days would provide welcome relief from the time pressure.
The real problem with the notice provision, however, is more funda-
mental. The requirement of 25 days' notice reflects an attempt to cover
too many dissimilar situations under a uniform rule that fits none of
them well. Notice of a sale enables the tax collector to drum up interest
among potential bidders, to observe the fairness of the sale, and to
reach the surplus proceeds, if any.n3 Notice well in advance of the
sale seems necessary only for the first of those purposes; but the tax
collector is likely to utilize the opportunity to drum up bids only in
the case of real property and certain business personal property, and in
these cases 25 days may be too short to be meaningful.3" In the typical
sale of pledged or repossessed consumer goods, there is unlikely to be a
surplus, and the tax collector would rarely find it worth his while either
to drum up bids or to observe the sale. A 25-day delay of the sale after
default or repossession can sometimes be prejudicial to the holder of a
security interest in personal property and should be required only if it
serves a purpose. While the law provides that the tax collector may
ute, with regard to postponed sales. If, for example, a federal tax lien was filed 24 days
before the date set for a sale (so that notice of the sale was not required to be gLiven),
and the sale was then postponed for a week (to a date 31 days after filing of the lien), a
literal reading of the statute would require further postponement in order to give 25
days' notice of the sale. The regulations, however, waive notice in such circumstances,
unless the postponement is for a period of more than 20 days. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-
1(c)(2)(ii), TiD. 6944, 1968 Isrr. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 37.
360. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7425(b)(2)(A)--(B).
261. Fortunately, the notice is considered filed on the day it is mailed, by registered
or certified mail, INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7502, and Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday
does not count if it falls on the last day. Id. § 7503; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-1(c), TM.
6944, 1968 INT. REv. BuL. No. 8, at 36. But the six days can pass very quickly if a holi-
day weekend intervenes before the last day.
262. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(2)-(d).
263. The tax collector himself is without authority to bid at the sale.
364. The American Bar Assodation proposal, which originated with real estate law.
yers, provided for 60 days' notice. 81 A.B.A. Rrp. 189 (1956); 84 A.B.A. REP'. 738, 742
(1959). But Congress shortened the period in an effort to accommodate the needs of the
personal property situation.
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consent to an earlier sale,305 it may (at least in some offices) take as long
to obtain the consent as to wait out the notice period. The law also
dispenses with the 25-day delay in the case of property which is "liable
to perish or become greatly reduced in price or value by keeping, or
which cannot be kept without great expense." 30 But the effectiveness
of the sale to pass title free of the federal tax lien is then dependent on
the correctness of the selling creditor's subjective view that the pre-
scribed conditions are satisfied.367
Consideration should therefore be given to minimizing the advance
notice period in all those situations where the time interval is unlikely
to be useful to the tax collector, and lengthening the period in other
cases where it would be helpful. If the required period of notice is to
depend on subjective distinctions between classes of property (as under
the present "perishable goods" rule), it seems desirable also to provide
that the Government's remedy for inadequacy of the notice shall be
only against the selling creditor, and that the innocent purchaser's
title shall not be impaired if he behaved reasonably.30 8
c. Foreclosure Without Sale
In some jurisdictions, and in some circumstances, real estate mort-
gages, security interests in personalty, and statutory liens may be
enforced by strict foreclosure, cutting off the interests of the debtor
and of junior lienors without a sale, but subject to a limited right of
redemption. Sometimes strict foreclosure requires judicial proceedings,
but it may also be accomplished by taking possession or by publishing
notice. 369
When resort to the courts is necessary, the existence of a federal tax
lien duly filed before commencement of the action would seem to pre-
dude strict foreclosure. Neither a sale nor a judgment in an action to
365. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7425(c)(2).
366. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7425(c)(3). The provision finds a precedent in Section
9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which adds a further exception for property
"of a type customarily sold on an established market"-an exception which was also In
the Bar proposal, 84 A.B.A. RE,. 738 (1959), but which Congress did not adopt.
367. In the case of securities or motor vehicles, Section 6323(b)(1) and (2) would ordi-
narily protect the purchaser's title regardless of the sufficiency of the seller's notice to
the Government. But purchasers of other personal property, even on a commodities
market, would ordinarily enjoy no such protection. See Second Installment, 675. The
regulations alleviate the problem by defining the qualified property in terms of the seller's
"reasonable view" that the conditions are met. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-1(e)(2), T.D.
6944, 1968 INT. REv. Bung. No. 8, at 38.
368. Cf. UNDFORM COMIMCSIAL CODE § 9-507(1).
369. See 4 A~mEuCAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 16.179-16.182 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952): 8 L.
JONEs, MORTGAGES, ch. 34 (8th ed. 1928); 2 G. GLMoE, SEcurry INTERTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 44.3 (1965).
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foreclose a mortgage or other lien can affect a federal tax lien filed be-
fore the action commenced if the United States is not made a party;aT°
and the United States has consented to be joined in a foreclosure pro-
ceeding only when a judicial sale is sought 3 ' Conceivably, the senior
lienor might first obtain strict foreclosure without joining the United
States, and then bring an action to quiet title, in which the United
States has consented to be joined even though sale is not sought.3 - But
where the relief sought in a quiet title suit includes the extinguishment
of a recognized junior lien, rather than merely an adjudication that
there is no lien or that a previous proceeding had effectively extin-
guished it, the second action might well be regarded as in substance a
foreclosure suit, in which a sale would be required, if the United
States is to be made a party and bound by the decree.- 3
The law, on its face, seems to ignore the possibility that strict fore-
closure might be effected nonjudicially as well as judicially. It provides
that in the absence of requisite notice to the tax collector a nonjudicial
sale shall not disturb a federal tax lien or title filed or recorded more
than 30 days before the sale, but it says nothing one way or the other
about the effect of a nonjudicial foreclosure without sale.374 In the
absence of congressional action, it might be argued, therefore, that state
law still governs the effect on the federal tax lien of such a foreclosure
of a senior lien or security interest, as it did under prior laie."3 5 In an
effort to dose that gap in the statute, the Treasury in its regulations has
broadly construed the term "nonjudicial sale" to include "the divest-
ment of the taxpayer's title to property which occurs by operation of
law" upon the expiration of the taxpayer-debtor's right of redemption
370. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7425(a)(1).
371. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964).
372. Id., see H.L Et. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1966); S. REP. No. 1703, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1966).
373. A quiet title suit, so employed, "embod[ies] all the essentials of an old-fashioned
strict foreclosure' Steffel v. Grissler, 129 N.J. Eq. 425, 427, 19 A.2d 798, 799 (1941); cf.
Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 138 Cal. 651, 72 P. 345 (1903). In United States v. Morrison,
247 F.2d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1957), the court declared that an action to quiet title,
within 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964), is not "one to extinguish the lien of the United States"
but seeks "a determination that a tax lien does not exist, has been extinguished, or is
inferior in rank." The court did acknowledge, however, that a tax lien might be extin-
guished in a quiet title suit if the court ascertained, without sale, that the value was
such as to leave no equity for the Government (as in Miners Sav. Bank v. United States,
110 F. Supp. 563 (M.D. Pa. 1953)). Query, whether that would still be permitted in the
face of the express requirement that "an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien.
naming the United States as a party under this section, must seek judicial sale." Cf. 84
A.B.A. REP. 738, 743 (1959), relating to proposed language differing materially from that
which was finally adopted.
374. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7425(b)(1).
375. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 257 (1960).
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under state law in a nonjudicial strict foreclosure.178 The Treasury
apparently hopes thus to assure itself at least of notice of the fore-
closure and of an opportunity to redeem realty therefrom, even though
it cannot under the statute insist that there be the kind of "sale" that
might produce surplus proceeds for application on the tax lien.
Congress should clarify and make consistent the rules applicable to
strict foreclosures. If a sale is thought essential to protect the Govern-
ment's junior interest from being "harshly, and oppressively"' 7 ex-
tinguished by strict foreclosure, the law should specify that federal tax
liens, duly and timely filed, shall not be disturbed by foreclosure with-
out sale, whether the proceeding is judicial 78 or nonjudicial. On the
other hand, if the right of a senior mortgagee or other lienor under
state law and the terms of his agreement to cut off his debtor's equity
without sale is to be recognized as against a junior federal tax lien,
subject only to the Government's right to notice and an opportunity
to redeem, that principle should apply to judicial as well as nonjudicial
strict foreclosures.
d. Redemption by United States
Formerly, in any judicial foreclosure in which the United States was
joined, it was allowed one year in which to redeem real property from
the sale, whether or not such right was granted generally to junior
lienors under applicable local law.370 The right of redemption was
originally (in 1931) considered necessary to protect the Government
from a sacrifice sale of property which, if there were competitive bid-
ding, might produce something for the junior federal lien. While like
protection might have been achieved by permitting the federal collec-
tion officer to bid against the senior lienor at the foreclosure sale, that
was not thought practicable where the Government did not have a first
lien,880 because of the need for obtaining a Congressional appropria-
tion of the amount of the cash price.881 Subsequent experience with
376. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-1(b)(1)-(2), Example (3), T.D. 6944, 1968 INT. RZv.
BuLL. No. 8, at 34.
377. 4 AEI mCAn LAw oF PRorEm R § 16.179, at 433 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
378. Including a quiet title suit that goes beyond a declaration of existing rights.
See note 373 supra.
379. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301 (1960).
380. The right to bid is so limited by the last sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964).
381. The provision for redemption was added in conference as a substitute for a
Senate amendment under which, in foreclosure suits in which the Government was
joined, the sale itself might be stayed until the expiration of the next session of Congress,
in order to allow Congress to appropriate money for a bid. H.R. REP. No. 2722, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1931).
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revolving fund appropriations, which can be used for purchases at
foreclosure sales in the discretion of the proper officer and then re-
plenished from the proceeds of disposition, is persuasive that redemp-
tion is not the only feasible way of meeting the problem. Federal
officers are now permitted to bid when necessary at the foreclosure of
certain junior mortgages in which the Government has an interest, -82
and in 1950 Congress accordingly felt free to eliminate in the most
important of such cases the federal right of redemption, which it
found depressed the price obtainable at the sale.3s3
About half the states (in numbers but not in population) likewise
provide for a period following a foreclosure sale during which the
debtor and usually the junior lienors may redeem the property.38 In
those states the presence of a federal redemption right rarely adds to
the problems that exist in any event. In the remaining states where
redemption is not generally provided for, however, the existence of
the rarely exercised federal redemption right creates a deterrent to
outside bidding, and thus may have the opposite of its intended ef-
fect. a3 5 The American Bar Association, therefore, has long urged that
the special federal redemption right be abolished, and that the Govern-
ment's interests be protected in less self-defeating fashion by broaden-
ing its right to bid at the sale.380
In enacting the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Congress declined to
eliminate the redemption right but, in cases where the federal interest
is a tax lien,387 it shortened the redemption period from one year to
120 days (or the period provided by state law, if longer), which may
382. 7 U.S.C. § 1985(a) (1964); 38 U.S.C. § 1820(a)(5) (1964).
383. 12 U.S.C. § 1701k (1964); 38 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (1964); see S. REP. No. 1286, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1950).
384. 4 AmEccAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 16.175-16.177 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Bridevell,
The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 Lmv & Cox-ssp. Pnon.
545, 548 (1938); Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption fron Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Mortgage Act, 23 MicH. L. Rav. 825 (1925); Note, 5 U. Cm. L Rrv. 62- (1933).
385. Cf. 4 AlERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 16.8 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Durfee &-
Doddridge, supra note 384, at 841 n.51 (declaring that the redemption right "caps the
wall we have built to keep the public away from the public sale"). In a fewr of the states
that do provide for statutory redemption, the redemption period precedes the sale; but
the federal period follows the sale and thus has a cumulative effect. This is also true in
the case of nonjudicial strict foreclosure, which the Treasury construes as resulting in a
sale when the redemption period under state law expires, after which the federal period
is added. See pp. 1173-74 supra.
386. 84 A.B.A. REP. 740, 742 (1959); cf. 81 A.B.A. REP'. 189 (1956). In H.R. REP. No.
2722, supra note 381, it was said that "the provision [for redemption] adds nothing to
the present difficulties in States which allow no redemption period, as under present
[pre-1931] conditions where present lien holders cannot sue the United States, the rights
of the United States never are barred by foreclosure decree." The fact that an uncon-
scionable situation was made no worse, however, is hardly sufficient justification.
387. The redemption period remains unchanged where the Government's interest is
other than a tax lien. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964).
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lessen its price-depressing effect.3 18 On the other hand, Congress for
the first time extended the redemption right to nonjudicial sales, 80
and authorized a revolving fund appropriation to be used for redemp-
tions390 which may cause redemptions to occur more frequently than
in the past. The new provision deserves a fair trial, but the practica-
bility of doing away with the redemption right should be studied
further.391
The new law also for the first time prescribes the price which the
Government must pay for redemption.30 2 It is the sum of:
(a) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at the sale (which, in
the case of a purchaser who is the holder of the lien being fore-
dosed, includes "the amount of the obligation secured by such lien
to the extent satisfied by reason of such sale");
(b) six per cent interest on such amount; and
(c) the excess, if any, of "the expenses necessarily incurred in
connection with [the] property" over the income derived from the
property, including its rental value if it is used by the purchaser
himself.
30 3
In permitting the Government to redeem from the senior lienor with-
out paying off the full indebtedness (and thus leaving him to get
satisfaction, if he can, through a deficiency judgment creating at best
388. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7425(d)(1). If state law allows a longer period only to
the debtor himself, and not to secured creditors, the Goverment may not avail of it.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.5-1(b)(2)(ii), T.D. 6944, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 40.
389. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7425(d). That the right probably did not exist In such
cases under prior law, see First Installment, 298 n.433.
390. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7810.
391. Conversations with Treasury officials indicate that the Internal Revenue Service
is thought to lack sufficient skilled personnel who could be entrusted with the power to
bid at the sales. Yet the situations in which real estate ought to produce a worthwhile
surplus above senior liens, and in which bidding might be considered, could ordinarily
be identified in advance by responsible officials (particularly if, as recommended In note
364 supra, the advance notice period for nonjudicial sales of realty is extended to 60
days), and any employee attending the sale could then be instructed to bid the price up
to a prescribed amount. This is the same kind of judgment that must be exercised later
in deciding whether to redeem. Furthermore, when the Government itself initilates the
foreclosure of a tax lien, and a sale is made that also discharges senior liens (INT. RV.
CODE of 1954, § 7403(c); cf. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1964)),
the practical situation is the same as if the initiative had been taken by the senior
lienor under 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964), yet Congress has never seen fit to provide a federal
redemption right in such cases. In such a sale, just as under Section 2410, the Govern.
ment cannot bid if it is necessary to put up cash to pay off senior liens. INT. REv. COD.
of 1954, § 7403(c).
392. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d) (1964); INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7425 (d)(2). Unlike the change
in the redemption period, the prescription of the price applies whether the Government
has a tax or non-tax lien (or a mortgage).
393. 28 US.C. § 2410(d) (1964) (emphasis added). The provision may be unduly liberal
in that it allows the purchaser six. per cent interest without offset for any net income lie
enjoys from the property between foreclosure and redemption, while reimbursing him
for any loss suffered. But the adjustments provided may work inequitably in individual
cases. See p. 1179 & notes 403-08 infra.
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a junior lien on whatever else the debtor may own),3 40 the new federal
law follows the prevailing pattern in those states which provide for
redemption after sale.3 95 It is a sharp departure, however, from the
interpretation placed on the previous federal law by courts in non-
redemption states,396 one of which declared:
I don't think Congress meant any such inequitable and un-
conscionable thing as to allow the Government, at any time up to
a year after the sale, to come in, offer what was paid at the fore-
closure sale, and immediately assume the position of senior lien-
holder, pushing everyone else into the background and thus, by
wiping out the foreclosure bid, gain an advantage which it could
never get at the foreclosure sale, or before it, by redeeming without
paying the amount of the mortgage, the interest, the fees, and
everything else that might be due to the senior lienor 2 7
Mortgagees in non-redemption states have frequently followed the
practice, in the absence of competition, of bidding low even if an anti-
deficiency law or the mortgagor's financial condition prevented their
thereby obtaining a greater aggregate recovery. Low bidding would
ordinarily reduce commissions and conveyance taxes, and would avoid
artificially creating taxable interest income or profit in what is essen-
tially a salvage operation.398 Now, mortgagees and other senior lienors
(including those making nonjudicial sales, which were not affected
before) must review and perhaps revise their bidding practices in the
light of the new threat. The existence of even a worthless right to a
deficiency judgment (for which the mortgagee may choose not to apply)
may now entitle the Government to obtain, without fully satisfying
the senior debt, the property which represents the mortgagee's only
hope of recouping his investment, at least if he does not in some legally
effective manner release his right to a deficiency before the sale. 99
594. The lien, if any, of the deficiency judgment would be inferior to a tax lien
antedating the foreclosure. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(a).
595. Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor during the Depression,
5 LAw 9- CO=IrP. PROB. 517, 526 (1938). Contra, Collins v. Riggs, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 491
(1872); Hart v. Jackson St. Baptist Church, 224 Ala. 64, 66, 139 So. 88, 89 (1932).
396. United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1959), afJ'd on other grounds,
363 U.S. 237 (1960); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. MacGarvie, 22 N.J. 539, 126 A.2d
880 (1956).
397. First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. MfacGarvie, 41 N.J. Super. 151, 156, 157, 124 A.2d
345, 348 (Ch. Div. 1956), modified & aff'd, 22 N.J. 539, 126 A2d 880 (1956) (emphasis
added).
398. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216 (1937); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-
6(b) (1959). See Snepp, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Cancellations, 17
J. TAX. 122 (1962).
399. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.5-1(c)(2), Examples (2), (3), T.D. 6944, 1968 Im. REv.
Buu.. No. 8, at 41, treat the portion of the debt allowable as a deficiency as not "satisfied
by reason of [the] sale," and hence as excluded from the redemption price, "whether or
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It may be questioned whether the new redemption price rule serves
any legitimate federal interest. The Government's financial interest is
fully protected if it is permitted to acquire whatever value the property
may have above the amount owing on senior liens; if there is no such
excess value, the Government is not hurt by the underbidding. State
redemption laws entitling junior lienors to take over the benefit of the
senior lienor's bargain (even when they are not injured) were designed
to operate as, and can be justified only as, an added threat to force the
senior lienor to bid higher and thus minimize the debtor's deficiency
obligation4O°-a problem which other states have chosen to meet, if at
all, in their own different ways. Conceivably, if any states have been
laggard in protecting debtors against underbidding, there may be a
national interest in generalizing this form of protection; but, if so, the
matter should be presented to Congress on that basis, and not as a
casual incident of federal lien legislation.
While the Government perhaps should enjoy the same advantage
that other junior lienors would have in those states with redemption
laws, Congress should consider requiring, in other circumstances, that
the redemption price cover the full amount owing to senior lienors,
so that redemption will be availed of only to provide a surplus for the
United States where the value of the property exceeds senior liens, and
not to obtain a windfall for the Government.401 (Of course, if the
Government does redeem for such full amount, the senior lienor's right
to a deficiency, whether or not reduced to judgment, should be either
discharged or passed to the Government by subrogation.)40 2 If that
suggestion is not acceptable, Congress should at least provide that the
full amount of the indebtedness shall be included in the redemption
price whenever the senior lienor, within a prescribed period after the
not [the mortgagee] seeks a judgment for the deficiency." The threat is perhaps not a seri-
ous one in states having anti-deficiency laws which treat the debt as satisfled to the extent
of the "fair value" or "true value" of the property, since the Government Is unlikely
to redeem if it must pay such an amount-which may be even higher than the market
value. 4 A imUcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16202 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Poteat, supra note
395, at 534.
400. Note, 5 U. Ci. L. Rzv. 625, 627-28 (1938).
401. The windfall may be further enhanced by the extinguishment, without right of
redemption under state law, of liens which were junior to the one foreclosed but senior
to the federal lien. At least if the federal lien is a tax lien, the windfall ultimately ben'.
fits the debtor through credit on his liability, See note 412 infra,
402. Full discharge might be justified on the theory that the Government, in redeem.
ing, is not speculating in claims but is signifying its belief that the property ha a real
value at least equal to the redemption price, of which the debtor should have the benefit.
However, that belief may be in error. Since the debtor will get credit for any profit the
Government makes on resale, at least if its interest was a tax lien, see note 412 Infra,
subrogation to the deficiency claim, assuming it has been duly preserved, may be Justified
as indemnifying the Government against loss on resale.
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sale, effectively relinquishes his right to a deficiency judgment or allows
it to expire unexercised.
The law should deal more explicitly with the "add-ons" to the
redemption price, which raise many problems and potential inequities,
particularly in those states where the senior lienor or other purchaser
takes immediate possession, free of any redemption right in the debtor
or private parties. The manner of accounting for "expenses necessarily
incurred" by the purchaser and for the income which is to offset them
is left uncertain,40 3 as are such questions as the standard for determin-
ing the "rental value" of the property if it is used by the purchaser
rather than rented to others,4 4 and his right to reimbursement for the
value of a crop which is growing on the land when redemption oc-
curs.40 5 If the purchaser undertakes capital improvements during the
federal redemption period,400 there is no provision for payment of their
value when the Government redeems.4 07 Nor is there any provision for
reimbursing a second mortgagee who forecloses and then is required
to pay the amortization on the first mortgage during the federal re-
demption period-although a court might nevertheless relieve him on
some theory of subrogation or equitable lien.408
403. Inequity may arise, for example, if the property taxes for an entire year are
paid or are deemed to accrue on a date with the 120-day period for redemption from a
federal tax lien. The amount must apparently be applied to exhaust income of the
120-day period before anything is added to the redemption price on that account, whereas
the income might be enjoyed free of that offset if tie redemption period fell at a dif-
ferent time of year. But see ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 77, § 28 (Supp. 1967), requiring reimburse-
ment of real estate taxes paid by the purchaser.
404. Since rental value is to be taken into account only "to the extent such property
is used by the purchaser," the test is presumably the value of the use to which the prop-
erty is actually put, rather than the amount of the rental that might be derived from
the highest and best use of the property. For state law, cf. Blessett v. Turcotte, 23 NM.
417, 136 N.V. 945 (1912).
405. See Dorrough v. Barnett, 216 Ala. 599, 114 So. 198 (1927) (purchaser allowed to
harvest the crop after redemption from him, but charged rent for the post-redemption
period).
406. Which, in the case of federal mortgages and nontax liens, is still a full year.
407. Even if the cost of the improvements can be construed to be "expenses neces-
sarily incurred," the interim income from the property must be exhausted before any
credit for such expenses is reflected in the price. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d)(3) (1964). But sec
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 740 (1960), giving a credit for the value added to the property by
permanent improvements made before the offer to redeem (see Rudisill v. Buckner, 244
Ala. 653, 15 So. 2d 333 (1943)), without offsetting such amount by interim income.
Williams v. Rouse, 124 Ala. 160, 27 So. 16 (1899). The well-advised mortgagee will bargain
for a release of the federal right of redemption before undertaking improvements. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 400.5-1(d)(4) T.D. 6944, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 42; Rev. Proc. 68-10,
1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 48.
408. In contrast, ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 732 (1958), includes in the price "any other valid
lien or incumbrance paid or owned by [the] purchaser." Stewart v. Stephenson, 243 Ala.
329, 10 So. 2d 159 (1942). See also I. REv. STAT. ch. 77, § 28a (1967). In the absence of
such a provision, an equitable lien was allowed in Keel v. Vinyard, 48 Idaho 49, 279
P. 420 (1929). Query, whether an equitable lien could be enforced against the Govern-
ment, once it takes title. See note 340 supra. It is understood that the administrative
practice, at least in the Internal Revenue Service, is to allow credit for such payiments.
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Where the federal interest is a tax lien extinguished by a nonjudicial
sale, the law for the first time provides the procedure to be followed in
effecting redemption, 409 and its effect in putting the United States in
the purchaser's shoes410 (rather than merely reviving its lien, as under
some state laws411) and in discharging the taxpayer's liability to the
extent of any profit enjoyed by the Government on resale of the re-
deemed property.412 But the law is silent, as it has ever been, concern-
ing the comparable questions of procedure and effect in the case of
judicial sales. 413 Whether tax liens or others are involved, the new law
provides no clue as to how, or whether, the Government is required to
make tender of the redemption price within the prescribed period
where the price involves such uncertain elements as the "fair" or "true
value" of the property (in anti-deficiency states), the rental value, and
the purchaser's interim expenses and income.414 Yet it is hardly con-
ceivable that the Government could or would make an open-ended
tender of its willingness to pay whatever amount might be determined
by a court to be required.4 r
F. Remedies of Junior Lienors and Subsequent Purchasers
A junior lienor or a purchaser who acquired property in the face of
an existing federal tax lien cannot, of course, enjoin a levy and sale,410
even though their effect will be to extinguish his rights in the prop-
erty.417 The law does, however, give him a specific remedy by suit
409. State procedure is to be followed if it exists. If there is none, or if the state
officer refuses to honor the redemption, the federal tax collector is to issue and record
a certificate of redemption. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(d)(3)(A)-(B). States whose laws
fail to provide for the recording of such certificates should amend such laws (as has been
done in GA. CODE ch. 67-26, as amended, April 14, 1967), since otherwise they will be
recorded only in the federal court.
410. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7425(d)(3)(C).
411. See 4 AMERcIAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 16.177 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Durfee 8d
Doddridge, supra note 384, at 845-47.
412. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 6342(a). State laws vary on whether a redeeming junior
lienor must credit the debtor with the excess of the value over the amount paid for
redemption. 4 AmElmeAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.177 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Durfee to
Doddridge, supra note 384, at 847-49.
413. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c)-(d).
414. Under state laws providing comparable "add-ons," an accounting may be de.
manded of the purchaser near the end of the redemption period, and tender Is excused
if illegal or exaggerated claims are made. Wilkes v. Hood, 237 Ala. 72, 185 So. 748 (1939);
Aust v. Rosenbaum, 74 Miss. 893, 21 So. 555 (1897). In First Nat'l Bank 8, Trust Co. v.
MacGarvie, 22 N.J. 539, 126 A.2d 880 (1956), where the Government's tender was Insutf.
ficient because of an error of law, the court allowed it 30 days after the mandate i
which to tender the proper amount.
415. Held sufficient, under state law, in Clarke v. Cowan, 206 Mass. 252, 92 N.E. 474
(1910); Sedlak v. Duda, 144 Neb. 567, 13 N.W.2d 892 (1944).
416. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7426(b)(1).
417. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6339(c).
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against the United States to reach any surplus proceeds above prior
liens.418 The rights in surplus proceeds become complicated when
property is seized and sold under two or more tax liens, some prior and
some inferior to an intervening nonfederal lien on the same property
or to an intervening purchaser. The Government has asserted the right
to apply the proceeds to all its liens, claiming that the intervening lien
or interest did not attach to the proceeds but followed the property
into the hands of the purchaser at the sale. The courts have correctly
held, however, that the sale under the senior federal lien extinguishes
all interests junior to it, and that such interests, including the junior
federal liens, attach to the proceeds in order of priority.410 On the
other hand, if the tax collector, having several liens, sells property in
which there are no intervening interests, he is free to apply the pro-
ceeds to the most junior tax liens. The Government is, and should be,
entitled to so marshal its securities that its senior liens may be satisfied
from those properties in which there are intervening interests, and its
junior liens from property which is free of such claims.4 0
There are other situations, however, in which the Government, be-
ing in the privileged position of having a general lien on all the prop-
erty of its debtor,4' is able to obtain full satisfaction from one asset
just as well as from another, and its selection of property on which a
third party has a junior lien, or which he has purchased since the
federal lien attached, may reduce the third party to the status of an
unsecured creditor without any benefit to the revenue. In such circum-
stances, the injured parties have invoked the equitable doctrine of
marshaling of assets, under which "a creditor having two funds to
satisfy his debt, may not by his application of them to his demand,
defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds.' 42'
418. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7426(a)(2)-(b)(3). For the procedural frustrations suf-
fered before the 1966 amendment, see First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1959); Oil City Natl Bank v. Dudley. 198 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
419. Sutcliffe v. Joey Drilling & Exploration Inc., 261 F. Supp. 417 (D. Kan. 1966);
Commerdal Credit Corp. v. Schwartz, 130 F. Supp. 524 (ED. Ark. 1955). But cf. United
States v. Ralph, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9583 (S.D. Cal. 1957). The statement in United
States v. Pollack, 370 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1966), that Joey Drilling was "i,.rongIy dedded"
is difficult to understand, since the case appears factually distinguished from Pollad:, Ee
note 420 infra, even if its language may be too broad. Izrr REV. CODE of 1954, § 6342(a)(3),
provides for applying the proceeds (after certain charges) on "the liability in respect of
which the levy was made," and § 6342(b) then calls for distribution of the balance to
the person "legally entitled thereto." But if that language is subject to the constnction
that all federal liens are to be satisfied ahead of intervening interests, it should be
amended.
420. United States v. Pollack, 370 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. American
Casualty Co., 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9617 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
421. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
422. Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 US. 449, 456-57 (1925). In Meyer v. United
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The courts have been willing to apply that doctrine in federal tax lien
cases only where both the encumbered and the unencumbered proper-
ties were before the court, as in suits to foreclose tax liens on several
properties423 or in bankruptcy and other collective insolvency pro-
ceedings.424 They have refused to interfere with the tax collector's
discretion when he proceeds against particular properties in which
others have junior interests, saying that "to require the Government
to pick out and foreclose only those liens which will create the least
hardship on third parties, would impose a considerable burden on the
revenue collection process. '425 Assuming the correctness of that prem-
ise, however, justice would seem to require that the courts or Congress
develop an alternative remedy. The third party might be permitted
to restrain resort to the property in which he is interested if he gives
his bond to make good any loss or added expense occasioned by re-
quiring the tax collector to pursue other properties. 420 A better alterna-
tive, less cumbersome and certainly less burdensome to the third party,
might be to let the tax collector take whatever property he chooses, but
to subrogate the displaced junior lienor or purchaser to the priority
which the federal tax lien had in the other property which was not
taken,427 with appropriate balancing of the equities where that property
too is encumbered.4
28
States, 375 U.S. 233, 237 (1963), the Supreme Court noted that it "has never applied the
doctrine of marshaling to federal income tax liens .. . . Nor has the Congress seen fit
to lay down any rules with reference to the application of the doctrine . . . ." Although
finding it inequitable to apply the doctrine in the circumstances presented, see Second
Installment, 614, the Court did not exclude its possible applicability in other situations.
423. United States v. Pollack, 233 F. Supp. 775, 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), afJ'd on other
grounds, 370 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Lord, 155 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H.
1957); United States v. Paul, 41 F. Supp. 41, 47 (E.D. Mich. 1940), afJ'd on other grotunds,
127 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1942), afl'd, 317 U.S. 329, 338 (1943); cf. United States v. Wcstmore-
land Manganese Co., 134 F. Supp. 898, 949 (E.D. Ark. 1955), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 3155 U.S.
890 (1957).
424. In re Marvin's, Inc., 51-2 U.S. Tax Cas. J 9423 (N.D. Tex. 1950). One question-
able decision preferred junior liens on real estate and left the Government to its lien on
unencumbered personalty, although the effect, because of the subordination of non-
possessory liens on personalty to administration expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (19641), was
that the prior federal claim was not fully satisfied. In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110
F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (bankruptcy). Marshaling is never properly applied If It
prejudices the senior lienor. 55 C.J.S. Marshaling Assets and Securities § 4 (1948).
425. Kovacs v. United States, 355 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 1U.S. 911
(1966) (in which the equities were such that the concurring judge declared, "I concur In
the foregoing simply because I think my oath requires me to do so." 355 F.2d at 352);
United States v. Herman, 310 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Stutsman
County Implement Co., 274 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Cohen, 271 F. Supp.
709 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Kelley Kar Co. v. United States; 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9481 (S.D. Cal.
1956); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Vine-Wood Realty Co., 414 Pa. 263, 199 A.2d 4,19 (1961).
426. Cf. Stowe v. Powers, 19 Wyo. 291, 304-05, 116 P. 576, 580 (1911).
427. Cf. Womans Hospital v. Sixty-Seventh St. Realty Co., 265 N.Y. 226, 192 N.E. 302
(1934). There is a close relationship between marshaling (wchich prevents injustice, but Is
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A junior lienor or subsequent purchaser of the taxpayer's property
might improve his position if he were permitted to contest the merits
of the tax on which the prior federal tax lien is based. We have seen
that the taxpayer himself, when the Government seeks a judicial fore-
closure of a lien on his property, may raise the merits of the tax as a
defense,29 and the outcome, of course, will inure to the benefit of
those with junior interests. Even if the taxpayer has no equity in the
particular property, he may be induced to contest the tax by the pros-
pect of a personal judgment which would preclude his later litigating
the issues in another forum where he may have more at stake."A If that
inducement is ineffective (because the taxpayer is propertyless, or has
absconded, or is simply unwilling for personal reasons to place his tax
in issue), the courts hold that the third party cannot raise the issue, but
must be content with the subordinate position which he voluntarily
or inadvertently accepted when he acquired his interest."3
It has been suggested that this may be the only feasible rule .4 32 It is
said that otherwise the Government might have to litigate the merits
in a number of suits involving adverse claimants to different properties,
who were not parties to the earlier suits and were not bound by them.
But that would be so only if the taxpayer was not personally served in
the earlier case, because a personal judgment against him (whether or
not he put the merits in issue) would bind those claiming through
not an absolute right) and subrogation (which remedies the injustice when it has oc-
curred). See Broadway Natl Bank v. Hayward, 285 Mass. 459, 189 N.E. 199 (1934). See
also Note, 35 A.L.L 1307 (1925). Subrogation to the Government's tMx claim (but not to
its summary remedies) is not unheard of, I.T. 1859, H1-2 Cum. Bum.. 228 (1923). although
it has never been decided whether such subrogation carries with it the Government's
Hen rights. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, 24 F.2d 836 (E.D.S.C. 1928);
cf. In re Neely, 10 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). No reason is apparent why it could not
(at least if the merits of the tax are excluded from consideration in any controversy
between the subrogated party and rival claimants to the other property, as discussed at
pp. 1183-84 infra).
428. Cf. White Co. v. Hammond Stage Lines, 180 La. 962, 974, 158 So. 353, 357 (1934);
James Stewart & Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 291 Mass. 534, 556, 196 N.E. 169, 180
(1935); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 39 Ohio App. 298, 177 N.E. 486 (1931).
429. P. 1147 9& note 218 supra.
430. See p. 1148 F, note 221 supra.
431. Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'g 169 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Graham v. United States, 243 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Pear-
son, 258 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Rutledge v. Riddell, 186 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Cal.
1960). Although one premise of the Second Circuit's aflirmance of Pipola, namely, that
the taxpayer himself could not defend on the merits, was overruled in United States v.
O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1961), the actual holding was not impaired. See Falik
v. United States, 343 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1965); Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. 718, 721
(ED. Pa. 1964), af'd per curiam, 341 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1965). See also note 442 infra.
432. See 84 A.BA RE. 677 (1959), which considered the problem but made no rccom-
mendation. In Pipola v. Chicco, 169 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). afl'd, 274 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1960), the district court asserted that the contrary rule "would make a shambles
of the provisions of the Act intended to enforce collection of taxes due from taxpayers."
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him.433 It is also said that third parties are ordinarily not in a position
to litigate the taxpayer's liability effectively, since they would require
access to information normally kept confidential. 43 4 But means exist
whereby third parties can obtain such information for use in litigation
in proper cases, 435 and it may be appropriate to require the taxpayer
to make such disclosure in order that the title he had purported to sell
may be defended or that his assets available for creditors may not be
depleted by his inaction. Although the defense may be less effective
than if the taxpayer had voluntarily elected to make it, that seems an
insufficient reason to deny the third party the right to try. Therefore,
consideration might be given to letting adversely affected third parties
contest the merits of the tax, at least in cases initiated by the Govern-
ment in which the taxpayer is a party and will be concluded by the
judgment.436
When a tax is collected by levy, or by an in rem proceeding which
does not result in a personal judgment against the taxpayer, he remains
free to recover the proceeds later by claim for refund. It would not
seem appropriate to permit those whose junior interests were extin.
guished by the levy or decree to initiate such a refund claim, unless
some procedure could be devised by which duplication would be pre-
vented and the taxpayer could be bound.437 But if the taxpayer does
establish his right to a refund, equity requires that the money should
not become general assets of his estate but should be held as a con-
433. United States v. Lake City Malleable, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 241, 244-45 (N.D. Ohio
1966); United States v. McGuire, 42 F. Supp. 337, 339 .N.J. 1941).
434. See INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 6103(a), 7213(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6103(a)-i (1965); cf. Cooper v. Halgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
435. Treas. Reg. § 301.9000-1 (1967); United States cx rel. Carthan v. Sheriff, 330 F.2d
100 (2d Cir. 1964); Rhodes v. Edwards, 178 Neb. 757, 135 N.W.2d 453, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 943 (1965).
436. The question then arises whether persons who are not parties to tle litigation,
but whose junior interests in other property would be adversely affected by the judgment
(see authorities cited note 433 supra), should be permitted to intervene. Practical and
equitable considerations must be balanced.
437. See Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 1942). The Second Circuit,
in Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1960), suggested that the purchaser, when
his junior interest was extinguished by the tax lien, might have standing to ste for
refund. But the cases cited for the point, United States v. Halton Tractor Co., 258 F.2d
612 (9th Cir. 1958), and Bladine v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, 63 F.2d 317 (8th Cir,
1933), involved collections in violation of the plaintiffs' priorities, not the merits of the
tax. Perhaps closer in point is Stahmann v. Vidal, 305 U.S. 61, 66 (1938), where tht
merits of the tax were permitted to be questioned by one from whom it had been col-
lected, but who the Government asserted was not the statutory "taxpayer." The Court
said, "Whether or not the tax was imposed upon the petitioners, they are, according to
the accepted principles, entitled to recover unless they were volunteers, which they plainly
were not because they paid the tax under duress of goods." 305 U.S. at 66. It would cause
great confusion, however, if each person whose junior interest in the taxpayer's property
was extinguished by a senior federal lien were permitted, as an involuntary payor pro
tanto, to proceed independently to contest the merits by claim and suit for refund.
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structive trust subject to the junior liens and interests of third parties
which were extinguished by the levy or decree.4 s8 A procedure should
be adopted by which such parties, without involving the Government
in any controversy they may have with the taxpayer, could cause a trust
to be impressed on the fund before it is paid over to the taxpayer.A4
438. See Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 169 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Pa.
1958), re'd, 268 F-2d 65 (3d Cir-. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 82. (1959); 179 F. Supp. 578
.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d -320 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, S64 U.S. 520
(1960). That plaintiff claimed ownership of a refund of taxes which the taxpayer bad
paid with funds alleged to have been frauduently obtained from plaintiff. Although the
district court found that the refund would be subject to a constructive trust in the tax-
payer's hands and "at least to an equitable lien" while in the tax collector's bands, the
ultimate decision was that there was no jurisdiction to restrain him from paying over
to the taxpayer. Houston v. Ormes, 252 US. 469 (1920), which permitted comparable
restraint of a federal officer, was distinguished as peculiar to situations in which personal
jurisdiction of the officer and of the principal claimant (here the taxpa)er) could be
obtained in the District of Columbia. In Big Farm Tire Co. v. Boland, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9700 (E.D. Va. 1960), where the taxpayer was contesting the merits of a jeopardy assess-
ment in the Tax Court concurrently with a suit in which the Goverment was adjudged
to have a prior lien on a certain note, the district court held in abeyance the disburse-
ment of the note proceeds to the tax collector to await the outcome in the Tax Court,
thereby protecting the junior lienor's interest in the fund in the event the tax should
not be sustained.
439. The Special Committee on Federal Liens considered, but did not act upon, a
proposal by which the District Director could pay the refund into court and interplead
the claimants. The draft, which would add a new Section 6408 to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, read as follows:
If the claim of any person having a lien upon or other interest in property of the
taxpayer is unsatisfied, either in whole or in part, by reason of the United States
having a prior lien upon such property under this title (or by reason of such person
having made a payment for discharge of property from such prior lien of the United
States), such person shall have a lien upon the right of the taxpa)er (subject to the
provisions of section 6402(a)) to a refund of any overpayment of the tax with respect
to which the prior lien of the United States was imposed. The lien of such person
upon such rights to refund shall have the same priority which his lien or interest
had in the property from which the lien of the United States was satisfied. If the
tax was satisfied from two or more properties, upon or in which different persons
had liens or interests, the refund shall be equitably apportioned among such
persons. This section shall impose no obligation upon the Secretary or his delegate
to pay a refund to any person other than the taxpayer, unless at least 60 days before
such refund is made such other person actually delivered to the District Director of
Internal Revenue to whom (or to whose predecessor in office) the tax was paid a
written notice of his claim of lien. If any such notices have been delivered, as pro-
vided herein, the refund shall not be paid to the taxpayer but shall be paid into the
court in which a suit for such refund is pending, or (if no suit is pending) into the
district court of the United States for the district in which is located the office of
the District Director of Internal Revenue by whom the refund is to be made; and
the taxpayer and all persons who have duly delivered such notices shall be inter-
pleaded. This section shall confer no right of action upon any person against the
United States; nor shall it confer any right of action against any officer or employee
thereof, in the event that the refund is mistakenly paid over to the taxpayer, unless
such action is willful and intentional.
A helpful analogy may be found in H.R. 6442, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), which was
sponsored by the Treasury as a means of relieving it of having to participate in litigation
between adverse claimants in the limited circumstances where claims against the United
States may be assigned or subjected to equitable liens. It would have required the person
asserting an assignment or lien to bring suit against the principal claimant and to obtain
an order restraining the latter from receiving the payment, which order would be served
on the United States (which would not be made a party to the suit). See Hearings on
H.R. 6642 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d
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A junior lienor who brings suit to foreclose his own lien has the
same right as a senior lienor to join the United States as a party de-
fendant,440 although there may be little point in it (unless priorities
are in dispute),441 since he cannot thereby obtain an adjudication of
the merits of the tax and thus affect the amount of the prior lien,
442
Whether or not the United States is joined, a senior federal lien (filed
before the proceeding) cannot, without the Government's consent,4 43
be discharged from the property by a judicial sale,4 4 even if state law
would discharge such liens. 45 However, if a junior creditor brings suit
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor, and the Govern-
ment fails to intervene, it has been held that the senior federal tax lien
does not attach to the property recovered.
440
Sess. (1942). In a pending case, in which a preliminary issue was disposed of in Hughes 8.
Co. v. United Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9280 (6th Cir. 1968), a
judgment creditor of the taxpayer had obtained from the district court an order restraining
the District Director from paying over to the taxpayer any tax refund which might be
determined to be due. The District Director complied by paying the refund into court, and
it is the taxpayer who is raising the sovereign immunity issue.
440. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964). See pp. 1169-70 supra.
441. In unusual circumstances, joinder of the United States may even be prejudicial,
since unknown federal liens which are superior to the plaintiff's lien even though not
filed before the proceeding will be extinguished if the United States is not joined. INT.
REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(a), but will apparently survive if it is joined. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2410(b)-(c) (1964). Amendment should be considered, as discussed in a related connec-
tion, p. 1170 supra.
442. P. 1183 supra. The House version of the bill which became the antecedent of
28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964) would have permitted only senior lienors to join the United
States, but the Senate extended that right to junior lienors, sayng, "The Government
ought not to desire to occupy a dog-in-the-manger position with respect to its liens,
neither taking steps to enforce them nor permitting others interested to test their validity
and priority." S. Ry. No. 351, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). The conferees, accepting the
Senate view on this point, noted that "[cjases may often arise where a junior lien holder
needs to be informed as to the validity, amount, etc. of a prior lien," H.R. RF. No,
2722, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1931), which might support the view that he is not limited
to disputing the priority of the liens. But it is the procedural validity of the prior lien,
not the merits of the tax on which it is based, that he may question. See Falik v. United
States, 343 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1965), citing Note, Conclusiveness of the Merits of a Tax
Assessment and the Congressional Policy of Summary Tax Collection, 71 YA=Z LJ. 1329,
133741 (1962).
443. The Government may consent to sale free of its senior lien, whether It is joined,
28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964), or not. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6425(b)(2).
444. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1964) (U.S. a party); INT. Rav. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(a)(1)
(U.S. not a party).
445. United States v. Peterson, 204 F. Supp. 683 (ED. Pa. 1962). The court "recogtlzetd]
that this result may shock real estate lawyers and title searchers steeped in the old and
firmly established principle of Pennsylvania law that a judicial sale divests real emtate
of all other liens on it except those preserved by statute," but it regarded the contrary
result as "even more shocking." 204 F. Supp. at 685. No change in this regard Is recom-
mended.
446. In In re Swan-Finch Oil Corp., 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9718 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), it wag
held that, under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the transfer is not set aside
completely but only to the extent of the creditor's claim, and the transfer remains valid
against the debtor and others daiming through him. A like result was reached, even
though the Government had intervened, in United States v. Fidelity & Deposit Co,, 214
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1954), on the ground that state law gave the junior creditor a lien on
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A nonjudicial sale, or a sale under confession of judgment, cannot
discharge a duly filed senior federal tax lien on the property sold, even
if the junior lienor complies with the new requirements for giving no-
tice to the tax collector.447 Therefore, the sale will be made subject to
and without disturbing the senior federal lien, 18 and the purchaser, of
course, will discount the price accordingly. Yet it has been held that the
proceeds of the sale, although reflecting only the net value of the junior
lienor's interest, become the property of the taxpayer and are subject to
valid liens, of which the senior federal lien must be first satisfied.42
That inequity should be corrected by Congress.3"
We have seen that when a senior nonfederal lien on real estate is
foreclosed by judicial or nonjudicial sale, the United States as a junior
lienor has a right of redemption.451 Under some state laws, when a
junior lienor has redeemed, the property may in turn be redeemed
from him by those with liens junior to his.452 The federal law fails to
the property from the time he instituted suit, whereas the earlier tax lien could not
attach to the property which had been transferred before it arose. But cf. United States
v. Texoma Drilling Co., 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9818 (N.D. Tex. 1962), in which the federal
tax lien and judgment liens of the plaintiffs were awarded priority in the recovered
property in the order in which they had arisen, subsequent to the transfer.
447. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.4-1(b)(1) T.D. 6944, 1968 Iz-r. REv. BuLi. No. 8, at 34.
Section 7425(b) of the statute is open to the construction that even a senior federal tax
lien may be discharged, subject to the Government's right to the proceeds, if due notice
of such a sale is given and if state law (e.g., the Pennsylvania law involved, before the
1966 Act, in United States v. Peterson, 204 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1962)) has that effect
on senior liens. See PLUMM & WRIGHT 236-37. The Treasury thinks otherwise, however,
and until it is successfully challenged the statement of rule (c) at page 298 of the First
Installment must be qualified accordingly. Apparently the Treasury would also question
rule (a) and note 431, so far as it is stated that a federal tax lien which is not filed more
than 30 days before the sale but which is senior in priority to the lien being enforced
by sale (eg., a landlord's lien or a state non-property tax lien) may be discharged by the
sale. The purchaser at the sale may enjoy the more limited protection of § 6523(a) it the
federal tax lien remains unified until he has perfected his rights as against subsequent
purchasers without actual notice. § 6322(h)(6). But he may be entrapped if he relies on
the 50 days of grace provided in § 7425(b).
448. INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 7425(b)(1).
449. Harris Equip. & Serv. Co. v. Samson Trailer Mfg. Corp., 190 A.2d 212 (NJ. Dist.
Ct. 1963), relying on United States v. Blackett, 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) (in whIch the
result was similar but the present question does not appear to have been placed in issue).
See PLUmm & "triHT 237.
450. The "dog-in-the-manger" quotation, supra note 442, is pertinent here. Although,
when the shoe is on the other foot, the Government acknowledges no obligation to facili-
tate a senior lienor's pursuit of chattels which the tax collector has sold subject to prior
Hens (see note 339 supra), it successfully argued in Harris Equip. & Serv. Co. v. Samson
Trailer Mfg. Corp., 190 A.2d 212 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1963), that it should not "be compelled
to pursue chattels which are mobile and very difficult of identification, into the hands
of others who choose to purchase them at an execution sale." That does not, however,
justify taking the net proceeds of the junior lienor's sale where the Government can in
fact trace the property and is as well able to enforce its lien as before. At most, where
the sale does make tracing difficult or impossible, the problem might be shifted to the
junior lienor, with rights of subrogation to the Government's lien.
451. Pp. 1174-80 supra.
452. 4 AzmarwN Lu'w or PopE=r" § 16.177 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
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make clear whether, in such a state, the holder of a lien junior to a tax
lien is permitted to redeem from the United States.
453
A person having a junior interest other than a lien or mortgage is
unlikely to derive much benefit from the Government's consent to be
named a defendant, unless he can frame his action as one to quiet title.
The consent is strictly limited to quiet title suits, foreclosures of liens
and mortgages, partition and condemnation suits, and actions of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader. 45 4 Thus, it has been held that
the United States may not be joined in a suit for specific performance,
brought by a contract purchaser of real estate, in which the plaintiff
seeks an adjudication of all liens and an order for distribution of the
tendered payment to those entitled.4 5 The American Bar Association
vainly urged that the consent be broadened to embrace any action
"involving the determination of rights in or liens upon any real or
personal property or any obligation" (including, among others, an
action to subject a decedent's real estate to the payment of debts).45 0 It
is not just in the types of cases enumerated in the statute that the
Government, as a Senate committee said 38 years ago, "ought not to
desire to occupy a dog-in-the-manger position with respect to its liens,




The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was a major first step toward
453. With respect to nonjudicial sales discharging tax liens, INT. lrv. Coan of 1954,
§ 7425(d)(3)(C) provides that redemption gives the United States "all the rights, title and
interest in and to such property acquired by the person from whom the United States
redeems such property by virtue of the sale of such property." Inferentially, if the senior
lienor's interest was subject to redemption by lienors junior to the federal lien, the
interest acquired by the United States is also. But the law is silent where the sale was
a judicial sale. In United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 864 U.S. 801, 309
(1960), the Government acknowledged that the owner, at least, might in turn redeem
from the United States pursuant to state law.
454. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1964). All but the first two were added by the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966.
455. Shaw v. Rippel, 224 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Ill. 1963). Perhaps the portion of the re-
quested relief which affected the United States could be construed as a plea for inter.
pleader, to which consent has now been given. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(5) (1964). An action
to declare a forfeiture of property under state law is another to which the Goverment's
consent does not extend. That defect in the law would be no impediment to such actions
if, as was held under prior law, federal liens could thereby be extinguished irrespective
of the Government's participation in the action. United States v. Bleasby, 257 F.2d 278
(3d Cir. 1958). But the 1966 legislation, INT. R1v. CODE Of 1954, § 7425(a), seems to allow
the Government to prevent extinguishment without joinder in cases in which jolnder
is impermissible, by filing a claim before the distribution of proceeds of a judicial sale
of property.
456. 84 A.B.A. REP. 736-37, 740 (1959).
457. S. REP. No. 351, supra note 442.
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bringing equity and reason to a too long neglected area of the law.
Congress thereby demonstrated its receptiveness to reform of the law
of federal liens and priorities when the deficiencies of the law are made
dear. We may hope that a comparable showing in the areas herein con-
sidered may evoke a similarly sympathetic response.
Piecemeal attack on the problems, whenever sufficient interest is
aroused in particular areas, seems preferable to undertaking another
omnibus bill, attempting to "reform the world" of federal liens and
priorities at one stroke. Such an ambitious venture would, at the very
least, encounter years of delay while it was studied in depth, first by its
sponsors, then by the executive branch, and finally by Congress; and
it might well fall of its own weight, as the tax lien legislation very
nearly did.
The proposals herein are not represented as final solutions. I have
consciously gone beyond my depth in many specialized areas of the
law in an effort to lay the groundwork for further study and discussion
and ultimately for more concrete recommendations by scholars and
practical lawyers skilled in those areas, working with those in and out
of government who are familiar with the difficulties faced by the tax
collector.
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